Summary
A hard-coded credential shared across device units can bypass authentication on brain stimulation equipment. An attacker within Bluetooth range may use this weakness to manipulate stimulation parameters and device state.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in brain stimulation devices that expose control functionality over Bluetooth and accept a credential embedded in the device implementation. Risk increases when the same credential is authorized across multiple units and access controls do not provide an additional device-specific authentication layer.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Bluetooth-accessible device control interfaces
- Required access: Proximity sufficient to communicate with the device over Bluetooth
- Trigger point: Authentication of a control session using the shared embedded credential
- Why exploitation is possible: The credential is present in the device implementation and is accepted as an authentication bypass across device units
Why this happens
The underlying issue is the inclusion and authorization of a fixed credential within the device or its supporting software.
Because the credential is shared across units and does not depend on a protected, device-specific secret, an attacker who obtains or derives it may authenticate without valid operator credentials.
This maps to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, where authentication secrets are embedded in a product and cannot be reliably changed or independently protected.
Potential impact
- An attacker may bypass authentication on an affected device
- Stimulation parameters could be altered without authorization
- Device operating state could be changed unexpectedly
- Patient safety or treatment effectiveness could be affected
- Compromise of one device may expose other units that share the credential
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shared embedded credentials from authentication decisions and strengthening Bluetooth control boundaries.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using unique, provisioned credentials or cryptographic identities for each device
- Supporting credential rotation, revocation, and secure recovery
- Requiring authenticated and authorized control sessions for safety-sensitive operations
- Applying least privilege so authenticated clients cannot change high-risk settings without additional authorization
- Limiting Bluetooth discoverability, pairing, and connection access where operationally appropriate
- Adding secure boot, protected storage, and tamper-resistant handling for device secrets
- Enforcing safe parameter ranges and independent safety interlocks
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess this weakness through:
- Static analysis and binary review for embedded passwords, keys, or authentication tokens
- Code review checks for constants used in authentication or authorization paths
- Device testing that compares credentials and authentication behavior across units
- Bluetooth protocol assessments for unauthenticated or weakly authenticated control operations
- Policy enforcement requiring unique secrets, rotation support, and protected secret storage
- Monitoring for unexpected Bluetooth pairing, authentication failures, and changes to stimulation state

