Summary
Koko Analytics prior to version 2.1.3 contains a SQL injection vulnerability where attacker-controlled tracking data is written unescaped into exported SQL and later executed during import.
By crafting tracking requests or uploading malicious SQL files, an attacker can cause arbitrary SQL execution in the WordPress database when an administrator runs the import functionality.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in WordPress sites that use the Koko Analytics plugin with versions prior to 2.1.3 and rely on its built-in analytics export/import features.
It involves two data paths:
- Unauthenticated tracking requests to the public endpoint storing path and referrer values directly in analytics tables
- Administrative use of the plugin's SQL export/import tools to migrate or back up analytics data
The risk materializes when administrators export tracking data to SQL and later import that SQL back into the site, or when a user with manage_koko_analytics privileges uploads a SQL file for import.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface (path-based injection):
- Public tracking endpoint in
src/Resources/functions/collect.phpacceptingpa(path) andr(referrer) parameters from any visitor - Admin export feature in
src/Admin/Data_Export.phpgenerating SQL based on stored analytics data - Admin import feature in
src/Admin/Data_Import.phpexecuting SQL statements via$wpdb->query - Required access:
- For stored injection: No authentication needed to send crafted tracking requests; an administrator later must perform an export and then an import of analytics data.
- For direct SQL upload: Any authenticated WordPress user with
manage_koko_analyticscapability can upload arbitrary.sqlfiles. - Trigger point:
- Execution occurs when the import handler reads the export (or uploaded SQL), splits on semicolons, and runs each SQL statement against the database.
- Why exploitation is possible:
- User-controlled strings from tracking data are embedded directly into SQL
INSERTstatements without proper escaping or parameterization. - The import handler performs only superficial header checks, does not restrict table names or statement types, and passes each SQL statement directly to
$wpdb->query.
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a classic SQL injection pattern (CWE-89) combined with unsafe import execution:
- Path (
pa) and referrer (r) values from the public analytics collection endpoint are stored verbatim in the analytics tables without normalization or sanitization suitable for later code generation. - When exporting data, these stored values are concatenated into SQL
INSERTstatements without using prepared statements or proper escaping, allowing injected delimiters and additional statements. - The import logic treats the SQL file as trusted script: it reads the file contents, performs a minimal header check, splits on
;, and executes each resulting statement with$wpdb->querywithout validating the target table, operation type, or content.
Abstractly, this reflects a failure to separate data from code in dynamically constructed SQL and a design that replays SQL text derived from untrusted input, turning analytics export/import into a powerful execution sink.
Potential impact
- Deletion of critical WordPress tables (e.g.,
wp_users,wp_options), which can render the site unusable - Insertion of backdoor administrator accounts or modification of existing user roles and capabilities
- Extraction or modification of sensitive data stored in the WordPress database
- Installation or activation of malicious plugins or content via manipulated database entries
- Persistent compromise of the site through tampered configuration, options, or stored content
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on preventing untrusted data from becoming executable SQL and hardening import workflows:
- Replace string-concatenated SQL in export logic with parameterized queries or structured export formats (e.g., CSV or JSON) that treat analytics values as pure data, not SQL fragments.
- Ensure any SQL generation layer robustly escapes all dynamic values using appropriate WordPress and database APIs, even when data is believed to be "internal" or "system-generated".
- Redesign the import feature to operate on structured data rather than arbitrary SQL text, validating schema, table names, and expected columns before inserting into the database.
- Apply strict validation and whitelisting in import routines so only allowed operations (e.g.,
INSERTinto known analytics tables) are possible, rejecting any other SQL statement types. - Limit the
manage_koko_analyticscapability to trusted administrators and review whether raw SQL execution is necessary at all; where feasible, use narrowly scoped service functions instead of direct query execution.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine code-centric review and runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis and code review:
- Search for dynamic SQL construction in the plugin code, especially concatenation of user-derived values into
INSERT,UPDATE, orDELETEstatements without$wpdb->prepareor equivalent escaping. - Flag any code that reads uploaded files or exports and passes their contents directly into
$wpdb->queryor other database APIs without parsing and validation. - Review analytics data flows from public endpoints into database fields that are later used in code generation or SQL scripting.
- Policy and tooling:
- Enforce development policies that prohibit arbitrary SQL imports or require rigorous validation and whitelisting when imports are necessary.
- Use WordPress security scanning tools or generic SAST engines configured to identify string-built SQL queries and direct execution of unvalidated SQL scripts.
- Operational monitoring:
- Monitor database logs for unusual or destructive SQL statements originating from the WordPress application user, such as mass
DROP TABLE,TRUNCATE, or unexpectedINSERTinto privileged tables. - Track administrative usage of analytics import/export features and correlate with anomalous database operations.

