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CVE-2026-24404

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Memory Safety / Undefined Behavior in iccDEV ICC XML Array

CVE-2026-24404

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Memory Safety / Undefined Behavior

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-476, CWE-690, CWE-758

Impact:

Denial of Service and Potential Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

iccDEV versions 2.3.1.1 and earlier contain a flaw in CIccXmlArrayType() where user-controllable data is unsafely incorporated into ICC profile structures, leading to null pointer dereferences and undefined behavior.

When an application processes attacker-influenced ICC profiles or similar binary blobs through these libraries, this can result in denial of service, data manipulation, logic bypass, and in some cases arbitrary code execution.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in applications that embed or rely on iccDEV up to version 2.3.1.1 for parsing, manipulating, or applying ICC color profiles or related structured binary formats.

The risk is highest when ICC profile data, XML-derived arrays, or other binary blobs can be influenced by untrusted or semi-trusted sources (e.g., user-uploaded images, documents, or external color profiles) and are passed into CIccXmlArrayType() without strict validation.

Environments that batch-process large volumes of media or run color management as part of server-side workflows may be particularly exposed to denial of service and memory safety issues.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any code path where iccDEV processes ICC profiles or structured binary blobs derived from user-controlled or externally sourced data.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or modify ICC profile data or associated XML/array fields (e.g., via uploaded files, embedded image profiles, or configuration assets).
  • Trigger point: The moment the application calls CIccXmlArrayType() (or dependent routines) on malformed or crafted profile data, causing internal pointers to become null or otherwise invalid.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Input is not sufficiently validated against expected structure, sizes, and constraints before being mapped into internal array and pointer structures, allowing null pointer dereferences and undefined behavior in low-level memory operations.

Why this happens

The core issue stems from insufficient validation and defensive handling of external data before it is converted into internal pointer-based structures.

CIccXmlArrayType() appears to assume that incoming profile data and XML-derived arrays conform to expected formats and contain valid references, failing to robustly check allocation results, indexes, and the presence of required objects.

This leads to CWE-476 (Null Pointer Dereference) and CWE-690 (Unchecked Return Value leading to Null Dereference) patterns, where pointers are dereferenced without confirming they are non-null.

Combined with CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) and CWE-758 (Reliance on Undefined Behavior), crafted inputs can push the library into undefined states, where the compiler and runtime no longer guarantee safety, opening the door to denial of service and potential code execution depending on compilation flags, optimizations, and surrounding memory layout.

Potential impact

  • Application crash and denial of service when malformed ICC data is processed.
  • Corruption or manipulation of color profile data in memory, potentially leading to incorrect rendering or downstream processing errors.
  • Bypass of application logic that assumes successful, trustworthy parsing of ICC profiles or color metadata.
  • Under certain build and platform conditions, escalation to arbitrary code execution due to exploitation of undefined behavior and corrupted control or data structures.
  • Degradation of availability in media processing pipelines or rendering services that handle untrusted images or documents at scale.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening input validation and hardening memory handling around ICC profile parsing:

  • Introduce strict structural validation for ICC profiles and associated XML/array data before they are mapped into internal structures, including bounds checks, field presence checks, and type validation.
  • Treat all externally sourced ICC data as untrusted, enforcing format constraints and rejecting any profiles that deviate from specifications instead of attempting to be lenient.
  • Ensure that all dynamic allocations and lookups associated with CIccXmlArrayType()-like functionality verify success and propagate errors rather than continuing with null or partially initialized pointers.
  • Adopt defensive programming patterns: explicit null checks, early returns on error, and clear ownership semantics for allocated buffers and objects.
  • Run color management code with least-privilege and, where feasible, within sandboxed processes or containers so that a crash or compromise is isolated from the broader application.
  • Prefer safe-by-default APIs and data abstractions (e.g., container classes that track lengths, higher-level profile objects) over raw pointer arithmetic and manual memory management for parsing complex formats.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Use static analysis tools configured with rules for null pointer dereference, unchecked allocation, and improper input validation, specifically targeting parsing routines and functions resembling CIccXmlArrayType().
  • During code review, flag areas where untrusted binary blobs or ICC profiles are parsed and converted into arrays, especially where pointer fields are assumed to be valid without checks or where error paths are incomplete.
  • Incorporate fuzz testing for ICC profile parsing and XML/array handling components to uncover crashes and undefined behavior driven by malformed inputs.
  • Monitor production systems for repeated crashes or abnormal terminations when handling certain image or document types, and feed offending samples back into a dedicated fuzzing and analysis pipeline.
  • Enforce secure coding guidelines around handling complex binary formats, supported by automated linters or CI policies that highlight risky memory patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/commit/cd637eb33f0c8055fa54d8776e00555d3d39ef0c
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/488
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-hqfg-45jp-hp9f

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if an application exposes ICC profile processing to remote users, for example by accepting uploaded images or documents that are automatically processed with iccDEV. In such cases, a remote attacker may trigger denial of service and, under specific conditions, attempt to leverage undefined behavior for code execution.

The attacker needs the ability to influence or supply ICC profile data or similar binary blobs that the application will pass to iccDEV. This might be through file uploads, content ingestion pipelines, or any mechanism that allows embedding custom color profiles into processed content.

The safest approach is to strengthen input validation and defensive memory handling in the parsing code: rigorously validate ICC structures before use, check all allocations and lookups for failure, and avoid dereferencing pointers that have not been explicitly verified. In addition, isolating parsing logic in a sandboxed, low-privilege component can limit the blast radius of any residual issues.

Prevention relies on adopting secure coding practices for binary format parsers: design parsers as fail-closed, invest in fuzz testing, use static analysis tuned for memory and null-dereference issues, and avoid reliance on undefined behavior. Establishing internal guidelines and automated checks around pointer safety, error handling, and input trust boundaries helps catch these patterns early in development.

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