Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in itsourcecode School Management System

CVE-2026-2189

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Manipulation via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the School Management System 1.0 report component (/ramonsys/report/index.php) allows untrusted user input from the ay parameter to be injected directly into SQL queries.

An attacker who can send crafted HTTP requests to the affected endpoint may manipulate database queries, potentially leading to data exposure, tampering, or account compromise over the network.

Affected context

The issue arises in the School Management System 1.0 within the reporting functionality exposed by /ramonsys/report/index.php.

The vulnerability is present where the ay request parameter is used to build SQL statements, likely to filter or select academic year or similar report dimensions, without sufficient input validation or parameterization.

Any deployment exposing this endpoint to untrusted users (such as the public internet or a shared school network) may be affected, depending on backend database permissions and application roles.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface to /ramonsys/report/index.php.
  • Required access: Network access to the web application; no special privileges are necessarily required if the report page is reachable without strong authentication.
  • Trigger point: Supplying crafted values for the ay parameter in GET or POST requests (depending on implementation) so that the resulting SQL statement is syntactically modified.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to concatenate the ay parameter directly into SQL queries without using prepared statements or robust input handling, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary SQL fragments.

Why this happens

This vulnerability is rooted in constructing SQL statements by directly interpolating user-controlled input from the ay parameter, rather than using parameterized queries or safe binding mechanisms.

This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where special characters (such as quotes, operators, or delimiters) are not correctly handled.

CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component) also applies at a more general level, as the application passes untrusted data into a downstream database component without adequate neutralization.

Conceptually, the code likely follows an insecure pattern similar to building query strings with string concatenation based on HTTP parameter values.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could read sensitive data from database tables, including student, staff, or administrative records, subject to database permissions.
  • An attacker may modify or delete data, affecting grades, attendance, fee records, or other school-related information.
  • The integrity of reports and academic records can be compromised, leading to inaccurate or falsified reporting.
  • In some configurations, attackers might escalate to execute administrative database commands or create new application accounts.
  • If the database account used by the application has extended privileges, the attacker could impact other databases or system-level functionality.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct concatenation of user input into SQL and tightening data handling around reporting features:

  • Refactor all database interactions in the report module (and elsewhere) to use prepared statements or parameterized queries, ensuring the ay parameter is bound as data, not code.
  • Apply strict server-side validation and canonicalization to the ay parameter, restricting it to expected formats (for example, whitelisting a limited set of academic year identifiers).
  • Implement a minimal-privilege database account for the application so that even if a query is manipulated, the scope of allowed operations is reduced.
  • Centralize query-building logic so that data access layers encapsulate parameterization and prevent ad hoc string-based queries in presentation code such as index.php.
  • Consider defensive measures such as database-level query restrictions, views, or stored procedures that expose only the required data for reporting.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Use SAST tools or custom linting rules to flag dynamic SQL construction, especially instances where $_GET, $_POST, or other request variables are interpolated into query strings.
  • Code review: During manual review, pay special attention to report and search functions, looking for string concatenation in SQL statements and lack of parameter bindings or input validation.
  • Logging and monitoring: Instrument database and application logs to capture unusual query patterns (e.g., presence of SQL control keywords in user-supplied parameters) and alert on anomalies indicative of injection attempts.
  • Security testing: Apply automated DAST tools and targeted penetration tests focused on endpoints that accept filter parameters (like ay) to surface injectable inputs.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/angtas/cve/issues/1
itsourcecode.comitsourcecode.com/
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.344892
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.344892
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.749746

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As described, the attack can be initiated remotely by sending crafted requests to the vulnerable report endpoint, provided the application is reachable over the network.

It depends on how the School Management System is configured. If the reports page is accessible without strong authentication or from shared user accounts, attackers may not need special credentials. If it is restricted to authenticated staff or administrators, an attacker would first need to obtain or abuse such access.

The most robust fix is to replace any string-concatenated SQL with parameterized queries or prepared statements and strictly validate the ay parameter against a whitelist of allowed values. This should be applied consistently across all database interactions, not just the affected file.

Adopt a secure data access layer that enforces parameterization by design, establish coding standards that forbid raw SQL concatenation with user input, and integrate security-focused code review and automated static analysis into the development lifecycle. Regular security testing of input-heavy endpoints, such as filters and reports, also helps catch regressions early.

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