Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Authorization Bypass in pgAdmin Server Mode

CVE-2026-1707

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Arbitrary Command Execution on pgAdmin Host

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A restore restriction bypass in pgAdmin allows an attacker using the web interface to observe and extract a temporary \restrict key during a PLAIN-format restore operation.

By racing the restore process and overwriting the restore script to call \unrestrict <key>, the attacker can re-enable meta-commands and achieve reliable command execution on the pgAdmin host.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects pgAdmin instances running in server mode that allow users to initiate restore operations from PLAIN-format dump files.

The issue manifests during active restore jobs where the pgAdmin backend generates and executes a restore script that is supposed to be restricted by a \restrict key.

Environments that expose the pgAdmin web UI to multiple users and allow them to manage or monitor restore operations are more likely to be impacted.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: pgAdmin web interface in server mode.
  • Required access: Ability to authenticate and use the pgAdmin UI sufficiently to:
  • Start or observe a PLAIN-format restore operation, and
  • Access or influence the location of the restore script file.
  • Trigger point: While a restore is actively running and before completion, the attacker monitors the process to obtain the \restrict key.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The restriction mechanism relies on a key that can be observed and then reused; the restore script can be overwritten mid-operation to embed a \unrestrict <key> command, disabling protections and re-enabling powerful meta-commands that lead to command execution.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an authorization enforcement flaw where a temporary restriction key intended to disable dangerous meta-commands during restore is both observable and re-usable by an attacker.

Instead of being fully isolated or cryptographically protected, the \restrict / \unrestrict mechanism relies on a shared secret that can be obtained in real time from the running operation.

Because the restore script remains modifiable while it is being executed, an attacker can race the process, overwrite the script, and leverage the disclosed key to remove restrictions.

This maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, as the system fails to maintain effective enforcement of command restrictions across the lifecycle of a restore operation.

Potential impact

  • Attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the pgAdmin host with the privileges of the pgAdmin process.
  • Attacker could access or modify PostgreSQL databases managed through pgAdmin beyond their intended authorization.
  • Attacker may pivot from the pgAdmin host to other internal systems, depending on network reach and credentials available.
  • Attacker can tamper with backups or restore content, potentially leading to data loss or corruption.
  • Attacker may establish persistence on the host by installing backdoors or modifying configuration files.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening the restore mechanism and reducing the trust surface around pgAdmin:

  • Treat restore scripts and dump files as untrusted input, and avoid executing meta-commands that can escape the database context.
  • Enforce atomic restore workflows where the script content cannot be modified once the job starts, or ensure it is generated in a location inaccessible to users.
  • Avoid reliance on runtime-disclosed keys for security; use enforcement mechanisms the client cannot observe or influence.
  • Run the pgAdmin service with the least privileges necessary, limiting its ability to execute OS-level commands or access sensitive filesystem paths.
  • Restrict who can start or monitor restore operations and ensure those capabilities are reserved for tightly controlled administrative roles.
  • Isolate pgAdmin on hardened hosts or containers with strict filesystem and process isolation to limit blast radius if a restore is abused.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for this class of issue using a combination of host, application, and code-level checks:

  • Static/code review:
  • Identify restore workflows that generate scripts in writable locations accessible to the same users who trigger them.
  • Flag any access control mechanisms that rely on short-lived, easily observable tokens or keys embedded in scripts or logs.
  • Review for database tooling that enables meta-commands or shell escapes during automated restore or backup operations.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor the pgAdmin host for unexpected process executions or shell commands originating from restore operations.
  • Track modifications to temporary restore scripts or working directories during active jobs, especially mid-execution changes.
  • Use file integrity monitoring to detect rapid or unusual changes to restore scripts after a job has already started.
  • Policy and tooling:
  • Enforce policies that prohibit executing unvetted scripts or meta-commands as part of backup/restore workflows.
  • Integrate automated security scanning tools to inspect administrative utilities and scripts for unsafe command execution patterns during CI/CD.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/9518

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, in environments where the pgAdmin web interface is reachable over the network. An attacker needs valid access to the pgAdmin UI, but exploitation occurs remotely via the browser, not through direct shell access to the host.

The attacker must be able to authenticate to pgAdmin (or otherwise gain access to an active session) and be allowed to interact with or monitor restore operations that use PLAIN-format dump files. They also need the ability to influence or overwrite the restore script during the operation.

The safest pattern is to ensure restore scripts cannot be altered once execution begins and that security does not depend on a key or token that can be observed or reused. Instead, enforce command restrictions in a way that is opaque to the client and guaranteed by server-side policy, not by modifiable script content.

Design administrative workflows such that:

  • Sensitive control channels (keys, tokens, restriction flags) are never exposed to user-controlled contexts.
  • Temporary files used by privileged operations are placed in isolated, non-user-writable locations and treated as immutable during execution.
  • Access control boundaries are enforced by the server and operating system rather than by conventions in user-visible scripts.
  • Security reviews explicitly examine backup/restore, migration, and maintenance utilities, which often run with elevated privileges.
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