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CVE-2026-24124

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Missing Authentication / Authorization Controls

CVE-2026-24124

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication / Authorization Controls

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Job Management and Workflow Tampering

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Dragonfly's Manager Job API endpoints expose job listing, modification, and deletion functionality without enforcing JWT authentication or RBAC authorization in affected versions.

Any unauthenticated user who can reach the Manager API can interact with /api/v1/jobs, potentially disrupting file distribution workflows, tampering with jobs, or deleting them entirely.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Dragonfly deployments where:

  • The Manager API is reachable over a network (internal or external),
  • Version 2.4.1-rc.0 or earlier is in use,
  • The Job API endpoints are enabled for operational use.

In these contexts, the /api/v1/jobs endpoints are wired into routing without the expected JWT authentication middleware and role-based access control (RBAC) checks, leaving job operations exposed to any caller with network access to the Manager API.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Dragonfly Manager API (/api/v1/jobs endpoints) over HTTP/HTTPS.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the Manager API host/port (no valid credentials needed).
  • Trigger point: Direct HTTP requests to Job API endpoints (e.g., list, update, delete operations).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The routing configuration for these endpoints omits JWT authentication middleware and RBAC enforcement, so the server does not verify identity or permissions before performing job operations.

Why this happens

The core issue is a missing authentication and authorization enforcement on sensitive endpoints, mapped to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

In the affected Dragonfly versions, the routing configuration for /api/v1/jobs does not attach the middleware responsible for JWT validation and RBAC checks.

As a result, operations that should require an authenticated and authorized user—such as viewing, updating, or deleting jobs—are exposed as unauthenticated API calls.

This is a design and configuration flaw in the access control layer, not a problem with the underlying authentication mechanism itself.

Potential impact

  • Unauthenticated users could view job definitions and metadata, potentially exposing operational details.
  • Attackers could modify existing jobs, altering distribution targets, images, or parameters.
  • Jobs could be deleted, disrupting file distribution and image acceleration workflows.
  • Operational instability or outages caused by widespread unauthorized job tampering.
  • Indirect data integrity issues if job changes affect how artifacts are distributed or updated.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strong, consistent access control around management APIs and treating job operations as privileged actions:

  • Ensure all management and job-related endpoints are consistently wrapped with authentication middleware (e.g., JWT verification) and role-based authorization checks.
  • Centralize route registration and middleware configuration to reduce the chance of leaving critical endpoints unprotected.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to job management roles so that only designated operators can create, modify, or delete jobs.
  • Restrict network exposure of the Manager API to trusted administrative networks or service meshes, reducing the set of potential callers.
  • Incorporate configuration checks or tests that verify all management endpoints require authentication as part of regular deployment pipelines.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for this class of issue using a combination of preventive and detective controls:

  • Static analysis / configuration review: Scan routing and middleware configuration to ensure that all sensitive endpoints (including /api/v1/jobs) are protected by authentication and authorization layers.
  • Code review signals: Treat newly added or modified management routes as high-risk and require reviewers to confirm that authentication and RBAC middleware are explicitly attached.
  • API gateway / WAF policies: Enforce authentication requirements at the edge for Manager APIs so that unauthenticated calls to management paths are blocked, even if the backend misconfigures middleware.
  • Runtime logging and anomaly detection: Monitor logs for job-related operations originating from unexpected IPs, service accounts, or without corresponding authentication events.
  • Security testing: Include authenticated vs. unauthenticated access tests to critical management endpoints as part of routine penetration testing and CI-based API security checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/commit/9fb9a2dfde3100f32dc7f48eabee4c2b64eac55f
github.comgithub.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/security/advisories/GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the Dragonfly Manager API is accessible over the network from an attacker's location (for example, exposed to the internet or reachable from a compromised internal host), the Job API endpoints can be accessed without authentication.

No. The vulnerability specifically stems from missing JWT authentication and RBAC checks. Any network client that can reach /api/v1/jobs can attempt to view, update, or delete jobs without providing credentials.

The safest pattern is to ensure that all job-related routes are consistently protected by authentication and authorization middleware. This includes validating JWTs on every management endpoint and enforcing RBAC so that only authorized roles can perform job operations. Additionally, restrict the Manager API's network exposure to trusted administrative environments.

Use secure-by-default routing patterns where authentication and authorization middleware are applied globally or via centralized route groups, and require explicit opt-out for truly public endpoints. Establish code review and automated checks that fail builds when newly added management endpoints are not covered by authentication/authorization policies, and periodically test API surfaces for unauthenticated access to sensitive functionality.

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