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CVE-2026-24403

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Integer Overflow / Improper Input Validation in iccDEV

CVE-2026-24403

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Integer Overflow / Improper Input Validation

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-190

Impact:

Memory Corruption and Potential Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

iccDEV versions 2.3.1.1 and below contain an integer overflow issue in the CIccProfile::CheckHeader() validation logic, where user-controllable ICC profile metadata is incorporated into size and offset calculations without sufficient bounds checking.

A crafted ICC profile that manipulates tag tables, offsets, or length fields can cause parsing errors, memory corruption, or denial of service, and in some environments may be leveraged for arbitrary code execution or to bypass application-level validation.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises when applications use iccDEV libraries (up to and including version 2.3.1.1) to load and validate ICC color profiles, typically from files or embedded resources.

It is most relevant in scenarios where ICC profiles are supplied by end users, untrusted documents, downloaded media, or other external sources, and where the application relies on CIccProfile::CheckHeader() to enforce profile integrity.

The issue manifests in the profile header and tag table parsing routines, which interpret size and offset values that can be controlled or influenced by an attacker.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: ICC profile parsing code paths (e.g., loading color profiles from files, images, or print jobs).
  • Required access: Ability to supply or replace an ICC profile that is subsequently processed by iccDEV (e.g., opening a crafted image/asset, importing a profile, or using an untrusted print/job file).
  • Trigger point: Invocation of CIccProfile::CheckHeader() or related validation routines on the malicious profile, particularly when tag tables, offsets, or size fields are parsed.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Integer arithmetic on attacker-controlled size/offset fields is performed without robust range checking, leading to overflows that can distort buffer size calculations or pointer arithmetic, resulting in out-of-bounds reads/writes or inconsistent internal state.

Why this happens

The core issue is improper handling of untrusted numeric metadata from ICC profiles during header and tag table validation.

CIccProfile::CheckHeader() and related code perform integer arithmetic on size and offset fields derived from the profile without ensuring they remain within valid bounds for the underlying buffers and address space.

This maps to:

  • CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound — arithmetic operations on attacker-controlled integers can wrap, producing unexpectedly small or large values.
  • CWE-20: Improper Input Validation — insufficient validation of profile metadata allows malformed or malicious profiles to pass initial checks.

When overflows occur, subsequent memory allocations, pointer computations, or range checks may be based on corrupted values, opening paths to memory corruption, logic bypass, or denial of service.

Potential impact

  • Application crash or denial of service when parsing a malformed ICC profile.
  • Out-of-bounds memory access that may lead to data corruption or unexpected behavior.
  • Potential arbitrary code execution under the privileges of the calling application, depending on memory layout and exploitation constraints.
  • Bypass of profile validation or enforcement logic, potentially allowing malformed or untrusted color data to be treated as valid.
  • Secondary impacts in workflows that automatically ingest ICC profiles from untrusted sources (e.g., print pipelines, media processing chains).

General mitigation guidance

The most robust mitigation centers on hardening numeric input handling and reducing trust in external ICC profile data.

Useful defensive patterns include:

  • Performing strict range checking on all size, count, and offset fields before using them in arithmetic or memory operations.
  • Using safe arithmetic helpers (e.g., checked addition/multiplication) that detect overflow and abort processing on error.
  • Validating that all tag offsets and lengths:
  • Are non-negative and within the bounds of the profile data.
  • Do not overlap in invalid ways and maintain expected alignment.
  • Treating all ICC profiles from external or user-controlled sources as untrusted and rejecting profiles that fail any structural or boundary checks.
  • Applying defense-in-depth through memory safety techniques (e.g., safer containers, bounds-checking abstractions, and compiler hardening flags).
  • Running profile-processing components with least privilege and, where feasible, within sandboxed or isolated processes to limit impact if parsing fails catastrophically.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both source-level patterns and runtime behavior.

Common strategies include:

  • Static analysis: Configure analyzers to flag integer arithmetic involving untrusted input (e.g., size, length, offset fields) and to detect unchecked additions/multiplications used in buffer allocation or indexing.
  • Code review: Examine ICC profile parsing paths for:
  • Direct use of profile header/tag values in pointer arithmetic or allocations without explicit bounds checks.
  • Assumptions that data sizes or counts are trustworthy.
  • Missing checks that computed offsets lie within the profile buffer.
  • Fuzz testing: Apply fuzzers to ICC profile parsing interfaces, mutating tag tables, offsets, and size fields to detect crashes or anomalous behavior.
  • Runtime protections: Enable memory safety and diagnostic tools (ASan, UBSan, Valgrind, or similar) in pre-production testing to surface overflows and out-of-bounds conditions triggered by malformed profiles.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/commits/d993997005449a0a6958e65b057bd25e17dff89
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/505
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-ph33-qp8j-5q34

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how ICC profiles are consumed. If an application automatically processes profiles embedded in remotely supplied content (such as images, documents, or print jobs), an attacker may be able to trigger the vulnerability by sending or hosting a crafted file that the application loads.

The attacker needs the ability to provide an ICC profile that will be parsed by the iccDEV-based component. This could mean uploading a file, opening an attacker-controlled image, importing a custom color profile, or otherwise influencing which profile the application processes.

The safest pattern is to implement comprehensive bounds and consistency checks for all header and tag table fields before using them, rely on checked integer arithmetic to detect overflow, and abort parsing with a hard failure whenever an inconsistency is found. Additionally, centralizing these checks in well-reviewed validation functions reduces the chance of bypasses.

Design parsers with a strict "reject by default" stance toward malformed data, treat all external file metadata as untrusted, and ensure every size, offset, and count is validated against the underlying buffer limits before use. Combine secure coding practices with static analysis, fuzz testing, and hardened build configurations to catch arithmetic and bounds errors early in development.

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