Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in D-Link DIR-823X set_filtering

CVE-2026-2210

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on the Router

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

D-Link DIR-823X firmware version 250416 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the /goform/set_filtering handler (function sub_4211C8).

Remote attackers can inject and execute system commands by manipulating request parameters processed by this endpoint, potentially gaining full control over the device under certain configurations.

Affected context

The issue arises in the web management interface of the D-Link DIR-823X (firmware 250416), specifically within the /goform/set_filtering endpoint handled by function sub_4211C8.

The vulnerability is relevant when:

  • The router's HTTP administration interface is reachable (e.g., from LAN, or WAN if remote management is enabled).
  • User-supplied input from filtering-related configuration requests is passed into OS-level commands without adequate sanitization or parameterization.
  • The underlying system executes these commands with elevated or root privileges typical of embedded router firmware.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface on the router, targeting the /goform/set_filtering path.
  • Required access: Network reachability to the management interface; depending on configuration, this might be limited to the local network or exposed externally if remote administration is enabled.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted HTTP requests (e.g., POST/GET) containing specially formed values to parameters processed by sub_4211C8.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler integrates user input directly into shell commands or command-line arguments without adequate validation, encoding, or use of safe APIs, allowing injected shell metacharacters or command fragments to be interpreted by the underlying OS.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from constructing shell commands using untrusted input in the router firmware's request handler for /goform/set_filtering.

Instead of treating user input as opaque data and passing it to safe, parameterized APIs, the firmware appears to concatenate input directly into a command string executed by a shell or equivalent interpreter.

This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), and is closely related to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), where failure to neutralize shell metacharacters enables arbitrary command execution.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands on the router.
  • Complete compromise of router configuration, including modification of firewall, DNS, and routing rules.
  • Interception, redirection, or monitoring of network traffic passing through the device.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks on internal network hosts.
  • Deployment of persistent malware or participation in botnets for DDoS or other malicious activity.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on eliminating direct shell command construction and reducing trust in HTTP-sourced configuration data:

  • Refactor command execution paths to use safe, parameterized APIs (e.g., direct system calls, library functions, or whitelisted operations) instead of shell invocation with concatenated strings.
  • Strictly validate and constrain all inputs used by filtering-related logic to a controlled set of characters and values (e.g., IPs, ports, protocol enums), applying allowlist-based validation.
  • Normalize and neutralize any remaining potentially hazardous characters (such as shell metacharacters) at the boundary where user input enters the business logic.
  • Run management-plane processes with the least privilege necessary and isolate command-executing components to minimize blast radius if a flaw is exploited.
  • Restrict exposure of the web management interface (disable WAN/remote management unless absolutely necessary, and segment management traffic where possible).

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can be approached from both code-level and runtime perspectives:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag string concatenation or formatting that feeds into system(), popen(), exec*(), or equivalent shell-executing wrappers, especially in HTTP request handlers and configuration endpoints.
  • Code review: Look for patterns where request parameters are directly interpolated into command strings, insufficient input validation, or reliance on blacklists for dangerous characters in network configuration modules.
  • Firmware and CI checks: Integrate automated scanning tools that understand common command injection sinks and taint from HTTP inputs within embedded C/C++ or scripting languages used in firmware.
  • Runtime monitoring: Where feasible, monitor for anomalous command execution patterns, unexpected child processes, or unusual outbound traffic originating from the management process.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/master-abc/cve/issues/34
github.comgithub.com/user-attachments/files/25010265/Remote.Command.Injection.in.D-Link.DIR-823X.via._goform_set_filtering.zip
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.344925
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.344925
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.752165
dlink.comdlink.com/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on configuration. If the router's management interface or relevant ports are exposed to the WAN via remote administration or port forwarding, an external attacker may reach the vulnerable endpoint; otherwise, exploitation is typically limited to local network attackers.

The attacker needs network access to the web management interface and the ability to send crafted HTTP requests to /goform/set_filtering. No physical access is required; logical access over the network is sufficient if the interface is reachable.

Replace any shell-based command construction using user input with safe, parameterized APIs and strongly typed interfaces.

Combine this with strict allowlist validation on all configuration parameters so only expected, minimally expressive values are accepted.

Adopt a secure coding policy for command execution that forbids direct shell invocation with untrusted input, enforce centralized input validation routines for all web endpoints, and integrate static analysis and security-focused code review into the firmware development lifecycle to catch command injection patterns early.

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