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CVE-2026-18285

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in Aeon Dataset Loader

CVE-2026-18285

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.0

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Aeon's load_rehab_pile_dataset method deserializes attacker-controlled data without adequate validation, allowing arbitrary code execution in the current process. Exploitation generally requires a user to visit a malicious page or open a malicious file that supplies the crafted data.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Aeon installations that invoke the load_rehab_pile_dataset method on data that may be influenced by an untrusted source. The risk becomes significant when a user processes a malicious file or interacts with content that causes crafted serialized data to reach the dataset-loading routine.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The Aeon dataset-loading functionality, particularly the

load_rehab_pile_dataset method

  • Required access: The attacker must provide or influence serialized input

consumed by the affected installation

  • User interaction: A target user must visit a malicious page or open a

malicious file

  • Trigger point: Processing the attacker-controlled data during dataset

loading

  • Why exploitation is possible: The input is deserialized without sufficient

validation, allowing attacker-controlled objects or behavior to be

reconstructed in the current process

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is the use of a deserialization mechanism that trusts serialized input from an insufficiently trusted source. Deserialization can reconstruct objects and invoke associated behavior before the application has established that the data is safe, enabling attacker-controlled code execution. This behavior maps to CWE-502, Deserialization of Untrusted Data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.
  • The attacker could access data or resources available to the affected application.
  • A successful attack may alter application behavior or local files.
  • The compromise could enable further activity under the privileges of the running process.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing unsafe deserialization paths and reducing trust in externally supplied dataset files. Secure-by-default patterns include using data formats and parsers that do not instantiate executable objects, applying strict allowlisted schemas and type validation, and validating content before any object reconstruction occurs. Input provenance and integrity should be established where practical, while file-opening and browser workflows should avoid implicitly processing untrusted datasets. Running the application with least privilege, isolating data-processing workloads, and limiting filesystem and network access can reduce impact if parsing controls fail.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static-analysis rules for unsafe deserialization APIs, dynamic object reconstruction, and dataset loaders that process untrusted files. Code review should examine whether deserialization occurs before authentication, schema validation, or type allowlisting, and whether user supplied paths or files reach the loader. Policy enforcement may require approved non-executable data formats, validated schemas, and sandboxed processing for externally sourced files. Automated security review tools can help identify these patterns during development and pull-request checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/aeon-toolkit/aeon/commit/751918052c0cce266b4f7cd4b084408526efc015
zerodayinitiative.comzerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-468/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be triggered through attacker-supplied content, but exploitation

generally requires user interaction, such as visiting a malicious page or

opening a malicious file.

Not necessarily. The key requirement is the ability to deliver serialized data

that the affected method processes; a user must then cause that data to be

loaded.

Avoid deserializing untrusted data into executable or dynamically constructed

objects. Prefer a restricted data format with strict schema, type, and

integrity validation.

Treat all externally sourced files as untrusted, enforce approved parser and

format policies, review deserialization boundaries, and isolate data

processing with least-privilege permissions.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.