Summary
The WebSocket authentication interface processes an unlimited number of authentication attempts without effective rate limiting or throttling.
Under high-volume abuse, this can enable denial-of-service by overwhelming the interface and suppressing or mis-routing legitimate charger telemetry, as well as brute-force attacks that may lead to unauthorized access.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects systems that expose a WebSocket-based API for authentication and telemetry exchange, particularly in environments where chargers or similar devices continuously report status data.
It is most relevant when:
- The WebSocket endpoint is reachable from untrusted networks (e.g., the public internet or partner networks).
- Authentication is handled over the same WebSocket channel that carries telemetry or operational messages.
- There is no effective rate limit, lockout, or backoff mechanism on authentication attempts per client, account, or IP.
In such deployments, attackers can abuse the lack of limits to generate excessive authentication traffic that competes with or disrupts legitimate charger telemetry and to systematically try large numbers of credentials.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The exposed WebSocket authentication endpoint, reachable over the network.
- Required access: Network-level ability to connect to the WebSocket server (no prior authentication needed); attacker does not need valid credentials.
- Trigger point: Sending a large volume of authentication requests (for DoS) or repeated guesses for usernames/passwords, tokens, or session identifiers (for brute force).
- Why exploitation is possible:
- The server does not enforce per-client, per-identity, or global rate limits on authentication attempts.
- There are no meaningful lockout, exponential backoff, or proof-of-work mechanisms to slow abusive clients.
- Telemetry and control messages share limited processing capacity or channels with authentication traffic, allowing malicious traffic to degrade or delay legitimate charger messages.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts as described by CWE-307.
The WebSocket API accepts authentication requests in an unbounded or weakly bounded manner, treating every incoming attempt as equally eligible for processing without accounting for abuse scenarios.
This design assumes that authentication attempts are relatively infrequent and honest, rather than treating them as a contested resource subject to adversarial behavior.
As a result, an attacker can automate rapid-fire authentication requests, consuming processing resources, saturating message pipelines, and systematically probing credentials without triggering protective responses.
Potential impact
- Attackers may cause partial or complete denial-of-service for charger telemetry by flooding the WebSocket authentication interface.
- Legitimate telemetry messages can be delayed, dropped, or mis-routed under high load, impacting monitoring, billing, or control functions.
- Brute-force attempts against user or device credentials may eventually succeed, leading to unauthorized access to charger controls or associated management interfaces.
- Compromised accounts or sessions could allow manipulation of charging sessions, configuration changes, or access to sensitive operational data.
- Sustained DoS conditions may degrade overall system reliability, potentially affecting service-level agreements and safety-related monitoring.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on controlling authentication attempt volume and reducing the value of brute-force guessing:
- Introduce per-IP, per-account, and per-connection rate limits on authentication attempts, tuned to realistic user and device behavior.
- Apply incremental penalties such as exponential backoff, temporary account cooldowns, or connection slowdowns after repeated failed attempts.
- Separate critical telemetry channels from authentication processing paths where feasible, so authentication abuse cannot easily starve telemetry.
- Use strong authentication mechanisms (e.g., long random tokens, mutual TLS, or hardware-bound credentials) to make brute-force guessing impractical.
- Log and monitor abnormal authentication patterns, enabling operational decisions such as upstream blocking or traffic shaping.
- Design authentication flows with secure defaults—limited retries, conservative failure handling, and graceful rejection of obviously abusive patterns.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify and monitor this class of weakness using several complementary approaches:
- Architectural and code review: Examine WebSocket handlers and authentication services to confirm explicit rate-limiting logic, backoff mechanisms, and account lockout policies are present and enforced.
- Static analysis and linting: Define patterns to flag authentication endpoints or WebSocket routes that lack middleware, filters, or guards for rate limiting and abuse detection.
- Configuration and policy checks: Verify that API gateways, load balancers, or Web Application Firewalls are configured with authentication-specific throttling rules for WebSocket traffic.
- Operational monitoring: Track metrics such as failed authentication counts per source, authentication requests per second, error rates, and telemetry latency to detect anomalous spikes indicative of brute-force or DoS attacks.
- Security testing: Conduct controlled rate and brute-force simulations in a staging environment to validate that protective mechanisms trigger appropriately and that telemetry remains resilient under stress.

