Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in rt-claw's HTTP request tooling allows an attacker to control the target URL of outbound requests.
When untrusted input is passed into claw_net_get/claw_net_post, the application may issue arbitrary network calls, making internal services and metadata endpoints accessible to a remote attacker.
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in rt-claw's HTTP request tooling allows an attacker to control the target URL of outbound requests.
When untrusted input is passed into claw_net_get/claw_net_post, the application may issue arbitrary network calls, making internal services and metadata endpoints accessible to a remote attacker.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in deployments that use the rt-claw HTTP request component (http_request) via claw_net_get and claw_net_post, and allow user-controlled data to influence the url argument.
It manifests most readily when applications pass externally supplied URLs or URL fragments directly into these helper functions without validation.
Environments where the application can reach internal networks, cloud metadata services, or privileged HTTP endpoints are particularly exposed, although the actual risk depends on network topology and access controls.
This vulnerability occurs in deployments that use the rt-claw HTTP request component (http_request) via claw_net_get and claw_net_post, and allow user-controlled data to influence the url argument.
It manifests most readily when applications pass externally supplied URLs or URL fragments directly into these helper functions without validation.
Environments where the application can reach internal networks, cloud metadata services, or privileged HTTP endpoints are particularly exposed, although the actual risk depends on network topology and access controls.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Any feature or API path that lets an attacker influence the
urlparameter provided toclaw_net_get/claw_net_post. - Required access: Remote interaction with the application (e.g., web API, CLI over network, or integration endpoint) capable of submitting crafted URLs.
- Trigger point: Execution of an HTTP request using
claw_net_getorclaw_net_postwhere the URL is derived from untrusted input. - Why exploitation is possible: The library treats the URL as trusted and does not enforce destination restrictions, allowing outbound requests to arbitrary hosts, including internal or sensitive infrastructure.
- Attack surface: Any feature or API path that lets an attacker influence the
urlparameter provided toclaw_net_get/claw_net_post. - Required access: Remote interaction with the application (e.g., web API, CLI over network, or integration endpoint) capable of submitting crafted URLs.
- Trigger point: Execution of an HTTP request using
claw_net_getorclaw_net_postwhere the URL is derived from untrusted input. - Why exploitation is possible: The library treats the URL as trusted and does not enforce destination restrictions, allowing outbound requests to arbitrary hosts, including internal or sensitive infrastructure.
Why this happens
The underlying bug class is server-side request forgery, mapped to CWE-918, where an application makes HTTP requests based on untrusted input without proper validation or restriction.
In rt-claw, the claw_net_get and claw_net_post functions appear to accept caller-provided URLs and forward them directly to the HTTP client layer, implicitly trusting them as safe destinations.
Abstractly, this reflects an insecure pattern where a server-side component acts as a proxy for user-chosen targets, lacking allowlists, scheme checks, or network segmentation controls to prevent access to internal resources.
The underlying bug class is server-side request forgery, mapped to CWE-918, where an application makes HTTP requests based on untrusted input without proper validation or restriction.
In rt-claw, the claw_net_get and claw_net_post functions appear to accept caller-provided URLs and forward them directly to the HTTP client layer, implicitly trusting them as safe destinations.
Abstractly, this reflects an insecure pattern where a server-side component acts as a proxy for user-chosen targets, lacking allowlists, scheme checks, or network segmentation controls to prevent access to internal resources.
Potential impact
- An attacker may force the application to send requests to internal services not directly exposed to the internet.
- An attacker could access cloud provider metadata endpoints and potentially obtain credentials or configuration secrets.
- Internal HTTP-based admin panels, management APIs, or debugging endpoints could be reached and interacted with.
- The application can be used as a pivot point for reconnaissance of internal network infrastructure.
- Depending on reachable endpoints, further compromise or data exfiltration from backend systems may occur.
- An attacker may force the application to send requests to internal services not directly exposed to the internet.
- An attacker could access cloud provider metadata endpoints and potentially obtain credentials or configuration secrets.
- Internal HTTP-based admin panels, management APIs, or debugging endpoints could be reached and interacted with.
- The application can be used as a pivot point for reconnaissance of internal network infrastructure.
- Depending on reachable endpoints, further compromise or data exfiltration from backend systems may occur.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on constraining where server-side HTTP requests are allowed to go and reducing trust in user-supplied URLs.
Defensive patterns typically include:
- Enforcing strict allowlists of permitted hostnames, IP ranges, and URL schemes for outbound requests.
- Rejecting or sanitizing user-controlled URLs, especially those pointing to private IP ranges, link-local addresses, or metadata services.
- Separating internal service-to-service communication from user-driven HTTP proxy functionality and avoiding generic "fetch any URL" features.
- Applying least-privilege networking, such as denying application containers direct access to sensitive internal segments or metadata endpoints.
- Designing APIs to accept logical resource identifiers rather than full URLs, resolving them server-side under controlled rules.
Effective mitigation centers on constraining where server-side HTTP requests are allowed to go and reducing trust in user-supplied URLs.
Defensive patterns typically include:
- Enforcing strict allowlists of permitted hostnames, IP ranges, and URL schemes for outbound requests.
- Rejecting or sanitizing user-controlled URLs, especially those pointing to private IP ranges, link-local addresses, or metadata services.
- Separating internal service-to-service communication from user-driven HTTP proxy functionality and avoiding generic "fetch any URL" features.
- Applying least-privilege networking, such as denying application containers direct access to sensitive internal segments or metadata endpoints.
- Designing APIs to accept logical resource identifiers rather than full URLs, resolving them server-side under controlled rules.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can surface SSRF risks through a mix of code-centric and operational checks:
- Static analysis rules that flag uses of HTTP client utilities (
claw_net_get,claw_net_post, or similar) where theurlargument originates from request parameters or other untrusted sources. - Code review practices that look for patterns such as "user chooses URL" or "proxy any URL" and question the necessity and safeguards around these flows.
- Policy-based enforcement in CI pipelines requiring host restrictions or URL validation helpers whenever outbound HTTP calls are implemented.
- Runtime monitoring of egress traffic to detect anomalous requests to internal IP ranges, metadata endpoints, or unexpected services, potentially combined with alerting and blocking.
Organizations can surface SSRF risks through a mix of code-centric and operational checks:
- Static analysis rules that flag uses of HTTP client utilities (
claw_net_get,claw_net_post, or similar) where theurlargument originates from request parameters or other untrusted sources. - Code review practices that look for patterns such as "user chooses URL" or "proxy any URL" and question the necessity and safeguards around these flows.
- Policy-based enforcement in CI pipelines requiring host restrictions or URL validation helpers whenever outbound HTTP calls are implemented.
- Runtime monitoring of egress traffic to detect anomalous requests to internal IP ranges, metadata endpoints, or unexpected services, potentially combined with alerting and blocking.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
