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CVE-2026-19826

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in xxl-rpc Listener

CVE-2026-19826

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-502

Impact:

Potential Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A high-severity unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the xxl-rpc Listener allows remotely supplied Hessian data to be processed by Hessian2Input.readObject.

When the listener accepts attacker-controlled serialized input, this flaw may enable unintended object construction and potentially lead to code execution or compromise of the service process.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects alldatacenter alldata deployments through version 0.6.8 when the xxl-rpc Listener processes Hessian-serialized data using HessianSerializer.java. Risk depends on whether the listener is remotely reachable and whether untrusted clients can submit serialized objects to the affected deserialization path.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A remotely reachable xxl-rpc Listener endpoint
  • Required access: Network access sufficient to submit requests to the listener; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Processing attacker-controlled data through Hessian2Input.readObject
  • Why exploitation is possible: The deserialization path may reconstruct objects from untrusted input without sufficiently restricting permitted types or behaviors

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of an object deserialization mechanism on data that may be controlled by a remote client. Generic deserialization can reconstruct application objects and invoke type-specific behavior before the input is fully trusted or constrained.

This maps primarily to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data. The associated CWE-20: Improper Input Validation reflects the broader failure to adequately validate and constrain serialized input before processing it.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may cause unintended object construction within the service process.
  • Successful exploitation could enable arbitrary code execution, depending on available classes and runtime configuration.
  • The service may experience unauthorized data access, modification, or denial of service.
  • A compromised process could provide a foothold for further access subject to its privileges and network permissions.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing unsafe deserialization paths and reducing trust in remote serialized input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer data-only formats with explicit schemas over native object deserialization.
  • Use allowlisted types and restricted serialization mechanisms when object serialization is unavoidable.
  • Validate message structure, size, type, and context before processing application data.
  • Require authentication and authorization at the listener boundary, and limit network exposure.
  • Run the service with least-privilege permissions and restrict its egress and lateral network access.
  • Treat serialized input as untrusted even when it originates from an internal network.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this vulnerability class through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying calls to Hessian deserialization APIs and generic object reconstruction.
  • Code review checks for remote endpoints that pass request data directly into deserialization routines.
  • Dependency and configuration reviews covering exposed RPC listeners, authentication, and network segmentation.
  • Runtime monitoring for anomalous serialized payloads, unexpected object types, repeated deserialization failures, and process-spawning behavior.
  • Policy enforcement that prohibits unsafe deserialization of untrusted network input unless explicit type restrictions are present.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/alldatacenter/alldata/
github.comgithub.com/alldatacenter/alldata/issues/832
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-19826
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/870236
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/389959
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/389959/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Potentially. Exploitation depends on an xxl-rpc Listener being reachable and accepting attacker-controlled Hessian-serialized data.

Not necessarily. The required access depends on the listener's authentication and network controls; unauthenticated exposure would increase risk.

Avoid native object deserialization for untrusted input. Prefer schema-defined data formats or tightly allowlisted, restricted deserialization.

Combine secure parser policies, strict input validation, authenticated RPC access, network segmentation, least-privilege execution, and monitoring for suspicious serialized requests.

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