Summary
The WebSocket API responsible for handling authentication requests does not enforce limits on the number or frequency of login attempts.
Without rate limiting, an attacker can flood the service to degrade availability or repeatedly attempt credentials, potentially leading to denial-of-service conditions or unauthorized access to charger telemetry and controls.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects systems that expose a WebSocket-based API for authenticating clients, particularly where the API handles charger telemetry or control channels.
It is relevant in deployments where:
- Authentication is performed over WebSockets rather than traditional HTTP endpoints
- There is no per-user, per-IP, or global threshold on authentication attempts
- Telemetry and control messages can be delayed, dropped, or misrouted when the authentication channel is overloaded
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public or network-accessible WebSocket authentication endpoint.
- Required access: Network-level reachability to the WebSocket server; no prior authentication is needed to attempt logins.
- Trigger point: Repeated authentication attempts are sent in rapid succession or at high volume over the WebSocket connection(s).
- Why exploitation is possible: The server does not enforce rate limits, lockouts, or progressive backoff on failed authentication attempts, allowing attackers to overwhelm resources or systematically guess credentials.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is the absence of controls on the frequency and volume of authentication attempts over the WebSocket interface.
This aligns with CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, where a system fails to limit repeated login attempts, enabling both brute-force attacks and resource exhaustion.
Architecturally, the authentication logic is treated as stateless and unthrottled, and the WebSocket layer does not implement compensating protections such as per-connection quotas, global rate limits, or account-based lockout policies.
Potential impact
- Attackers may perform high-volume authentication attempts that degrade or disrupt charger telemetry handling.
- Legitimate telemetry messages can be delayed, suppressed, or misrouted due to overloaded WebSocket infrastructure.
- Attackers could systematically brute-force credentials and gain unauthorized access to telemetry data or control functions.
- Compromised accounts may allow manipulation of charger behavior or access to sensitive operational data.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally involves introducing defensive controls around authentication frequency and resource usage:
- Apply per-identity, per-IP, and global rate limits to authentication requests at the WebSocket layer and/or an upstream gateway.
- Implement progressive delays, backoff, or temporary blocking after repeated failed authentication attempts.
- Use account lockout or step-up verification mechanisms after a configurable threshold of failures, especially for high-privilege accounts.
- Separate critical telemetry and control channels from authentication channels to reduce the blast radius of DoS attempts.
- Design authentication flows to minimize expensive operations per attempt and run services with capacity and isolation boundaries that limit impact from abusive clients.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can focus on monitoring authentication behavior and reviewing code for missing controls:
- Use static or manual code review to confirm that WebSocket authentication handlers enforce attempt limits, lockouts, or throttling.
- Inspect gateway and API configuration for absence of rate-limiting rules on authentication endpoints.
- Monitor logs and metrics for unusually high volumes of failed authentication attempts, repeated attempts from a small set of sources, or spikes in WebSocket connection churn.
- Employ anomaly-detection systems or WAF/API gateways that can automatically flag and throttle abusive authentication patterns.

