Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in UTT HiPER 810 formUser

CVE-2026-2080

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Appliance

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

UTT HiPER 810 firmware 1.7.4-141218 contains a command injection vulnerability in the setSysAdm functionality of /goform/formUser, where the passwd1 parameter is unsafely used in backend system commands.

A remote attacker who can send crafted HTTP requests to the device's management interface may execute arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the web management process.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in the web-based administration interface of UTT HiPER 810 routers running firmware 1.7.4-141218, specifically in the setSysAdm handler within /goform/formUser.

It becomes relevant in deployments where:

  • The device's HTTP/HTTPS management interface is reachable over a network segment accessible to attackers (LAN, WAN, or management VLAN).
  • The passwd1 parameter is accepted and processed when updating or setting system administrator credentials.
  • Backend scripts or binaries invoke system-level commands using user-controlled data without adequate sanitization or escaping.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/HTTPS management interface at /goform/formUser on the UTT HiPER 810.
  • Required access: Network access to the router's web interface; additional authentication may or may not be required depending on configuration.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted HTTP request that calls the setSysAdm functionality and supplies a malicious value in the passwd1 parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The passwd1 value is incorporated into a system command on the underlying OS without robust input validation, encoding, or proper argument separation, allowing injected shell metacharacters to break out of the intended command context.

Why this happens

This issue stems from unsafe construction of shell commands with untrusted user input, mapping directly to CWE-77 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command) and related CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output).

In the vulnerable code path, the backend logic handling setSysAdm appears to interpolate the passwd1 parameter into a command line—potentially via a shell or system call—without strictly treating it as data.

As a result, shell control characters (such as command separators, redirection operators, or subshell syntax) in passwd1 are interpreted by the shell, enabling an attacker to append or replace the intended command with arbitrary OS commands.

The absence of strict validation, whitelisting, and safe process invocation APIs creates an implicit execution channel for attacker-supplied input.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands on the router with the privileges of the web administration process.
  • Complete compromise of the device's configuration, including creation of backdoor accounts or persistent access.
  • Interception, modification, or redirection of network traffic traversing the device.
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for attacks into internal networks.
  • Deployment of malware or participation in botnets, leveraging the router as an attack platform.
  • Denial of service by altering system files, exhausting resources, or forcing reboots.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct command invocation with untrusted input and reducing the exposure of the management interface:

  • Replace shell-based command construction with safer APIs that pass arguments as arrays to the underlying OS, avoiding shell interpretation altogether.
  • Apply strict input validation on administrator password fields, enforcing allowed character sets and length limits, and rejecting or encoding shell metacharacters.
  • Introduce robust output encoding or escaping when user-controlled data must interact with OS-level tools.
  • Run web management components under least-privileged accounts and separate critical system operations into more restricted contexts.
  • Restrict access to the management interface to trusted networks and, where feasible, require VPN or out-of-band channels for administrative access.
  • Apply defense-in-depth controls such as network firewalls and access control lists to limit who can reach /goform/formUser.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag string concatenation or formatting operations used to build shell commands that contain HTTP parameter values like passwd1, especially in request handlers such as /goform/formUser or setSysAdm-equivalent functions.
  • Code review: During manual review, look for use of system(), popen(), exec*(), or shell scripts that directly embed web form parameters, and verify that password-handling paths never touch the shell or external commands in an unsafe manner.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Enforce secure coding policies that prohibit invoking the shell with untrusted web parameters and require centralized helpers for OS interaction.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use logging and intrusion detection to spot anomalous values in passwd1 (e.g., command separators, redirection symbols) and unusual outbound connections or processes spawned by the web service.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cha0yang1/UTT810CVE/blob/main/README.md
github.comgithub.com/cha0yang1/UTT810CVE/blob/main/README.md#reproduction-steps
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.344646
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.344646
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.745521

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the router's management interface is exposed to the internet or an untrusted network segment. If access is limited to an internal or management network, exploitation is constrained to actors with reach into that environment.

The exploitability may vary based on the device's configuration. In many deployments, authentication is required to reach administrative functions like setSysAdm, but any misconfiguration or additional flaws (such as weak or default credentials) can lower the effective access barrier.

The most robust fix is to remove shell-dependent command construction and use parameterized OS APIs that treat arguments purely as data. Combined with strict input validation on administrator fields, this breaks the injection path entirely instead of attempting to filter dangerous characters.

Adopt a secure development policy that forbids building shell commands from user input, mandate the use of vetted wrapper functions for system interactions, and integrate automated static analysis and security-focused code review into the development lifecycle, with particular attention to web form handlers and management interfaces.

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