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CVE-2026-24107

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in Tenda W20E usbPartitionName Handling

CVE-2026-24107

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-94

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Device

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Tenda W20E routers contain an input handling flaw where the usbPartitionName parameter is passed directly into doSystemCmd without proper validation or sanitization.

Under these conditions, an attacker who can control this parameter may inject arbitrary system commands, leading to full compromise of the device.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Tenda W20E V4.0br_V15.11.0.6 firmware when the device processes user-controlled values for usbPartitionName, typically as part of USB storage management or related administrative operations.

The risk is present where the router exposes a network-accessible interface (such as a web management panel or related endpoint) that accepts this parameter and where the parameter value is subsequently passed to doSystemCmd for execution on the underlying operating system.

Deployments that enable remote management or expose the admin interface beyond a tightly controlled LAN are more likely to be at risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Management interface or API handling usbPartitionName on the Tenda W20E device.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests that control the usbPartitionName value (this may involve authenticated or unauthenticated access depending on the router's configuration).
  • Trigger point: Invocation of backend code that passes usbPartitionName directly into doSystemCmd to construct and execute system-level commands.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parameter is not validated, normalized, or safely encoded before being composed into a shell or OS command, allowing attacker-controlled content to alter the intended command structure.

Why this happens

The core issue is a failure to enforce strict separation between data and commands when interacting with the operating system command interpreter.

The usbPartitionName parameter is treated as trusted input and concatenated or interpolated into a command string that is executed via doSystemCmd without robust validation, escaping, or the use of parameterized, non-shell-based APIs.

This behavior aligns with CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code, in the sense that attacker input influences dynamically constructed executable content at the OS level, enabling arbitrary command execution.

Potential impact

  • Arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the router's management process or underlying OS user
  • Complete compromise of the Tenda W20E device, including configuration manipulation and firmware tampering
  • Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the router
  • Interception, modification, or redirection of network traffic routed through the device
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot for further attacks within the internal network or participation in botnets

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on preventing untrusted input from ever influencing executable command strings and reducing the privileges and exposure of the management surface.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Replacing shell-based command construction with safe, parameterized system APIs that do not invoke a command interpreter.
  • Applying strict allowlists for usbPartitionName, validating against expected formats (e.g., fixed identifiers, alphanumeric labels) and rejecting any unexpected characters or structures.
  • Centralizing input validation logic for management parameters and enforcing consistent, minimal parsing rules.
  • Running management processes with least privilege, so that even if a flaw exists, the reachable damage is constrained.
  • Restricting access to the router's administrative interfaces to trusted networks and disabling remote management when not strictly required.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection strategies typically rely on both code-centric and operational perspectives:

  • Static analysis: Flag usage of APIs like system, popen, or wrappers such as doSystemCmd where arguments are derived from HTTP parameters or other user-controlled fields without sanitization or allowlists.
  • Code review: Look for direct string concatenation or formatting operations that combine user input with shell metacharacters, and absence of centralized validation on parameters like usbPartitionName.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Enforce secure coding standards that disallow dynamic shell command construction from request data, and use automated linters to identify violations.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use network intrusion detection or router-specific logging to highlight anomalous management requests or unusual command execution patterns, while ensuring that logging does not expose sensitive data.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/akuma-QAQ/CVEreport/tree/main/D-link/CVE-2026-24107
tenda.com.cntenda.com.cn/material/show/2707

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the router's management interface is exposed. If remote administration is enabled or the admin interface is accessible from untrusted networks, an attacker may be able to exploit it over the internet. Otherwise, exploitation is generally limited to local network attackers.

The attacker must be able to send requests that control the usbPartitionName parameter. Whether authentication is required depends on how the specific endpoint is implemented and configured, but in many consumer or SMB router setups, weak or default credentials can lower the bar for access.

The strongest pattern is to eliminate shell-based command composition altogether and use non-shell system APIs with strict parameterization. In addition, usbPartitionName should be constrained to a small, validated set of acceptable values rather than accepting arbitrary strings.

Establish and enforce secure coding guidelines that forbid direct execution of user-influenced command strings, require centralized input validation with allowlists, and mandate security-focused code reviews and static analysis for any code interacting with system-level commands or interpreters.

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