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CVE-2026-22553

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in InSAT MasterSCADA BUK-TS MMadmServ

CVE-2026-22553

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

InSAT MasterSCADA BUK-TS contains an OS command injection flaw in a field exposed via the MMadmServ web interface, allowing user-controlled input to be passed to the operating system shell.

Under vulnerable configurations, a remote attacker who can reach this endpoint may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the SCADA service account, leading to full remote code execution on the host.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs within the MMadmServ web interface of InSAT MasterSCADA BUK-TS, where user-supplied data is incorporated into system-level command execution.

It is relevant in deployments where:

  • The MMadmServ web interface is enabled and reachable over the network
  • Input from certain web fields is processed by backend logic that invokes OS commands
  • There is no robust sanitization, escaping, or strict parameterization of shell arguments

The risk is heightened when the SCADA server runs with elevated privileges or resides in a network segment with access to critical control systems.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible MMadmServ web interface endpoint
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the vulnerable endpoint (often unauthenticated or low-privilege, depending on deployment)
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted data into the affected field, which is subsequently passed to an OS command execution routine
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs or forwards shell commands using user input without enforcing strict validation, encoding, or command parameterization, enabling an attacker to inject additional commands or arguments.

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing operating system commands with user-controlled data and invoking them via shell-based APIs (for example, system calls that interpret command strings).

Instead of treating user input as inert data, the implementation allows it to influence the structure of the command executed by the OS, which aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

The bug class is characterized by:

  • Building command strings using concatenation or templating with untrusted input
  • Relying on shell parsing instead of using fixed, parameterized execution APIs
  • Lack of strict whitelisting, canonicalization, or separation between data and control elements.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands on the SCADA server
  • Installation of malware or backdoors on the affected host
  • Exfiltration or manipulation of configuration files and process data
  • Disruption or sabotage of SCADA operations by stopping, reconfiguring, or falsifying processes
  • Lateral movement to other systems reachable from the compromised host
  • Complete takeover of the underlying operating system account running the service

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on preventing user input from altering command structure and reducing the privileges of any command execution that remains necessary:

  • Replace shell-based command construction with high-level APIs or libraries that perform required actions without invoking a shell.
  • Where invoking external programs is unavoidable, use parameterized execution primitives that pass arguments as arrays rather than as a single shell-parsed string.
  • Apply strict input validation and whitelisting for all parameters that influence system-level actions, accepting only known-good values and formats.
  • Remove or disable any non-essential functionality in the MMadmServ interface that relies on dynamic shell commands.
  • Run SCADA services and auxiliary web interfaces with least privilege, separating duties so that a compromise yields minimal control over the broader system.
  • Apply network segmentation and access control to limit which users and networks can reach the MMadmServ endpoints.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag the use of shell-executing APIs (e.g., system(), exec*, popen(), shell=True flags) where arguments include web request parameters or other untrusted sources.
  • Code review: Look for string concatenation or templating involving request fields being passed into command execution routines; verify the absence of shell interpretation where untrusted data is involved.
  • Security testing: Use focused web application security testing and fuzzing to identify parameters whose modification changes command behavior or causes unexpected system responses.
  • Runtime monitoring: Implement logging for command execution, including arguments and calling contexts, and flag anomalous or user-patterned command lines.
  • Policy enforcement: Incorporate secure coding guidelines into CI/CD pipelines and gate changes that introduce new shell command usage paths without proper hardening.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-055-01.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-055-01

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploited remotely by any attacker who can reach the MMadmServ web interface and interact with the vulnerable endpoint. In many SCADA deployments, this may include users on internal networks or VPNs; exposure to the public internet would significantly increase the risk.

The core requirement is the ability to send crafted requests to the affected field. Whether authentication is needed depends on how the interface is configured; in some cases, low-privileged or even unauthenticated access may be sufficient if the vulnerable endpoint is exposed.

The safest fix is to eliminate shell-based command construction entirely, replacing it with dedicated APIs or fixed, parameterized invocation mechanisms that do not interpret user input as part of a command. Any remaining command execution should strictly separate data arguments from control syntax and enforce hard validation.

Adopt a defensive coding standard that forbids passing untrusted data into shell commands, require the use of parameterized execution APIs, and integrate static analysis plus security code review into the development lifecycle. Additionally, design web interfaces so that operational tasks do not depend on dynamically composing OS commands from user input.

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