Summary
The IRIS web application contains a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in its datastore upload functionality, allowing attacker-controlled script content to be persistently saved.
When other users view the affected datastore entries, the malicious JavaScript executes in their browser, potentially enabling session hijacking and unauthorized actions within the application.
The IRIS web application contains a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in its datastore upload functionality, allowing attacker-controlled script content to be persistently saved.
When other users view the affected datastore entries, the malicious JavaScript executes in their browser, potentially enabling session hijacking and unauthorized actions within the application.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in the IRIS web application's datastore upload feature, where user-supplied data is stored and later rendered in the browser.
It is most relevant in deployments where uploaded datastore content can be viewed by multiple users and is displayed without robust HTML encoding or content sanitization.
The issue is more likely to manifest in interfaces that render rich text or user-generated fields directly into the DOM, especially in shared workspaces or multi-tenant environments.
This vulnerability occurs in the IRIS web application's datastore upload feature, where user-supplied data is stored and later rendered in the browser.
It is most relevant in deployments where uploaded datastore content can be viewed by multiple users and is displayed without robust HTML encoding or content sanitization.
The issue is more likely to manifest in interfaces that render rich text or user-generated fields directly into the DOM, especially in shared workspaces or multi-tenant environments.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web-based datastore upload interface accessible through a browser.
- Required access: Ability to upload or submit datastore content (e.g., authenticated user or any user with write permissions).
- Trigger point: Viewing of the stored, malicious datastore entry in the IRIS web UI by any user whose browser renders the injected content.
- Why exploitation is possible: The application stores and later renders user-provided input without sufficient output encoding or sanitization, enabling embedded scripts to execute in the victim's browser.
- Attack surface: Web-based datastore upload interface accessible through a browser.
- Required access: Ability to upload or submit datastore content (e.g., authenticated user or any user with write permissions).
- Trigger point: Viewing of the stored, malicious datastore entry in the IRIS web UI by any user whose browser renders the injected content.
- Why exploitation is possible: The application stores and later renders user-provided input without sufficient output encoding or sanitization, enabling embedded scripts to execute in the victim's browser.
Why this happens
The underlying issue aligns with CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-Site Scripting).
IRIS stores user-supplied content from the datastore upload function and later embeds it into HTML pages without context-appropriate escaping or sanitization.
Because the application treats datastore fields as safe for direct rendering, script tags or event handlers within the stored content are interpreted by the browser as executable code, rather than inert data.
The underlying issue aligns with CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-Site Scripting).
IRIS stores user-supplied content from the datastore upload function and later embeds it into HTML pages without context-appropriate escaping or sanitization.
Because the application treats datastore fields as safe for direct rendering, script tags or event handlers within the stored content are interpreted by the browser as executable code, rather than inert data.
Potential impact
- Attackers may execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the victim's IRIS session.
- Malicious scripts could hijack authenticated sessions via cookie or token theft, where not otherwise protected.
- Users could be tricked into performing unintended actions, such as modifying or deleting datastore entries.
- Sensitive information displayed in the application interface can be read and exfiltrated by injected scripts.
- The IRIS UI may be visually defaced or manipulated to drive phishing or social engineering attacks.
- Attackers may execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the victim's IRIS session.
- Malicious scripts could hijack authenticated sessions via cookie or token theft, where not otherwise protected.
- Users could be tricked into performing unintended actions, such as modifying or deleting datastore entries.
- Sensitive information displayed in the application interface can be read and exfiltrated by injected scripts.
- The IRIS UI may be visually defaced or manipulated to drive phishing or social engineering attacks.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on treating all datastore content as untrusted and enforcing strict output encoding and sanitization before rendering in the browser.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying context-aware HTML, attribute, and JavaScript encoding for every user-controlled value inserted into web pages.
- Using a well-reviewed HTML sanitization library to strip or neutralize script tags, event attributes, and dangerous URL schemes from rich content fields.
- Designing UI components so that user-generated content is rendered as plain text by default, avoiding direct insertion into the DOM as HTML where possible.
- Implementing Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict inline scripts and limit the impact of any residual XSS.
- Aligning permission models so that only trusted roles can upload content that is widely visible to other users, reducing exposure when sanitization fails.
Effective mitigation centers on treating all datastore content as untrusted and enforcing strict output encoding and sanitization before rendering in the browser.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying context-aware HTML, attribute, and JavaScript encoding for every user-controlled value inserted into web pages.
- Using a well-reviewed HTML sanitization library to strip or neutralize script tags, event attributes, and dangerous URL schemes from rich content fields.
- Designing UI components so that user-generated content is rendered as plain text by default, avoiding direct insertion into the DOM as HTML where possible.
- Implementing Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict inline scripts and limit the impact of any residual XSS.
- Aligning permission models so that only trusted roles can upload content that is widely visible to other users, reducing exposure when sanitization fails.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines automated inspection and manual review of how user input flows into HTML views.
Useful strategies include:
- Static analysis rules that flag direct insertion of request parameters or datastore values into templates or DOM APIs without encoding.
- Code review checklists focused on template rendering paths, verifying that all user-controlled data passes through encoding or sanitization layers.
- Security tests and fuzzing that inject common XSS payload patterns into datastore uploads and then observe how those entries are rendered.
- Centralized policies that require the use of shared helper functions for output encoding and prohibit inline HTML construction with concatenated strings.
- Periodic dynamic application security testing (DAST) to probe web interfaces for reflected and stored XSS, supplemented by automated QA scripts.
Detection typically combines automated inspection and manual review of how user input flows into HTML views.
Useful strategies include:
- Static analysis rules that flag direct insertion of request parameters or datastore values into templates or DOM APIs without encoding.
- Code review checklists focused on template rendering paths, verifying that all user-controlled data passes through encoding or sanitization layers.
- Security tests and fuzzing that inject common XSS payload patterns into datastore uploads and then observe how those entries are rendered.
- Centralized policies that require the use of shared helper functions for output encoding and prohibit inline HTML construction with concatenated strings.
- Periodic dynamic application security testing (DAST) to probe web interfaces for reflected and stored XSS, supplemented by automated QA scripts.
