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CVE-2026-24696

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Rate Limiting in WebSocket Authentication Interface

CVE-2026-24696

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Rate Limiting

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Denial-of-Service and Unauthorized Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The WebSocket authentication interface processes an unlimited number of authentication attempts without effective rate limiting or throttling.

Under high-volume abuse, this can enable denial-of-service by overwhelming the interface and suppressing or mis-routing legitimate charger telemetry, as well as brute-force attacks that may lead to unauthorized access.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects systems that expose a WebSocket-based API for authentication and telemetry exchange, particularly in environments where chargers or similar devices continuously report status data.

It is most relevant when:

  • The WebSocket endpoint is reachable from untrusted networks (e.g., the public internet or partner networks).
  • Authentication is handled over the same WebSocket channel that carries telemetry or operational messages.
  • There is no effective rate limit, lockout, or backoff mechanism on authentication attempts per client, account, or IP.

In such deployments, attackers can abuse the lack of limits to generate excessive authentication traffic that competes with or disrupts legitimate charger telemetry and to systematically try large numbers of credentials.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The exposed WebSocket authentication endpoint, reachable over the network.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to connect to the WebSocket server (no prior authentication needed); attacker does not need valid credentials.
  • Trigger point: Sending a large volume of authentication requests (for DoS) or repeated guesses for usernames/passwords, tokens, or session identifiers (for brute force).
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The server does not enforce per-client, per-identity, or global rate limits on authentication attempts.
  • There are no meaningful lockout, exponential backoff, or proof-of-work mechanisms to slow abusive clients.
  • Telemetry and control messages share limited processing capacity or channels with authentication traffic, allowing malicious traffic to degrade or delay legitimate charger messages.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts as described by CWE-307.

The WebSocket API accepts authentication requests in an unbounded or weakly bounded manner, treating every incoming attempt as equally eligible for processing without accounting for abuse scenarios.

This design assumes that authentication attempts are relatively infrequent and honest, rather than treating them as a contested resource subject to adversarial behavior.

As a result, an attacker can automate rapid-fire authentication requests, consuming processing resources, saturating message pipelines, and systematically probing credentials without triggering protective responses.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may cause partial or complete denial-of-service for charger telemetry by flooding the WebSocket authentication interface.
  • Legitimate telemetry messages can be delayed, dropped, or mis-routed under high load, impacting monitoring, billing, or control functions.
  • Brute-force attempts against user or device credentials may eventually succeed, leading to unauthorized access to charger controls or associated management interfaces.
  • Compromised accounts or sessions could allow manipulation of charging sessions, configuration changes, or access to sensitive operational data.
  • Sustained DoS conditions may degrade overall system reliability, potentially affecting service-level agreements and safety-related monitoring.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on controlling authentication attempt volume and reducing the value of brute-force guessing:

  • Introduce per-IP, per-account, and per-connection rate limits on authentication attempts, tuned to realistic user and device behavior.
  • Apply incremental penalties such as exponential backoff, temporary account cooldowns, or connection slowdowns after repeated failed attempts.
  • Separate critical telemetry channels from authentication processing paths where feasible, so authentication abuse cannot easily starve telemetry.
  • Use strong authentication mechanisms (e.g., long random tokens, mutual TLS, or hardware-bound credentials) to make brute-force guessing impractical.
  • Log and monitor abnormal authentication patterns, enabling operational decisions such as upstream blocking or traffic shaping.
  • Design authentication flows with secure defaults—limited retries, conservative failure handling, and graceful rejection of obviously abusive patterns.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify and monitor this class of weakness using several complementary approaches:

  • Architectural and code review: Examine WebSocket handlers and authentication services to confirm explicit rate-limiting logic, backoff mechanisms, and account lockout policies are present and enforced.
  • Static analysis and linting: Define patterns to flag authentication endpoints or WebSocket routes that lack middleware, filters, or guards for rate limiting and abuse detection.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Verify that API gateways, load balancers, or Web Application Firewalls are configured with authentication-specific throttling rules for WebSocket traffic.
  • Operational monitoring: Track metrics such as failed authentication counts per source, authentication requests per second, error rates, and telemetry latency to detect anomalous spikes indicative of brute-force or DoS attacks.
  • Security testing: Conduct controlled rate and brute-force simulations in a staging environment to validate that protective mechanisms trigger appropriately and that telemetry remains resilient under stress.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-062-08.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-062-08

Frequently asked

questions

This issue can often be exploited remotely by any party that can open WebSocket connections to the affected service.

No prior authentication is needed, which means it can be abused at scale if the endpoint is reachable from the internet or large partner networks.

The attacker only needs basic network connectivity to the WebSocket authentication endpoint.

They do not require valid credentials or special permissions; a scripted client capable of opening WebSocket connections and sending authentication frames is sufficient.

The most robust pattern is to enforce multi-layer rate limiting and abuse controls around authentication.

This includes server-side throttling per source and per identity, lockout or cooldown after repeated failures, and, where possible, separating authentication from latency-sensitive telemetry flows.

Treat authentication mechanisms as a high-risk resource in design reviews, with explicit non-functional requirements for rate limiting, resilience, and abuse detection.

Standardize middleware or gateway policies for authentication endpoints, integrate automated checks in CI/CD to flag endpoints without rate limits, and continuously monitor authentication metrics for anomalies.

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