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CVE-2026-24405

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Heap Buffer Overflow in iccDEV CIccMpeCalculator::Read()

CVE-2026-24405

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Heap Buffer Overflow

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-122

Impact:

Arbitrary Code Execution and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A heap buffer overflow in the CIccMpeCalculator::Read() function of iccDEV versions 2.3.1.1 and below can be triggered when user-controlled data is parsed as ICC profile content or similar structured binary blobs.

Under these conditions, an attacker could corrupt heap memory, potentially causing denial of service, data manipulation, logic bypass, or even arbitrary code execution within the consuming application.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects applications that embed or rely on the iccDEV library (≤ 2.3.1.1) to read or process ICC color profiles and related binary structures using CIccMpeCalculator::Read().

It becomes relevant when:

  • The application accepts externally supplied ICC profiles or profile-like binary inputs (e.g., from files, network streams, or embedded resources), and
  • These inputs are passed to the library without robust validation or size checks.

In such contexts, malformed or malicious profile data can drive the library into reading beyond allocated heap buffers.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any feature that loads or processes ICC profiles or structured binary blobs via iccDEV (e.g., image processing pipelines, print/color management tools, document viewers).
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence ICC profile data or other binary blobs processed by CIccMpeCalculator::Read() (file upload, document import, image asset ingestion, or network-delivered content).
  • Trigger point: Invocation of CIccMpeCalculator::Read() on attacker-controlled binary content, typically during profile parsing or color transformation setup.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parser trusts length/structure fields from the input, performing reads into heap-allocated buffers without sufficient bounds checking (CWE-20 + CWE-122), allowing heap memory to be overwritten.

Why this happens

The core issue is improper validation of externally influenced data used to drive memory operations within CIccMpeCalculator::Read().

The function appears to rely on size or count values embedded in the ICC profile data (or similar binary structures) without enforcing strict bounds relative to the allocated heap buffers.

This pattern aligns with:

  • CWE-122: Heap-Based Buffer Overflow, where dynamic memory is overwritten because read/write operations extend past the intended buffer size.
  • CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, as attacker-controlled fields are not rigorously checked before being used to determine buffer sizes or offsets.

When the parser accepts inconsistent or oversized metadata, it can read or write beyond the buffer boundary, corrupting the heap and enabling control over application behavior.

Potential impact

  • Application crash or termination, resulting in denial of service.
  • Heap corruption that may allow an attacker to control program flow under favorable conditions.
  • Manipulation or corruption of processed color profile data and associated rendering outputs.
  • Bypass of application logic tied to color management, profile selection, or validation.
  • Potential arbitrary code execution in the context of the application using iccDEV.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on hardening both the library usage patterns and the broader input-handling architecture:

  • Enforce strict validation of ICC profiles and binary blobs before they reach CIccMpeCalculator::Read(), including format checks, length constraints, and structural consistency.
  • Treat all externally supplied profile data as untrusted, regardless of file type or source, and apply layered validation at file ingestion boundaries.
  • Prefer parsing APIs and internal patterns that derive buffer sizes from trusted, internally computed constraints rather than directly from input-supplied length fields.
  • Apply defensive programming techniques such as explicit boundary checks on all reads/writes, graceful failure on inconsistencies, and robust error handling paths.
  • Run applications that process untrusted media in sandboxed or least-privileged contexts to limit the impact of potential exploitation.
  • Consider isolating complex binary parsing (such as ICC handling) into dedicated helper processes with constrained privileges and well-defined interfaces.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can approach detection from both code and runtime perspectives:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag direct or indirect use of unvalidated length/offset fields when allocating or indexing heap buffers in parsing code, especially within binary format readers.
  • Code review: Focus reviews on functions that parse ICC profiles or custom binary structures; look for loops and read operations controlled by input-derived sizes or counts without explicit bounds enforcement.
  • Fuzz testing: Apply coverage-guided fuzzing to ICC parsing paths and any code invoking CIccMpeCalculator::Read(), using malformed and boundary case profile files to uncover overflows and crashes.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use hardened allocators or memory sanitizers (e.g., ASan in testing builds) to detect heap overflows during QA, and monitor production for recurring crashes linked to profile parsing.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/commit/d22fc174866e2521f8a5f9393fab5be306329f62
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/479
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-2r5c-5w66-47vv

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if an application processes ICC profiles or similar binary data obtained over a network or from user-supplied content (such as uploaded images, documents, or media), an attacker can remotely deliver a crafted payload. If the library is only used on locally supplied, trusted content, the practical remote risk is reduced.

The attacker needs the ability to provide or influence ICC profile data or a structured binary blob that the application will process via iccDEV. This may be as simple as uploading or opening a crafted image or document, or causing the application to fetch remote media that embeds a malicious profile.

The safest pattern is to ensure strict bounds checking around all heap operations driven by parsed metadata, reject malformed or inconsistent profile data early, and centralize validation logic so that no code path can bypass it. Parsing should never trust size or index values from inputs without validating them against known limits and buffer capacities.

Future prevention relies on designing binary parsers with a defensive mindset: treat all external data as untrusted, implement clear invariants and schema validation, enforce conservative limits on sizes and counts, and maintain comprehensive fuzzing and static analysis coverage for all parsing components. Adopting secure coding guidelines for memory management and regularly reviewing high-risk parsing code further reduces recurrence.

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