Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Missing Authentication in MOMA Seismic Station

CVE-2026-1632

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Administrative Access and Configuration Manipulation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MOMA Seismic Station up to version v2.4.2520 exposes its web management interface without any authentication, allowing anyone who can reach the interface to access administrative functions.

An unauthenticated attacker could modify configuration settings, extract device data, or remotely reset the device, especially in deployments where the interface is reachable over a network.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in MOMA Seismic Station deployments where the web management interface is reachable over a network (local or remote) and no compensating access controls (such as network segmentation, VPN, or reverse proxies enforcing authentication) are in place.

In such environments, the device's management pages can be accessed directly via a browser or HTTP client without presenting credentials, exposing configuration and operational controls to any network user who can connect.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web management interface exposed over HTTP/HTTPS
  • Required access: Network reachability to the device's management IP/port (no prior authentication needed)
  • Trigger point: Direct HTTP requests to management endpoints through a browser, script, or automated tool
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application does not enforce authentication or session validation for administrative functions, allowing anyone to invoke privileged operations

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where security-sensitive operations are exposed without verifying the user's identity.

In this case, the web management interface provides capabilities such as configuration changes, data access, and device reset but does not require any login or credential check before allowing access.

Architecturally, the design appears to assume a trusted network environment and omits an authentication layer for administrative endpoints, resulting in direct anonymous access to critical management functions.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized modification of device configuration, potentially affecting seismic monitoring accuracy or behavior
  • Unauthenticated acquisition of device data and operational information
  • Remote reset or reboot of the device, causing monitoring downtime or data loss
  • Use of the device as a foothold for further network reconnaissance or attacks if additional interfaces are exposed
  • Disruption of safety or monitoring workflows that rely on accurate, continuous seismic data

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically centers on enforcing strong authentication and reducing exposure of management interfaces:

  • Introduce mandatory authentication for all management endpoints, using robust credential mechanisms and secure session handling.
  • Apply role-based access control so that only authorized administrators can change configurations or reset the device.
  • Place management interfaces on dedicated administration networks or behind VPNs, bastion hosts, or secure proxies that require user authentication.
  • Implement secure-by-default configurations that disable unauthenticated access out of the box and require explicit opt-in for any remote management.
  • Follow least-privilege principles so that services and components exposed over the network have only the minimal capabilities required.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect missing authentication issues in device management interfaces by:

  • Performing authenticated and unauthenticated web scans to verify that administrative URLs require login before granting access.
  • Using configuration and compliance checks that flag devices with open management ports not protected by authentication or network controls.
  • Incorporating security-focused code reviews that examine controller routes and handlers for critical functions and validate that they consistently enforce authentication and authorization checks.
  • Employing automated application security testing tools (DAST/SAST) to identify endpoints exposing state-changing operations without session or identity verification.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-034-03.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-034-03

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the web management interface is reachable from an external or shared network, an attacker can interact with it remotely without authentication. If the interface is only accessible on a tightly controlled internal network, the risk is reduced but still present for insiders or anyone who gains internal access.

The attacker only needs basic network access to the device's management IP and port. No credentials or prior foothold on the device are required, making it accessible to any user or system that can route traffic to the interface.

The most robust fix is to require authentication for all management operations, using secure login mechanisms and enforcing that every administrative action is tied to an authenticated session. Pair this with authorization checks so that only designated admin roles can access sensitive functions.

Adopt a security-by-design approach where all administrative and configuration interfaces are treated as sensitive by default. During development and design reviews, require explicit authentication and authorization for any function that changes settings, exposes sensitive data, or controls device operation, and validate this through automated tests and periodic security assessments.

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