Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Command Injection in Tenda HG10 Boa Webserver formSamba

CVE-2026-1687

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Embedded Device

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Tenda HG10 devices expose a command injection flaw in the Boa webserver endpoint /boaform/formSamba where the serverString parameter is unsafely incorporated into system commands.

A remote attacker who can reach the web interface may execute arbitrary commands on the router's underlying operating system, leading to full device compromise.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in the web management interface of certain Tenda HG-series devices using the Boa webserver.

The issue arises when handling Samba-related configuration via /boaform/formSamba, where user-supplied input is passed into shell command construction.

Environments are at risk when the router's HTTP management interface is exposed to untrusted networks (e.g., WAN) or when attackers can reach the administrative interface through local or lateral access.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint /boaform/formSamba on the device's Boa webserver
  • Required access: Network reachability to the web interface; in some deployments, access to the authenticated admin session may or may not be required depending on how the handler is implemented
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted data in the serverString parameter as part of a request to configure or interact with Samba settings
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to concatenate serverString directly into a shell command or shell-interpreted context without robust validation, quoting, or neutralization, enabling injection of additional commands (CWE-77 / CWE-74)

Why this happens

The root cause is improper handling of user-supplied data when constructing shell commands executed by the underlying operating system.

Instead of treating serverString as opaque data, the code likely interpolates it into a command string that is then handed to a shell (for example via system() or an equivalent API).

This pattern maps to CWE-77 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command) and CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component), because special characters and metacharacters (such as command separators) in the input are not reliably sanitized or constrained.

As a result, an attacker can craft input that breaks out of the intended command structure and injects arbitrary shell instructions.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands on the router
  • Full compromise of the device, including reading or modifying configuration and credentials
  • Use of the router as a pivot point for attacks against internal network hosts
  • Installation of persistent malware such as botnet agents or traffic sniffers
  • Disruption of network services provided by the device (e.g., denial of service or configuration corruption)

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating command construction with raw user input and reducing the trust granted to network-exposed interfaces.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Replacing shell command construction with direct API calls or library functions that configure services without invoking a shell
  • Constraining all user-supplied fields (like serverString) to strict, whitelist-based patterns and expected formats (e.g., hostnames or predefined options) rather than arbitrary strings
  • Using parameterized execution primitives or argument lists (exec-style APIs) instead of building commands via string concatenation
  • Running the webserver and any helper processes with least-privilege accounts and minimal capabilities to limit damage if an injection occurs
  • Restricting exposure of the management interface (e.g., disabling WAN administration, applying network ACLs, or isolating admin interfaces on dedicated management networks)

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally combines code-centric and configuration-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Scan firmware or source code for command execution APIs (e.g., system, popen, exec*) that concatenate or interpolate HTTP parameters such as serverString into command strings
  • Code review: Examine CGI handlers and form-processing routines for places where user input influences shell commands, environment variables, or service configuration files processed by shells
  • Policy enforcement: Apply internal secure-coding policies that prohibit shell invocation with untrusted input and flag deviations in code review or CI pipelines
  • Runtime monitoring: Where possible, monitor router or embedded device logs and network behavior for anomalous command execution patterns or unexpected outbound connections, which may indicate exploitation

Automated firmware analysis tools and SAST platforms can be configured with rules targeting command injection patterns in C-based HTTP handlers and CGI programs.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/SunnyYANGyaya/cuicuishark-sheep-fishIOT/blob/main/Tenda/HG10/formSamba-serverString-command.md
github.comgithub.com/SunnyYANGyaya/cuicuishark-sheep-fishIOT/blob/main/Tenda/HG10/formSamba-serverString-command.md#poc
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.343481
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.343481
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.741281
tenda.com.cntenda.com.cn/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The vulnerable endpoint is part of the router's web interface, so any attacker who can reach that interface over the network may be able to exploit the issue, depending on authentication and exposure settings.

At minimum, the attacker must have network access to the web management port.

In some device configurations, additional requirements (such as admin authentication) may apply, but historically similar issues in embedded web interfaces have sometimes been reachable without strong authentication.

The strongest fix is to remove shell-based command construction entirely in favor of direct library calls or tightly scoped APIs.

If shell execution cannot be avoided, inputs like serverString must be strictly validated against a whitelist of allowed formats and passed as separate arguments to avoid interpretation by the shell.

Adopt secure coding standards for embedded web interfaces: forbid concatenation of user input into commands, mandate input validation and canonicalization, enforce least privilege for service accounts, and integrate static analysis and security review into the firmware development lifecycle so command injection patterns are caught before release.

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