Summary
An OS command injection vulnerability in Cisco RV110W/RV130/RV130W router firmware allows arbitrary commands to be executed with root privileges via a mis-sanitized configuration parameter.
When an authenticated remote attacker can supply crafted values to the lan_ipv6_prefixlen setting, they may trigger execution of system-level commands on the device, leading to full compromise.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in the web-based management interface of Cisco RV110W/RV130/RV130W small business routers running affected firmware versions.
It is exposed when the lan_ipv6_prefixlen configuration parameter is processed by backend code without adequate validation or sanitization before being incorporated into shell-level operations.
The issue is relevant in environments where remote web administration is enabled and reachable to authenticated users, whether over the local network or via VPN/remote access.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Router web management interface (HTTP/HTTPS).
- Required access: Valid authenticated session with sufficient rights to change LAN IPv6 configuration parameters.
- Trigger point: Submission or update of the
lan_ipv6_prefixlenconfiguration value, which is then processed by thercbinary'ssub_34984()function. - Why exploitation is possible: User-supplied data is concatenated or embedded into shell commands without proper escaping, validation, or separation between data and executable logic, enabling injection of arbitrary command sequences.
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a classic command injection pattern where application logic assembles shell commands using untrusted, user-controlled input.
In the affected sub_34984() function of the rc binary, the lan_ipv6_prefixlen parameter is taken from configuration data and passed into an OS command context without sufficient validation, length checks, or character restrictions.
This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, in which metacharacters, separators, or command fragments from user input are interpreted by the shell as additional commands rather than benign data.
Potential impact
- Router compromise, allowing execution of arbitrary commands as root.
- Modification of network configuration, firewall policies, or routing behavior.
- Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the device.
- Interception or manipulation of traffic traversing the router.
- Use of the router as a pivot point for attacks against internal network hosts.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on breaking the linkage between user-provided configuration data and direct shell command execution.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding shell invocation entirely for configuration operations; use dedicated system APIs or libraries that treat parameters as data, not commands.
- Enforcing strict validation of configuration inputs, especially numeric fields like prefix lengths, with clear bounds and type checks.
- Rejecting or sanitizing special shell metacharacters, control characters, and unexpected tokens in all user-controlled strings.
- Running management components with least privileges and minimizing the number of code paths that can invoke system-level commands.
- Applying a secure-by-default posture in router configuration, limiting remote management exposure and requiring strong authentication for administrative access.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection generally involves a combination of code-level and behavioral techniques:
- Static analysis rules targeting potentially dangerous command execution APIs (e.g., system(), popen(), execve()) where user input flows into command strings.
- Code review checks for string concatenation or formatting operations that mix configuration parameters with shell commands, especially in router management utilities.
- Security testing and fuzzing of web administration interfaces with crafted inputs to identify where untrusted data reaches OS command interpreters.
- Policy-based enforcement in development pipelines requiring input validation for configuration parameters and banning direct shell calls in sensitive components.
- Runtime monitoring or logging on network devices, where feasible, to detect anomalous command executions initiated via the management interface.

