Summary
A regression in Shopware's map(...) override between versions 6.7.0.0 and 6.7.6.0 allows specially crafted arrays and PHP Closures to bypass allow‑list checks.
Under certain conditions, an attacker who can influence the map(...) input can cause execution of unintended PHP code, leading to a high‑impact code injection scenario.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects Shopware 6 installations from 6.7.0.0 up to, but not including, 6.7.6.1 that use the overridden map(...) functionality in their PHP code paths.
The issue appears when user-controlled or indirectly influenced data is passed to map(...) and is transformed into arrays or Closures that are not properly validated against an allow list.
Custom extensions, plugins, or integrations that rely heavily on dynamic mapping or expression-style callbacks are more likely to exercise the vulnerable behavior.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Server-side PHP execution within Shopware's application runtime.
- Required access: Ability to influence or supply data passed to the vulnerable map(...) override (e.g., via HTTP parameters, plugin configuration, or templating data).
- Trigger point: Invocation of the map(...) override with a crafted array and/or PHP Closure that escapes or bypasses the intended allow list checks.
- Why exploitation is possible: The regression reintroduces a state where closures and complex array structures are not strictly checked against a whitelist, allowing attacker-controlled logic to be evaluated as executable code instead of treated as data.
Why this happens
The root cause is a regression in the security controls around Shopware's map(...) override, which is intended to constrain what kinds of callbacks or operations can be applied.
Instead of enforcing strict allow-list validation on all incoming callbacks and array structures, the implementation allows certain PHP Closures and arrays to slip through without verification.
This maps to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), where dynamic execution mechanisms (such as Closures or interpreter-evaluated callbacks) are exposed to untrusted data.
In abstract terms, the bug arises because the code generation/execution path (closures used by map(...)) trusts the structure and origin of its inputs without consistently enforcing a whitelist or rejecting unexpected callable types.
Potential impact
- Execution of attacker-controlled PHP code within the Shopware application context.
- Unauthorized access to sensitive data handled by the Shopware instance.
- Privilege escalation within the application by chaining arbitrary code with existing permissions.
- Modification of application behavior, including order processing, payment flows, or content rendering.
- Potential pivot to the underlying server environment, depending on configuration and hardening.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on removing dynamic code execution paths for untrusted inputs and tightening allow-list enforcement:
- Ensure that any higher-order functions (like map(...)) only accept callbacks and Closures from known, trusted sources and types.
- Apply strict allow-list logic to callable and array arguments, rejecting any input that does not match an expected, pre-defined structure or known function identifier.
- Avoid designs where untrusted input can influence which Closure or callable will be executed; instead, map user choices to a fixed set of safe operations.
- Introduce defensive checks that treat unexpected Closures or complex nested arrays as invalid, failing fast rather than attempting to interpret them.
- Run Shopware code under least-privilege PHP and OS accounts, limiting damage in case arbitrary code paths are reached.
How teams detect issues like this
High-level detection methods can focus on both code and runtime behavior:
- Static analysis: Define rules that flag dynamic execution patterns (Closures, callables, eval-like constructs) where the source of the underlying data is user-controlled or not clearly constrained.
- Code review: Pay special attention to utility functions like map(...), filter(...), or custom higher-order functions that accept callbacks or arrays derived from request parameters or template data.
- Configuration and policy checks: Enforce internal guidelines discouraging dynamic callback resolution from user input and require explicit allow lists for all code that dispatches to callables.
- Runtime monitoring: Use application logs and monitoring to detect unusual execution paths, such as unexpected callback names or anomalous data structures passed into mapping utilities.
- Automated security scanning tools that understand PHP callables and Closures can help highlight locations where untrusted data can affect executed code.

