Summary
ClipBucket v5 contains a blind SQL injection vulnerability in the channel comment feature, where user-supplied data is concatenated directly into SQL queries without validation.
An attacker who can submit comments to a channel can manipulate the obj_id parameter in a POST request to /actions/ajax.php to infer database content, potentially leading to full compromise of the application's data.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in ClipBucket v5 installations, specifically versions 5.5.2-#187 and below, when channel comments are enabled and processed via the /actions/ajax.php endpoint.
The issue manifests when the obj_id parameter from a POST request is passed unvalidated into the user_exists method and then into the database count function, where it is concatenated into a SQL query.
Any deployment that exposes this functionality to untrusted users, such as public-facing video sharing portals, may be affected.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web application endpoint
/actions/ajax.phphandling channel comment submission. - Required access: Ability to submit a comment on a channel (typically unauthenticated or low-privilege authenticated user, depending on site configuration).
- Trigger point: Supplying crafted input in the
obj_idPOST parameter when adding a comment to a channel. - Why exploitation is possible: The
obj_idvalue is interpolated directly into a SQL query inside theuser_exists→countcall chain without input validation, sanitization, or the use of parameterized queries, enabling blind SQL injection via boolean/time-based inferences.
Why this happens
The core issue aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Application logic takes an HTTP POST parameter (obj_id) and passes it through multiple layers (ajax.php → user.class.php → db.class.php) until it is concatenated into an SQL string.
This pattern treats user-controlled data as trusted, allowing special SQL characters such as ', =, and comment markers (--) to alter the intended query structure.
The absence of parameterized queries, escaping, or strict typing for identifiers results in a blind SQL injection condition, where attackers can infer database state through query success/failure or response timing.
Potential impact
- Extraction of sensitive data from the application database (e.g., user profiles, email addresses, hashed passwords).
- Enumeration of database schema, including table and column names.
- Escalation of privileges by modifying account records or role mappings stored in the database.
- Insertion or modification of application data, potentially leading to integrity violations (e.g., fake users, manipulated video metadata, or comments).
- Facilitation of further attacks, such as session hijacking, credential stuffing, or targeted phishing based on exfiltrated information.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on removing direct string concatenation of user-controlled data into SQL queries and reducing trust in request parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, especially where user input influences query structure or identifiers.
- Introducing strict validation and normalization for parameters like
obj_id, ensuring they conform to expected formats (such as numeric IDs) before reaching the data access layer. - Implementing a centralized database abstraction layer that enforces safe query-building patterns and forbids ad-hoc string concatenation.
- Applying least-privilege principles to the database account used by the application, restricting its ability to perform destructive or administrative operations.
- Adding application-level input handling policies (e.g., rejecting unexpected characters or patterns in IDs) to narrow the attack surface.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect and monitor for this vulnerability class using a combination of static and dynamic approaches:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or custom linters to flag SQL query construction that uses string concatenation with HTTP parameters or untrusted variables. Focus on patterns where request variables propagate into data access methods without sanitization.
- Code review: During manual reviews, look for database access layers (
db.class.php, similar wrappers) that accept raw strings, as well as any use of concatenation for WHERE clauses or identifiers. Verify that all queries are parameterized and that input types are enforced. - Dynamic testing: Employ DAST tools or manual penetration tests to probe endpoints like
/actions/ajax.phpwith typical SQL injection payload patterns and analyze differences in responses, errors, or timing that indicate blind SQL injection. - Runtime monitoring: Enable application and database logging to detect anomalous query patterns, such as unexpected comment markers, tautological conditions (e.g.,
1=1), or repeated queries with small input variations.

