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CVE-2026-24245

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-24245

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge for Linux contains an unsafe deserialization flaw that allows untrusted data to be processed as executable objects.

If an attacker can influence the serialized input reaching the bridge, they may achieve code execution, privilege escalation, data tampering, or information disclosure.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in environments where NVIDIA Megatron Bridge for Linux consumes serialized data as part of its normal operation.

It is most relevant when serialized inputs can be influenced by external actors, such as inter-process communication, integration services, or network-facing components.

The risk increases in deployments where deserialized objects are processed with elevated privileges or have broad access to system resources and sensitive data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Interfaces that accept serialized data for processing by Megatron Bridge (e.g., IPC, APIs, file-based inputs, or integration connectors).
  • Required access: Ability to submit or modify serialized payloads that the bridge will deserialize, which may require local access, compromised service accounts, or control over upstream data sources.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the deserialization routines in Megatron Bridge that convert serialized input into runtime objects.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The deserialization logic treats incoming data as trusted, allowing construction of arbitrary objects or invocation of unintended code paths without robust validation or sandboxing.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-502: Unsafe Deserialization, where application logic deserializes data from potentially untrusted sources using powerful, general-purpose serialization mechanisms.

Such mechanisms can reconstruct complex object graphs, sometimes including executable behaviors, initialization hooks, or privileged operations that run during or immediately after deserialization.

When the system fails to restrict which types can be instantiated, or to constrain their behavior, crafted payloads can abuse these features to perform unauthorized actions, including arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may execute arbitrary code within the Megatron Bridge process context.
  • Privileges available to the bridge service could be escalated or abused for broader system compromise.
  • Critical data passing through the bridge can be tampered with or corrupted.
  • Sensitive information accessible to the bridge may be exposed or exfiltrated.
  • Overall system stability can be affected, leading to denial of service conditions.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on limiting trust in serialized inputs and reducing the power of deserialization routines.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Avoiding generic object deserialization in favor of simple, structured formats (e.g., JSON with strict schema enforcement).
  • Restricting deserialization to a narrow set of safe, known types and rejecting unknown or unexpected classes.
  • Introducing validation layers that verify incoming data against strict schemas before deserialization.
  • Running Megatron Bridge components with least-privilege accounts and minimizing their access to sensitive files, networks, and system APIs.
  • Applying segregation of duties and process isolation so that deserialized data cannot directly trigger privileged operations.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves a mix of code-centric and operational techniques:

  • Static analysis configured to flag use of unsafe or unrestricted deserialization APIs in Megatron Bridge and related integration code.
  • Code reviews that focus on how serialized data enters the system, where it is deserialized, and what object types are allowed.
  • Security policies requiring explicit type whitelists or schema validation for serialized input, enforced via automated checks in CI/CD.
  • Runtime monitoring for anomalous behavior in the bridge process, such as unexpected child processes, unusual file access, or atypical network connections that may indicate malicious deserialization payloads.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5841
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24245
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-24245

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if Megatron Bridge is exposed through networked interfaces or services that accept serialized input from remote sources. In other deployments, exploitation may be limited to local or adjacent components that can feed data into the bridge.

An attacker must be able to control or significantly influence the serialized data consumed by Megatron Bridge. This might involve access to upstream services, local file systems, IPC channels, or compromised applications that interact with the bridge.

The safest pattern is to avoid generic deserialization of untrusted data entirely. Where deserialization is required, restrict it to simple, well-defined data structures, enforce strict schemas, and only allow a limited set of benign types to be instantiated.

Prevention involves architectural and procedural controls: standardizing on secure data formats, embedding type whitelists and validation layers, running services with minimal privileges, and incorporating checks for unsafe deserialization into code review guidelines and automated security tooling.

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