Summary
A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in the IRIS web application allows attacker-controlled data in the assets function to be persistently saved and later executed in users' browsers.
When malicious scripts are stored and rendered without proper sanitization or encoding, visiting users can have their sessions hijacked, data stolen, or actions performed on their behalf.
A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in the IRIS web application allows attacker-controlled data in the assets function to be persistently saved and later executed in users' browsers.
When malicious scripts are stored and rendered without proper sanitization or encoding, visiting users can have their sessions hijacked, data stolen, or actions performed on their behalf.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the IRIS web application's assets function, where user-supplied content is stored and subsequently displayed in the browser.
It is present when the application fails to properly neutralize or encode HTML and script content before rendering, particularly in views or templates that reflect asset metadata or labels back to users.
The issue typically surfaces in multi-user environments where one user can create or modify assets that other users later view.
The vulnerability occurs in the IRIS web application's assets function, where user-supplied content is stored and subsequently displayed in the browser.
It is present when the application fails to properly neutralize or encode HTML and script content before rendering, particularly in views or templates that reflect asset metadata or labels back to users.
The issue typically surfaces in multi-user environments where one user can create or modify assets that other users later view.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: IRIS web application interface, specifically asset-related input fields or parameters.
- Required access: Ability to create, edit, or otherwise supply data to the assets function (e.g., authenticated user with asset management permissions).
- Trigger point: Any page or UI component that renders stored asset data to other users without proper output encoding.
- Why exploitation is possible: The application stores untrusted input from the assets function and later renders it as HTML without escaping, allowing embedded script code to run in the victim's browser.
- Attack surface: IRIS web application interface, specifically asset-related input fields or parameters.
- Required access: Ability to create, edit, or otherwise supply data to the assets function (e.g., authenticated user with asset management permissions).
- Trigger point: Any page or UI component that renders stored asset data to other users without proper output encoding.
- Why exploitation is possible: The application stores untrusted input from the assets function and later renders it as HTML without escaping, allowing embedded script code to run in the victim's browser.
Why this happens
The underlying bug class is stored cross-site scripting (CWE-79), where untrusted user input is persistently stored and rendered back to clients without neutralizing active content.
In the IRIS assets function, data originating from users is treated as display-safe HTML and inserted into the page output without proper context-aware escaping or sanitization.
This insecure pattern allows the browser to interpret attacker-provided strings as executable JavaScript, bridging the trust boundary between server-side storage and client-side execution.
The underlying bug class is stored cross-site scripting (CWE-79), where untrusted user input is persistently stored and rendered back to clients without neutralizing active content.
In the IRIS assets function, data originating from users is treated as display-safe HTML and inserted into the page output without proper context-aware escaping or sanitization.
This insecure pattern allows the browser to interpret attacker-provided strings as executable JavaScript, bridging the trust boundary between server-side storage and client-side execution.
Potential impact
- Attackers may execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of victim user sessions.
- Malicious scripts could steal session cookies or authentication tokens and enable account takeover.
- Attackers can modify page content, inject phishing forms, or redirect users to malicious sites.
- Sensitive data displayed in the application can be exfiltrated to external endpoints.
- Users' actions may be performed on their behalf, such as changing settings or initiating transactions.
- Attackers may execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of victim user sessions.
- Malicious scripts could steal session cookies or authentication tokens and enable account takeover.
- Attackers can modify page content, inject phishing forms, or redirect users to malicious sites.
- Sensitive data displayed in the application can be exfiltrated to external endpoints.
- Users' actions may be performed on their behalf, such as changing settings or initiating transactions.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on consistently applying context-aware output encoding for all asset-related fields that reach HTML, JavaScript, or URL contexts.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Treat all asset metadata and user-supplied strings as untrusted, and escape them at render time according to the output context (HTML, attribute, JavaScript, URL).
- Use templating engines or frameworks that enforce automatic escaping by default and avoid mixing raw HTML with user data.
- Apply a robust input validation strategy that restricts allowed characters or formats for asset fields, reducing the chance of script injection while still prioritizing output encoding.
- Segregate untrusted display content from privileged application logic, and avoid rendering raw HTML fragments from user-controlled asset data.
- Enforce least privilege in front-end code, avoiding use of construction APIs like
innerHTMLorevalfor dynamic content.
Effective mitigation focuses on consistently applying context-aware output encoding for all asset-related fields that reach HTML, JavaScript, or URL contexts.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Treat all asset metadata and user-supplied strings as untrusted, and escape them at render time according to the output context (HTML, attribute, JavaScript, URL).
- Use templating engines or frameworks that enforce automatic escaping by default and avoid mixing raw HTML with user data.
- Apply a robust input validation strategy that restricts allowed characters or formats for asset fields, reducing the chance of script injection while still prioritizing output encoding.
- Segregate untrusted display content from privileged application logic, and avoid rendering raw HTML fragments from user-controlled asset data.
- Enforce least privilege in front-end code, avoiding use of construction APIs like
innerHTMLorevalfor dynamic content.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines code analysis with behavioral testing:
- Static analysis can flag unescaped uses of asset-related variables in templates, views, or frontend code where user-controlled strings reach the DOM.
- Code review should look for direct insertion of user input into HTML, attributes, or script blocks, especially in the assets function and related rendering paths.
- Security-focused unit and integration tests can validate that asset fields are properly encoded and that common XSS payloads are rendered inert.
- Policy-based checks in CI/CD (e.g., lint rules or SAST tools) can automatically enforce escaping patterns and block introduction of new unescaped output sites.
Detection typically combines code analysis with behavioral testing:
- Static analysis can flag unescaped uses of asset-related variables in templates, views, or frontend code where user-controlled strings reach the DOM.
- Code review should look for direct insertion of user input into HTML, attributes, or script blocks, especially in the assets function and related rendering paths.
- Security-focused unit and integration tests can validate that asset fields are properly encoded and that common XSS payloads are rendered inert.
- Policy-based checks in CI/CD (e.g., lint rules or SAST tools) can automatically enforce escaping patterns and block introduction of new unescaped output sites.
