Summary
A server-side request forgery flaw in rt-claw's HTTP request tooling allows crafted URLs to make the application issue arbitrary outbound requests.
When an attacker can control the url argument to claw_net_get or claw_net_post, they may pivot through the server to reach internal services and protected resources.
A server-side request forgery flaw in rt-claw's HTTP request tooling allows crafted URLs to make the application issue arbitrary outbound requests.
When an attacker can control the url argument to claw_net_get or claw_net_post, they may pivot through the server to reach internal services and protected resources.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in deployments that use rt-claw's http_request component to perform outbound HTTP calls and pass user-influenced URLs into claw_net_get or claw_net_post.
It becomes risky when application logic does not validate or constrain destination addresses and the host running rt-claw has network visibility into internal services, metadata endpoints, or other sensitive infrastructure.
This vulnerability appears in deployments that use rt-claw's http_request component to perform outbound HTTP calls and pass user-influenced URLs into claw_net_get or claw_net_post.
It becomes risky when application logic does not validate or constrain destination addresses and the host running rt-claw has network visibility into internal services, metadata endpoints, or other sensitive infrastructure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Any feature that allows users or integrated systems to supply or influence the
urlargument to rt-claw HTTP functions. - Required access: Ability to send requests to the application and control or significantly affect the target URL for outgoing HTTP calls.
- Trigger point: Invocation of
claw_net_getorclaw_net_postwith attacker-controlledurlvalues, causing the server to initiate outbound connections. - Why exploitation is possible: The implementation appears to trust the
urlparameter without enforcing strict allowlists, scheme checks, or network boundaries, enabling requests to internal hosts and privileged endpoints.
- Attack surface: Any feature that allows users or integrated systems to supply or influence the
urlargument to rt-claw HTTP functions. - Required access: Ability to send requests to the application and control or significantly affect the target URL for outgoing HTTP calls.
- Trigger point: Invocation of
claw_net_getorclaw_net_postwith attacker-controlledurlvalues, causing the server to initiate outbound connections. - Why exploitation is possible: The implementation appears to trust the
urlparameter without enforcing strict allowlists, scheme checks, or network boundaries, enabling requests to internal hosts and privileged endpoints.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a lack of destination validation and network boundary enforcement when constructing outbound HTTP requests.
The claw_net_get and claw_net_post functions treat the url argument as fully trusted, allowing arbitrary hostnames, IPs, and possibly protocols.
This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where an application is abused as a proxy to reach internal or otherwise restricted resources because user-controlled data is used directly as a remote resource locator.
The underlying issue is a lack of destination validation and network boundary enforcement when constructing outbound HTTP requests.
The claw_net_get and claw_net_post functions treat the url argument as fully trusted, allowing arbitrary hostnames, IPs, and possibly protocols.
This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where an application is abused as a proxy to reach internal or otherwise restricted resources because user-controlled data is used directly as a remote resource locator.
Potential impact
- May access internal web services and administrative interfaces not exposed to the internet.
- Could query cloud instance metadata services and obtain credentials or configuration secrets.
- Can be used to bypass network-based access controls by tunneling through the vulnerable server.
- May aid in reconnaissance of internal network topology and service availability.
- Could facilitate further compromise by chaining SSRF with other weaknesses (e.g., misconfigured internal APIs).
- May access internal web services and administrative interfaces not exposed to the internet.
- Could query cloud instance metadata services and obtain credentials or configuration secrets.
- Can be used to bypass network-based access controls by tunneling through the vulnerable server.
- May aid in reconnaissance of internal network topology and service availability.
- Could facilitate further compromise by chaining SSRF with other weaknesses (e.g., misconfigured internal APIs).
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on restricting where outbound HTTP requests can go and reducing trust in caller-provided URLs.
Common patterns include:
- Enforcing strict allowlists of permitted domains or endpoints for all outgoing HTTP calls.
- Rejecting or normalizing URLs that target private IP ranges, localhost, or link-local addresses.
- Limiting supported schemes to safe, expected values (e.g., only
httpsto known hosts). - Applying least-privilege networking rules so the service cannot reach sensitive internal segments or metadata endpoints.
- Centralizing HTTP client usage behind a controlled abstraction that validates destinations before requests are issued.
Effective mitigation focuses on restricting where outbound HTTP requests can go and reducing trust in caller-provided URLs.
Common patterns include:
- Enforcing strict allowlists of permitted domains or endpoints for all outgoing HTTP calls.
- Rejecting or normalizing URLs that target private IP ranges, localhost, or link-local addresses.
- Limiting supported schemes to safe, expected values (e.g., only
httpsto known hosts). - Applying least-privilege networking rules so the service cannot reach sensitive internal segments or metadata endpoints.
- Centralizing HTTP client usage behind a controlled abstraction that validates destinations before requests are issued.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify SSRF risks in rt-claw integrations by:
- Reviewing code for patterns where user input or request parameters flow directly into
claw_net_getorclaw_net_post. - Using static analysis rules that flag unvalidated URL construction or calls to outbound HTTP clients with tainted data.
- Establishing code review checklists that require destination validation, allowlists, and scheme checks around HTTP request utilities.
- Monitoring network logs for unusual outbound connections from application servers, especially to internal or cloud-metadata endpoints.
Organizations can identify SSRF risks in rt-claw integrations by:
- Reviewing code for patterns where user input or request parameters flow directly into
claw_net_getorclaw_net_post. - Using static analysis rules that flag unvalidated URL construction or calls to outbound HTTP clients with tainted data.
- Establishing code review checklists that require destination validation, allowlists, and scheme checks around HTTP request utilities.
- Monitoring network logs for unusual outbound connections from application servers, especially to internal or cloud-metadata endpoints.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
