Summary
A critical OS command injection vulnerability in the Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater allows attacker-controlled network filter parameters to influence command construction.
When the affected function processes manipulated enable, name, or mac values, a remote attacker may be able to execute commands on the repeater, subject to the device's exposed management interface and access controls.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the repeater's network MAC-filter configuration handler, where request parameters are processed by a function using sprintf in /protocol.csp. It may affect deployments where the management interface is reachable by an attacker and the relevant configuration endpoint accepts insufficiently constrained input.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The repeater's web or HTTP management interface and its MAC-filter configuration endpoint
- Required access: Network reachability to the affected interface; additional authentication requirements depend on the device's management configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
enable,name, ormacparameters by the vulnerable configuration function - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled values are incorporated into command-related processing without adequate separation between data and operating-system commands
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is command injection caused by treating externally supplied parameter values as trusted input during command construction. Use of string formatting in a command-processing path can allow input to alter the intended command structure when validation and command/data separation are insufficient.
This maps primarily to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component describing the broader injection class.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the repeater
- The device could be taken over or rendered unavailable
- Network traffic could be monitored, redirected, or disrupted
- Stored configuration and connected-network information could be altered
- The compromised device could be used to reach other systems on the local network
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on preventing user input from becoming executable command syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing shell or command-string construction with structured APIs that pass arguments separately
- Applying strict allowlist validation for MAC addresses, names, and boolean-like configuration values
- Treating all management-interface input as untrusted, including requests from internal networks
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted administrative networks and enforcing authentication
- Running device services with the lowest practical privileges and limiting access to sensitive operating-system functions
- Using secure-by-default management settings and minimizing unnecessary command execution from web handlers
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying
sprintf, string concatenation, or formatting functions in command execution paths - Code review checks for request parameters reaching shell interpreters, system APIs, or administrative utilities
- Taint analysis tracing HTTP or CGI inputs into process-spawning and command-building functions
- Runtime monitoring for unusual management requests, unexpected child processes, or abnormal outbound connections from the repeater
- Policy enforcement that prohibits shell command construction from unvalidated web input
Automated code review and firmware analysis tools may help identify risky data flows, but findings should be validated against the device's actual execution path.

