Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Missing Authentication

CVE-2026-1670

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Account Takeover / Loss of Account Control

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An unauthenticated API endpoint allows remote modification of the "forgot password" recovery email address without verifying the caller's identity.

An attacker who discovers this endpoint can redirect password reset flows to an email address they control, enabling full account takeover under certain conditions.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in products exposing an API for managing account recovery settings, specifically the email used for "forgot password" flows.

The issue manifests when the endpoint that updates the recovery email is reachable over the network, does not enforce proper authentication, and accepts state-changing requests solely based on user-supplied identifiers (e.g., account ID or username).

It is most risky in deployments where the recovery email is a primary factor in password reset or account recovery.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal API endpoint for updating "forgot password" recovery email
  • Required access: Network access to the API; no valid user credentials required
  • Trigger point: Sending a crafted request to the unauthenticated endpoint specifying a target account and attacker-controlled email
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint performs a sensitive state change (recovery email update) without verifying that the requester is the legitimate account owner, violating basic authentication and authorization expectations

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

A security-sensitive operation—changing the recovery email used in password reset flows—is exposed via an API route that does not require prior authentication or session validation.

This design implicitly trusts any caller that can reach the endpoint, rather than enforcing user identity checks and authorization controls before applying changes to account recovery settings.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may redirect password reset emails to an address they control.
  • Attackers can potentially perform full account takeover once the recovery email is changed.
  • Users may lose access to their accounts and associated data.
  • Attackers can pivot into further fraud, impersonation, or data exfiltration using compromised accounts.
  • Loss of user trust and potential regulatory or compliance implications due to unauthorized account access.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigations focus on enforcing strong authentication and authorization around account recovery operations:

  • Require a valid, authenticated session before allowing any change to the recovery email or similar security settings.
  • Enforce ownership verification for high-risk changes (e.g., re-enter password, use an existing second factor, or confirm via current recovery email/phone).
  • Treat recovery-channel updates as high-value actions with additional step-up authentication and throttling.
  • Apply server-side authorization checks to ensure that users can only modify their own account recovery settings.
  • Design APIs so that sensitive state changes cannot be performed solely based on user identifiers supplied in the request body or URL.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves:

  • Reviewing API specifications and code for endpoints that modify authentication, recovery, or security settings without explicit authentication middleware.
  • Using static analysis or custom linters to flag routes performing critical actions (e.g., email/phone changes, password resets) that are missing authentication or authorization checks.
  • Adding security test cases to QA and automated tests that attempt unauthenticated access to sensitive endpoints.
  • Conducting periodic access control audits on identity- and account-management services, including negative tests for unauthenticated and cross-account access.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-048-04.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-048-04
honeywell.comhoneywell.com/us/en/contact/support

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As described, an attacker who can reach the API over the network can attempt to change the recovery email without prior authentication.

No. The core issue is the lack of authentication on a critical endpoint, so valid credentials are not required for exploitation.

Enforce mandatory authentication and proper authorization checks on any endpoint that modifies account recovery or security settings, ideally combined with step-up verification for such changes.

Adopt a security-by-design approach for identity and account-management APIs: classify sensitive operations, require strict authentication and authorization for all of them, and enforce these requirements through shared middleware, security reviews, and automated tests.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.