Summary
A command injection vulnerability in Roxy-WI's log viewing feature allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary system commands on the underlying server.
The issue arises because a user-controlled grep parameter is incorporated into a shell command twice—once sanitized and once raw—enabling crafted input to break out of the expected command context when log queries are processed.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects Roxy-WI deployments that expose the web-based log viewing functionality to authenticated users.
The flaw is located in app/modules/roxywi/logs.py around line 87, where the grep query string used to search within log files is passed into a shell command in both sanitized and unsanitized forms.
Environments where users with limited trust can access log views, or where application accounts have broad OS-level privileges, are more exposed to risk.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of Roxy-WI, specifically the log viewing endpoint.
- Required access: Valid authenticated session with permission to access log viewing features.
- Trigger point: Submission of a specially crafted
grepparameter in a request that causes the backend to construct and execute a shell command. - Why exploitation is possible: The backend builds shell commands dynamically and reuses the user input twice, such that one use bypasses sanitization, allowing injection of additional shell tokens or commands into the executed process.
Why this happens
The core issue is the construction of shell commands using untrusted input, aligning with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.
In the vulnerable code, the grep parameter is first sanitized but then incorporated again in raw form into the same command string.
This pattern effectively nullifies the initial sanitization, permitting user-controlled data to influence the command interpreter directly.
By mixing input validation with shell-based command composition instead of using safe process execution interfaces and strict argument handling, the implementation leaves a gap that attackers can exploit.
Potential impact
- Authenticated users could execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the Roxy-WI process.
- Attackers may read sensitive files accessible to the application user.
- Malicious commands could be used to write or delete files, leading to data loss or tampering.
- Compromise of the Roxy-WI host could provide a pivot point to other infrastructure services managed by the interface.
- Installation of backdoors or tooling that enables persistent access to the server.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct shell interpretation of user input and reducing the privileges associated with log operations:
- Replace shell command composition with safe process execution APIs that accept argument lists (e.g., no shell=True semantics) and treat user input strictly as data.
- Ensure user-provided search terms are only ever passed as individual arguments, not interpolated into a broader shell command string.
- Apply strict validation and allowlisting of permitted search patterns to minimize the set of acceptable inputs (e.g., limiting to simple text patterns without metacharacters).
- Run the Roxy-WI application under a dedicated, least-privileged OS account with minimal file system and process capabilities.
- Segment log access so that only necessary log files are exposed to the web interface, reducing the blast radius of any misuse.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect similar command injection risks and potential exploitation by:
- Performing static code analysis that flags dynamic shell command construction, especially where user input appears in command strings or where
shell=True-style execution is used. - Incorporating security-focused code review practices that require reviewers to inspect how user parameters like
grepare passed into subprocess calls and verify that they are not interpolated into shell commands. - Adding unit and integration tests that attempt to pass command metacharacters (e.g.,
;,&&,|) into search parameters and confirm they have no effect beyond literal matching. - Monitoring application and system logs for unusual command patterns, unexpected child processes, or anomalies originating from the Roxy-WI process.
- Using automated application security testing tools (SAST/DAST) configured to probe log viewing endpoints with injection test cases.

