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CVE-2026-24697

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in Cisco Small Routers

CVE-2026-24697

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution with Root Privileges

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

An OS command injection flaw in Cisco RV130/RV130W and RV110W routers allows arbitrary commands to be executed through the start_bonjour() function of the rc binary.

When an authenticated attacker controls the wan_hostname configuration parameter, they can inject shell commands that run with root privileges on the device.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in the management plane of Cisco RV130/RV130W and RV110W small business routers when processing the wan_hostname configuration value.

It is relevant in deployments where:

  • Web-based or API configuration interfaces are exposed to authenticated users over the network
  • Router firmware versions include the vulnerable rc binary and start_bonjour() implementation
  • User-supplied hostname values are incorporated into shell-level operations without robust sanitization

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remote management interface (web UI or equivalent configuration channel)
  • Required access: Valid authenticated access capable of setting or modifying the wan_hostname parameter
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the start_bonjour() function in the rc binary after the malicious hostname is saved and processed
  • Why exploitation is possible: The wan_hostname value is concatenated into shell commands without sufficient validation or escaping, enabling command injection.

Why this happens

The underlying bug class is OS command injection (CWE-78), where untrusted input is embedded into system shell commands.

In this case, the start_bonjour() function in the rc binary uses the wan_hostname configuration value directly in command-line construction, likely via shell or system utilities, without strict filtering or argument separation.

This insecure pattern treats a user-controlled string as part of an executable command, allowing attackers to append additional shell metacharacters and commands that the router executes with root privileges.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary OS commands as root on the router.
  • The device configuration could be altered, backdoors installed, or services disabled.
  • Network traffic could be monitored, redirected, or manipulated from the compromised router.
  • The router could be enlisted into botnets or used as a pivot point for further attacks inside the network.
  • Logs and security settings can be tampered with to hide malicious activity.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating the ability for user-controlled data to influence shell command structure.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Avoiding direct shell invocation for configuration tasks and using library APIs or system calls with explicit argument separation.
  • Strictly validating and normalizing hostname input against a well-defined whitelist of allowed characters and length.
  • Applying output encoding or safe argument passing mechanisms that prevent shell metacharacters from being interpreted.
  • Running management-plane processes with the least privileges practical so that, if a command injection occurs, impact is constrained.
  • Designing configuration flows so that user-supplied values are never concatenated into command strings without rigorous checks.

How teams detect issues like this

High-level detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag calls where user-input variables are passed into shell-building functions (e.g., system, popen, backticks) without sanitization.
  • Code review practices that require explicit justification and validation for any use of shell commands in configuration handling logic.
  • Secure coding policies that prohibit constructing command strings from configuration parameters, enforced via automated linting or SAST tools.
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual command patterns or unexpected processes spawned by router management components, where feasible.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/glkfc/IoT-Vulnerability/blob/main/cisco/RV130/2/wp-en.md

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation is limited to contexts where an attacker can authenticate to the router's management interface and modify the wan_hostname parameter. It is not typically exploitable by unauthenticated external users.

The attacker must have valid credentials or otherwise gain authenticated access that permits changing configuration values, specifically the WAN hostname, through the router's management interface.

The safest pattern is to remove shell-based command construction for configuration operations, use system APIs with properly separated arguments, and strictly validate the hostname input against an allowed character set before use.

Preventing similar vulnerabilities requires adopting secure coding standards that forbid embedding user input into shell commands, enforcing input validation for all configuration parameters, and using automated static analysis and code reviews to catch command injection patterns early in development.

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