Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in D-Link DIR-823X Static Route

CVE-2026-2157

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Command Execution on Router

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A command injection vulnerability in the /goform/set_static_route_table handler of D-Link DIR-823X firmware 250416 allows crafted request parameters to be concatenated into operating system commands.

A remote attacker who can reach the device's web management interface may execute arbitrary commands with the router's system privileges by manipulating fields such as interface, destip, netmask, gateway, or metric.

Affected context

This issue occurs in the web management interface of D-Link DIR-823X devices running firmware 250416 when handling static routing configuration updates.

The vulnerable logic resides in the function sub_4175CC, which processes user-supplied parameters for /goform/set_static_route_table.

When these parameters are incorporated into shell commands without adequate validation or escaping, hostile input can alter the intended command sequence.

The vulnerability becomes relevant in environments where the router's administrative HTTP(S) interface is reachable to an attacker over the network.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint /goform/set_static_route_table on the DIR-823X web management interface.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the management interface; depending on configuration, this may require knowing or bypassing admin authentication.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted request (e.g., POST) supplying malicious values in one or more of interface, destip, netmask, gateway, or metric.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled parameters are passed into shell commands without strict validation, canonicalization, or safe invocation APIs, enabling injection of additional shell metacharacters and commands.

Why this happens

The root cause follows the OS Command Injection pattern defined in CWE-78.

The router firmware appears to construct shell commands directly from HTTP parameters (interface, destip, netmask, gateway, metric) within sub_4175CC, likely using string concatenation and passing the result to a shell interpreter.

Because these values are treated as trusted and are not rigorously sanitized, quoted, or restricted to a fixed format, attackers can introduce shell control characters to alter the command's structure.

This reflects an insecure design where system-level operations depend on raw, unvalidated web input rather than using parameterized APIs or constrained configuration channels.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands on the router.
  • Complete compromise of the router's operating system and configuration.
  • Interception, modification, or redirection of network traffic routed through the device.
  • Deployment of persistent malware or participation in botnets.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks against internal network hosts.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation should focus on eliminating direct command construction from HTTP parameters and reducing the trust placed in user input.

General defensive patterns include:

  • Replacing shell command construction with safer, parameterized system APIs or native routing configuration interfaces that do not invoke a shell.
  • Strictly validating and normalizing all route parameters (interface, destip, netmask, gateway, metric) against expected formats (e.g., IP addresses, CIDR masks, bounded numeric metrics, whitelisted interfaces).
  • Applying strong output encoding or escaping for any values that must be passed to command-line contexts, ensuring shell metacharacters cannot alter command structure.
  • Enforcing least-privilege execution for management components where feasible, so that a compromise has reduced system impact.
  • Limiting remote access to the management interface via network segmentation, firewall rules, and disabling WAN-side administration where not strictly required.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and firmware developers can detect this vulnerability class using multiple approaches:

  • Static analysis: Scan CGI handlers and backend code for use of shell execution functions (e.g., system, popen, backticks) where inputs derive from HTTP parameters, especially in routing or configuration handlers.
  • Code review: Flag patterns where request parameters are concatenated into command strings, lack strict input validation, or bypass central validation utilities.
  • Dynamic testing: Use web application security testing tools and fuzzers to send crafted inputs containing shell metacharacters to /goform/set_static_route_table and monitor for anomalous behavior or command execution.
  • Policy enforcement: Adopt secure coding guidelines that prohibit direct shell invocation with user input, and integrate automated checks into the firmware build pipeline to prevent reintroduction of similar issues.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/master-abc/cve/issues/28
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.344859
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.344859
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.748376
dlink.comdlink.com/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the router's management interface is exposed beyond the local network or if an attacker can reach it via VPN or other remote access. In many home setups, the risk is higher from local network attackers or malware already inside the LAN.

That depends on the specific device configuration and any additional weaknesses present. In a secure configuration, an attacker would generally need valid administrative access or to bypass authentication through another flaw or misconfiguration.

Remove direct shell command construction from user inputs. Instead, use dedicated system APIs or libraries to update routing tables, and strictly validate all parameters (e.g., ensuring destip and gateway are valid IPs, netmask matches allowed formats, and metric is a bounded integer).

Adopt a design where web handlers never pass raw user input to a shell. Enforce input validation as a standard practice, forbid dangerous APIs in coding guidelines, use code review and static analysis to catch violations, and test administrative endpoints with security-focused automated tools before release.

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