Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in D-Link DIR-823X set_language

CVE-2026-2084

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Appliance

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in the /goform/set_language endpoint of the D-Link DIR-823X router allows attacker-controlled data in the langSelection parameter to be interpreted as part of an operating system command.

When exposed to the internet or an untrusted network, a remote attacker can leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary commands on the device, potentially taking control of the router and its traffic.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web management interface of the D-Link DIR-823X (firmware 250416), specifically within the code handling the /goform/set_language request.

It is relevant when:

  • The router's web interface is reachable from the attacker's network segment or the internet
  • The langSelection parameter is processed by backend scripts that invoke system-level utilities
  • User-supplied values are passed into shell commands without robust sanitization, escaping, or safer invocation methods

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface on the router, specifically the /goform/set_language endpoint
  • Required access: Network-level access to the management interface (e.g., LAN or WAN if remote administration is enabled); authentication requirements depend on device configuration
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted langSelection parameter value in an HTTP request to /goform/set_language
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parameter value is incorporated into a command string or shell context without adequate validation or escaping, enabling attacker-controlled command fragments to be executed by the underlying OS

Why this happens

The underlying defect is improper handling of externally supplied input before it is used in operating system command execution.

In typical implementations, language selection or configuration endpoints invoke scripts or binaries, often via shell commands.

If the langSelection parameter is concatenated directly into a shell command line (or passed through a call that spawns a shell) without strict validation or neutralization of metacharacters, the shell interprets attacker-controlled fragments as additional commands.

This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), and more generally with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, where the product fails to distinguish data from executable control characters in command contexts.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary system commands on the router
  • Full compromise of the device configuration and firmware environment
  • Interception, modification, or redirection of network traffic passing through the router
  • Use of the router as a pivot point for attacks into the internal network
  • Deployment of persistent malware or participation in botnets and DDoS campaigns

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on eliminating direct shell interpretation of untrusted input and reducing the exposure of the management interface:

  • Refactor backend logic to avoid constructing shell command strings from user input; favor direct API calls, system libraries, or parameterized invocations that do not invoke a shell.
  • If OS-level tools must be called, strictly validate inputs against a whitelist of expected values (e.g., predefined language codes) and reject or default any unexpected content.
  • Avoid passing user-controlled data to generic command interpreters; when unavoidable, apply robust escaping routines designed for the specific shell and context.
  • Restrict network exposure of administrative interfaces (e.g., disable WAN management by default, limit access to trusted segments, and require strong authentication).
  • Apply least-privilege principles for the processes handling HTTP requests so that command execution, if compromised, has minimal rights on the system.

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection typically combines code-level inspection with behavioral monitoring:

  • Use static analysis to flag patterns where request parameters (like langSelection) are passed into functions that spawn shell commands (e.g., system, popen, exec* wrappers, backticks).
  • During code review, look for string concatenation or interpolation that mixes user input with command-line arguments or shell metacharacters, especially in CGI scripts, embedded web servers, or router management daemons.
  • Enforce secure coding guidelines that prohibit shell invocation with untrusted data and require whitelisting for configuration options.
  • Employ runtime monitoring on devices where feasible (e.g., logging unusual command executions or configuration changes triggered by web requests) and analyze logs for anomalous patterns in the set_language endpoint usage.
  • Incorporate automated security testing (such as dynamic application security testing and fuzzing) focused on router web endpoints that accept parameters used by backend scripts.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/master-abc/cve/issues/24
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.344651
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.344651
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.746379
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.746380
dlink.comdlink.com/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the router's management interface is exposed to an attacker—either over the internet via remote administration or within the local network—the attacker can send crafted HTTP requests to exploit the command injection.

The attacker needs network-level reachability to the /goform/set_language endpoint. Whether authentication is required depends on how the device is configured; in some deployments, misconfiguration or default credentials can lower the barrier to exploitation.

Remove any dependence on shell command construction with user input. Instead, use direct system APIs or fixed command templates with validated, whitelisted parameters, and ensure that untrusted data can never introduce shell control characters or additional commands.

Adopt a secure development standard that treats all external input as untrusted, mandates strict validation and whitelisting for configuration fields, bans shell invocation with raw user input, and uses automated security testing and code review checklists focused on command execution paths.

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