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CVE-2026-21688

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Type Confusion / Data Type Mismatch in iccDEV ICC Profile

CVE-2026-21688

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Type Confusion / Data Type Mismatch

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-190, CWE-476, CWE-681

Impact:

Memory Corruption and Potential Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

iccDEV versions prior to 2.3.1.2 contain a type confusion issue in SIccCalcOp::ArgsPushed() within IccProfLib/IccMpeCalc.cpp, triggered while processing ICC color profiles.

When malformed or malicious ICC profiles are handled, this flaw can lead to memory corruption with potential for crashes or code execution in applications that embed the iccDEV library.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in applications that integrate the iccDEV library to parse or manipulate ICC color profiles, particularly when the SIccCalcOp multi-process element is evaluated.

It becomes relevant when untrusted or externally supplied ICC profiles are accepted from files, documents, or image streams without stringent validation.

Desktop applications, image-processing pipelines, print workflows, and any software that automatically loads ICC profiles at render or import time may be affected, depending on how they expose profile loading to users or remote inputs.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any code path that passes ICC profiles into iccDEV for parsing or evaluation (e.g., opening images, documents, or assets that embed ICC profiles).
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence an ICC profile consumed by the vulnerable application (local file open, downloaded content, document/image import, or network-delivered media).
  • Trigger point: Processing of a profile that exercises the SIccCalcOp::ArgsPushed() logic in IccProfLib/IccMpeCalc.cpp, especially when internal argument types or counts are inconsistent with expectations.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Improper handling or verification of argument types/counts allows a mismatch between expected and actual data representations, leading to corrupted calculations, memory misuse, or incorrect casting and interpretation of data.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from insufficient validation and type safety in the implementation of the SIccCalcOp operator, specifically around argument handling in ArgsPushed().

The code assumes that arguments conform to expected data types and ranges, but does not robustly verify or enforce those assumptions when parsing profile data.

As a result, crafted profiles can cause the code to treat values as if they belonged to a different type or size than they actually do, a classic CWE-681 (Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types) and type confusion pattern.

Related weaknesses like improper input validation (CWE-20), potential integer miscalculations (CWE-190), and null dereferences (CWE-476) may compound the problem, leading to out-of-bounds access, invalid pointer usage, or other memory safety issues when the mis-typed data is used in calculations or memory operations.

Potential impact

  • Application crashes when loading or processing a malicious ICC profile
  • Memory corruption that could be steered toward arbitrary code execution in the context of the vulnerable process
  • Data integrity issues in color processing pipelines, including incorrect color transformations or corrupted output
  • Denial of service in automated image or print workflows that process untrusted media at scale
  • Potential sandbox escapes or privilege escalation when the library runs in a more privileged or trusted component

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening type safety and input trust boundaries around ICC profile processing:

  • Introduce strict validation of ICC profile structures and multi-process elements before they reach calculation paths such as SIccCalcOp::ArgsPushed(), rejecting profiles with inconsistent argument counts, types, or sizes.
  • Use defensive programming patterns when converting or casting numeric values, including explicit range checks, saturation logic, and well-defined type conversion routines.
  • Apply robust null checks and precondition assertions around all pointer dereferences and dynamic allocations within the color processing pipeline.
  • Run ICC profile processing components with the least privileges necessary and, where feasible, isolate them in separate processes or sandboxes to limit the blast radius of potential memory corruption.
  • Favor higher-level abstractions and safer container types for managing argument arrays and buffers rather than unmanaged raw pointers, to reduce the risk of misaligned access.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can use several approaches to detect this class of vulnerability and its potential exploitation:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag risky numeric conversions, unchecked casts, and pointer arithmetic around profile parsing code, especially in IccProfLib/IccMpeCalc.cpp and related modules.
  • Code review signals: During manual review, pay attention to areas where ICC profile fields are mapped directly to runtime structures without thorough validation, and where assumptions about argument counts or types are implicit rather than enforced.
  • Fuzz testing: Apply coverage-guided fuzzers to ICC profile loading and transformation functions, supplying malformed and random profiles to uncover crashes, assertion failures, or memory safety issues.
  • Runtime hardening: Enable address sanitizers, undefined behavior sanitizers, and stack/heap protection in test builds to surface misuse of memory and unsafe conversions during QA and continuous integration.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/379
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/pull/422
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-3r2x-j7v3-pg6f

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the affected application consumes ICC profiles. If profiles can be supplied via network content (such as images or documents loaded from remote sources), an attacker may remotely trigger the vulnerable path by delivering a crafted asset.

The attacker must be able to influence or provide an ICC profile that the vulnerable application will process. This may be as simple as convincing a user to open a malicious image or document, or submitting a file to a service that performs server-side color management.

The safest pattern is to enforce strong input validation and type checks before any numeric conversions or pointer-based operations, ensuring that all ICC profile fields, argument counts, and data types are consistent and within expected ranges. Additionally, using safer conversion functions and defensive checks around all casts reduces the likelihood of type confusion and memory corruption.

Adopt a secure coding strategy for binary and structured data parsers: validate all externally supplied data against a strict schema, avoid relying on implicit type assumptions, use static and dynamic analysis to catch risky conversions, and isolate complex parsers in hardened, least-privilege components. Incorporating fuzz testing and sanitizer-backed test suites into the development lifecycle is particularly effective at detecting this class of bug early.

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