Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability affects the sanitize_proxy_url function in Super Agent Party's extension_proxy route. A remote attacker may be able to influence the URL processed by the server, causing it to make requests to unintended destinations when the route is exposed and input validation is insufficient.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments of Super Agent Party that expose the extension_proxy route and process attacker-influenced URL values through sanitize_proxy_url. Risk depends on the server's network reachability, available credentials, routing controls, and whether internal services accept requests from the affected application.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible
extension_proxyroute - Required access: Ability to send requests to the exposed route; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the attacker-influenced
urlargument bysanitize_proxy_url - Why exploitation is possible: URL validation or normalization may fail to reliably constrain the destination, allowing the server to initiate requests beyond the intended proxy targets
Why this happens
The underlying bug is insufficient validation of a user-controlled URL before the application uses it for an outbound request. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an application accepts attacker-influenced network destinations without enforcing a sufficiently restrictive destination policy. Common weaknesses include incomplete hostname validation, unsafe redirect handling, or failure to account for alternate address representations.
Potential impact
- The server may send requests to internal network services
- Cloud or infrastructure metadata may be exposed where reachable
- Internal service endpoints may receive unauthorized requests
- Network reconnaissance may become possible through response behavior or timing
- Sensitive data may be accessed if trusted internal services are exposed
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a strict outbound request policy and reducing trust in client-supplied destinations.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowlisting approved schemes, hostnames, ports, and destination ranges
- Resolving hostnames and validating the resulting addresses before connecting
- Blocking loopback, link-local, private, multicast, and other restricted address spaces
- Revalidating destinations after redirects and DNS resolution
- Avoiding direct use of user-provided URLs when a server-side identifier can select a predefined target
- Applying egress network controls and least-privilege service-account permissions
- Returning minimal outbound response content to callers
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis for outbound HTTP clients that consume request parameters or other untrusted URL sources
- Code review checks for incomplete hostname, scheme, port, redirect, and DNS-rebinding validation
- Runtime monitoring of outbound requests to private, loopback, link-local, metadata, or unexpected external destinations
- Policy enforcement for application egress traffic and proxy target allowlists
- Security testing that verifies canonicalization and destination checks across alternate address representations
Automated review tools may help identify request sinks connected to untrusted URL input, but findings should be validated against deployment-specific network controls.

