Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in D-Link DIR-823X DDNS Service

CVE-2026-2143

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Embedded Device

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

D-Link DIR-823X firmware version 250416 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the DDNS Service endpoint /goform/set_ddns.

By manipulating specific DDNS parameters, a remote attacker can inject system commands that execute on the router, potentially taking control of the device.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in the web management interface of D-Link DIR-823X routers running firmware 250416, specifically in the DDNS configuration handler at /goform/set_ddns.

It appears when user-supplied DDNS parameters are passed into underlying system utilities or shell commands without adequate sanitization or escaping.

The risk is relevant in scenarios where the router's HTTP interface is exposed to untrusted networks (e.g., WAN access enabled, or LAN access compromised by a local attacker or malware).

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) management interface of the router, via the /goform/set_ddns handler.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the router's web interface (typically network adjacency on LAN; WAN access if remote management is enabled or otherwise exposed).
  • Trigger point: Submission of DDNS configuration data using the parameters:
  • ddnsType
  • ddnsDomainName
  • ddnsUserName
  • ddnsPwd
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to concatenate one or more of these parameters into shell commands or system calls without robust input validation or proper quoting, allowing attacker-controlled content to break out of the intended command and inject additional OS commands.

Why this happens

This issue is a classic OS command injection flaw, mapped to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), with aspects overlapping CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

The DDNS service likely invokes system utilities (for example, to update DNS records or configure networking) using command strings built from request parameters such as ddnsType, ddnsDomainName, ddnsUserName, and ddnsPwd.

Instead of treating these values as data passed through safe APIs (like parameterized library calls or properly escaped arguments), the implementation appears to embed them directly in a shell command.

This insecure pattern allows meta-characters and command delimiters to be interpreted by the shell, causing attacker-controlled commands to run with the privileges of the web management process or underlying system account on the router.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands on the router with elevated privileges.
  • Complete compromise of router configuration, including traffic rules, DNS settings, and routing behavior.
  • Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the device's firmware filesystem (where writable).
  • Interception, redirection, or manipulation of user traffic for phishing, credential theft, or content tampering.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks against internal network devices.
  • Enrollment of the router into botnets for DDoS attacks or other abusive activities.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on breaking the assumption that user-supplied input can be safely embedded in commands and on minimizing the privileges of any component that must interact with the OS:

  • Prefer high-level library calls or system APIs to perform DDNS updates instead of shelling out to command-line utilities.
  • Where command-line tools are unavoidable, pass user-supplied values strictly as arguments to process-spawning APIs that avoid the shell (e.g., exec-style calls without command-line parsing) and apply strict whitelisting of expected formats.
  • Apply rigorous input validation to DDNS parameters:
  • Enforce character whitelists suitable for domain names, usernames, and passwords.
  • Reject or escape shell meta-characters and control operators.
  • Constrain length and structure to reasonable bounds.
  • Run the web management service and DDNS components with least privilege, ensuring they have only the minimal permissions required for network configuration.
  • Segregate management interfaces from untrusted networks by default, restricting access to trusted administrative segments via firewall rules or management VLANs.
  • Establish secure development guidelines that prohibit direct concatenation of user input in any command or script context across the firmware codebase.

How teams detect issues like this

Identifying command injection in embedded web interfaces benefits from a combination of code-centric and system-level analysis:

  • Static analysis:
  • Flag code that builds shell command strings using concatenation, formatting, or templating with HTTP parameters, particularly in DDNS or network configuration modules.
  • Look for uses of APIs that spawn shells (e.g., system-like calls, popen invocations, backticks in scripts) with untrusted input.
  • Create rules targeting the /goform/set_ddns handler and similar endpoints where configuration is passed to the OS.
  • Code review signals:
  • Manual review of CGI handlers, HTTP form processing, and router management scripts for unsafe command construction.
  • Focus on DDNS-related logic that passes user data to binaries without clear escaping or whitelisting.
  • Runtime and policy enforcement:
  • Track suspicious command executions or abnormal process trees on the router during DDNS configuration changes, where feasible.
  • Use automated firmware analysis tools and web vulnerability scanners capable of fuzzing parameters like ddnsType, ddnsDomainName, ddnsUserName, and ddnsPwd for command injection behavior.
  • Integrate secure coding policies into the firmware build pipeline to prevent new uses of dangerous command execution patterns with user input.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/master-abc/cve/issues/25
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.344778
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.344778
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.747492
dlink.comdlink.com/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the router is deployed. If remote management or the web interface is accessible from the WAN side (or unintentionally exposed via port forwarding or misconfiguration), an attacker on the internet may be able to reach the vulnerable /goform/set_ddns endpoint. If management access is limited to the internal network, an attacker would generally need local network access or control of a device inside that network.

The attacker needs the ability to send HTTP requests to the router's management interface. In many home or small-office settings, this means being on the same LAN or Wi-Fi network. If authentication is required for DDNS configuration and is properly enforced, valid credentials would also be necessary; however, the precise authentication posture should not be assumed secure without verification.

The safest pattern is to avoid constructing shell commands from user-controlled input entirely. Use dedicated APIs or libraries for DDNS and network management operations, and when interaction with system utilities is unavoidable, pass arguments as data through non-shell process execution functions. Combine this with stringent input validation and least-privilege execution for all management components.

Prevention depends on design-time decisions: treat all external input (including configuration parameters) as untrusted, forbid direct concatenation of such data into command strings, and standardize on safe wrappers or libraries for system interactions. Enforce these practices through secure coding standards, mandatory code review for management interfaces, and automated static analysis rules targeting command execution APIs, so unsafe patterns are caught early in development.

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