Summary
A command-injection flaw in dracut allows untrusted DHCP-derived data to be written into an emergency-hook shell script without adequate shell quoting. An attacker controlling a rogue DHCP server on an adjacent network may cause commands to execute with root privileges when the system later handles a boot failure and sources the hook.
Affected context
The issue occurs in dracut systems that:
- Process DHCP-provided ROOT_PATH data during initramfs or network boot handling
- Include that data in an error message generated by the die() function
- Write the message into an emergency-hook shell script
- Source the generated hook during subsequent boot-failure handling
Exploitability depends on the attacker being able to influence DHCP responses and the affected system later entering a code path that sources the generated emergency hook.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Adjacent network through DHCP configuration delivery
- Required access: Ability to operate or control a rogue DHCP server visible to the target
- Trigger point: Creation and later sourcing of the dracut emergency-hook script during boot-failure handling
- Why exploitation is possible: DHCP-derived content is incorporated into shell script text without sufficient quoting, allowing shell syntax to be interpreted when the hook is sourced
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper neutralization of externally controlled data before it is embedded in a shell script. dracut's error-handling path places a message containing DHCP-derived ROOT_PATH data into an emergency-hook file, but does not apply shell-safe quoting or treat the value strictly as data.
This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, because attacker-influenced input can alter the behavior of a shell script when it is interpreted.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands with root privileges
- The initramfs or early-boot environment could be compromised
- System confidentiality, integrity, and availability could be affected
- Persistence or additional compromise may be possible depending on the boot environment and available privileges
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on keeping externally supplied values out of executable shell context and reducing trust in network-provided configuration.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Treating DHCP-derived values strictly as data rather than shell source
- Applying context-appropriate shell escaping when script generation cannot be avoided
- Using structured data or fixed command arguments instead of dynamically generated shell code
- Validating and constraining network-provided path values before use
- Limiting when emergency hooks are generated and sourced
- Running early-boot components with only the privileges and capabilities they require
- Applying network controls that reduce exposure to unauthorized DHCP servers
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches can include:
- Static analysis rules for concatenating external input into shell scripts or command strings
- Code review checks for generated initramfs hooks and unquoted shell variables
- Searches for error-handling functions that write user- or network-controlled content to executable files
- Policy enforcement requiring shell-safe quoting and structured process APIs
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected DHCP infrastructure, modified initramfs hook files, or unusual commands executed during early boot
Automated code-review and security-scanning tools may help identify shell injection patterns, but findings should be validated against the actual boot and sourcing paths.

