Summary
A command injection vulnerability in the H3C NX15 V100R017 repeater functionality may allow a remote attacker to cause operating-system commands to be interpreted by the device. The risk arises when attacker-controlled input reaches the repeater API without adequate validation or safe command handling.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the H3C NX15 V100R017 web API, specifically in the repeater processing functionality exposed through /api/esps. It is associated with the esps.wan.repeater.set/repeaterproc operation when the my2P4key argument is processed in a way that may allow command syntax to influence operating-system execution. Exploitability depends on the API being reachable and the device accepting the relevant request.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible H3C NX15 management or API service
- Required access: Ability to reach the affected endpoint; additional authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
my2P4keyargument by the repeater operation - Why exploitation is possible: Input may reach an operating-system command execution path without sufficient separation between data and commands
Why this happens
The underlying issue is improper neutralization of special elements used in an operating-system command, mapping primarily to CWE-77: Command Injection. The related CWE-74 classification reflects the broader failure to separate control syntax from application data. The insecure pattern occurs when externally supplied input is concatenated into or otherwise interpreted by a shell or command processor instead of being treated strictly as validated data.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute commands with the privileges of the affected service
- The device could be compromised or its configuration altered
- Sensitive network, credential, or operational data could be exposed
- The vulnerability could enable further access to connected systems
- Network availability or device functionality could be disrupted
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on removing shell interpretation from request
processing and reducing trust in network-supplied input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process or library APIs that pass fixed arguments without invoking a shell
- Apply allowlist validation for values such as keys, identifiers, and configuration parameters
- Keep command construction separate from request data and reject unexpected characters or structures
- Run the affected service with the least privileges needed for its function
- Restrict management interfaces to trusted networks and enforce strong access controls
- Use secure-by-default API behavior that rejects malformed or unrecognized input
How teams detect issues like this
Detection programs commonly look for:
- Static-analysis findings involving shell execution, command concatenation, or dynamic process invocation
- Code-review signals where API parameters flow into command builders or interpreters
- Tests that submit boundary characters and unexpected input types to confirm strict rejection
- Network monitoring for unusual requests to repeater-management endpoints
- Policy enforcement requiring allowlist validation and prohibiting shell invocation for externally influenced data
Automated code-review and software-composition tools may help identify risky command-execution patterns, but findings should be validated against the actual request and privilege boundaries.
