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CVE-2026-23958

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Inadequate Credential Management in DataEase Authentication

CVE-2026-23958

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Inadequate Credential Management

CWE:

CWE-522

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Account Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

DataEase used the MD5 hash of a user's password as the secret key for signing JWT tokens, directly coupling authentication secrets to user credentials.

An attacker could brute-force the admin's password by repeatedly submitting crafted JWTs to unmonitored token verification endpoints, eventually recovering a valid admin credential and taking over the system.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects DataEase deployments where JWT-based authentication is enabled and the signing secret is deterministically derived from the user's password via MD5.

It is most relevant in environments where:

  • Admin or privileged accounts exist with guessable or brute-forceable passwords, and
  • API endpoints that validate JWTs are exposed to attackers and are weakly monitored or rate-limited.

The issue arises regardless of infrastructure stack whenever the application relies on these password-derived JWT secrets for access control.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any network-accessible API endpoint that validates JWT tokens (including undocumented or unmonitored endpoints).
  • Required access: No prior authentication is strictly required; the attacker only needs the ability to send arbitrary JWTs to the target endpoints.
  • Trigger point: Submission of JWTs signed with candidate secrets derived from guessed admin passwords to the JWT verification logic.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The JWT signing secret is the MD5 hash of the admin's password, so successful brute-forcing of the JWT secret is equivalent to brute-forcing the admin password itself. This deterministic, user-password-based secret eliminates entropy separation between user credentials and server-side secrets.

Why this happens

The core issue is the insecure practice of deriving a server-side JWT signing secret directly from user passwords using a weak hash function.

This aligns with CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials, because:

  • Passwords, or simple hashes of them (MD5), are repurposed as high-value cryptographic secrets.
  • There is no separation between user authentication credentials and application signing keys, so attacking one effectively compromises the other.

In abstract terms, the bug class is:

  • Using low-entropy, user-chosen secrets (passwords) as cryptographic keys.
  • Employing an outdated, fast hashing algorithm (MD5) that is well-suited for brute-force guessing.
  • Failing to use independent, randomly generated, high-entropy keys for JWT signing.

Potential impact

  • Full compromise of admin accounts after successful brute-force of the password-derived JWT secret.
  • Unauthorized administrative access to the DataEase instance, including configuration changes and data exposure.
  • Creation or modification of user accounts and roles, enabling persistent unauthorized access.
  • Access to sensitive visualizations, datasets, and potentially underlying data sources configured in the platform.
  • Lateral movement into other systems integrated with DataEase through compromised credentials or configuration.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on decoupling user credentials from application secrets and hardening authentication design:

  • Use independent, randomly generated, high-entropy secrets for JWT signing rather than any value derived from user passwords.
  • Treat JWT signing keys as server-side configuration or key-management assets, not user data, and rotate these keys periodically.
  • Employ modern password handling patterns: strong password hashing (e.g., adaptive KDFs) solely for verification, not as cryptographic keys.
  • Enforce robust password policies (length, complexity, and uniqueness) to reduce the effectiveness of brute-force guessing attempts.
  • Implement rate limiting, anomaly detection, and monitoring on all authentication and JWT validation endpoints.
  • Apply least-privilege principles for administrative accounts and separate duties where possible to reduce the impact of a single account compromise.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-level analysis with operational monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Look for JWT libraries being configured with secrets derived from user-provided values (e.g., password hashes).
  • Flag any use of general-purpose or weak hash functions (like MD5) in authentication or token-signing code paths.
  • Verify that JWT signing keys are loaded from secure configuration, environment variables, or key management systems rather than computed from request data.
  • Configuration and policy enforcement:
  • Enforce organizational standards that prohibit password-derived keys and require random, high-entropy secrets for token signing.
  • Integrate security checks in CI/CD pipelines to prevent regressions in authentication design.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Track unusual patterns of JWT validation failures or high-volume access to token verification endpoints.
  • Set alerts for excessive or sequential token verification attempts that may indicate brute-force activity.

Automated code scanning tools and SAST solutions can be configured with custom rules to identify password-derived secrets and weak hash usage.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/dataease/dataease/security/advisories/GHSA-5wvm-4m4q-rh7j
ox.securityox.security/blog/blog-dataease-cve-2026-23958-admin-takeover/

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability is high when attackers can access JWT verification endpoints without strict rate limiting or monitoring. Because the JWT secret is derived from the admin's password using MD5, an attacker who can perform many verification attempts can systematically brute-force the password and gain administrative access.

Typically, only network access to the affected DataEase instance and the relevant JWT validation endpoints is required. The attacker does not need valid credentials initially, as they are attempting to recover the admin's password via brute force.

The safest approach is to completely separate user passwords from JWT signing keys. Use a randomly generated, high-entropy server-side secret (or keys managed by a dedicated key management system) for JWT signing, and handle user passwords exclusively via secure password hashing for verification.

Prevention involves design-level security controls: mandate independent, random secrets for all cryptographic operations; prohibit using passwords or their hashes as keys; adopt modern password hashing schemes; and enforce security reviews of authentication and token management logic, supported by automated static analysis and CI/CD checks.

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