/

CVE-2026-15732

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) in WGDashboard

CVE-2026-15732

Received

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized access to internal network resources and sensitive responses

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WGDashboard's webhook functionality may allow an authenticated attacker to cause the server to send arbitrary HTTP requests and return the responses. The issue becomes risky when the application can reach internal services, administrative endpoints, or sensitive network locations that the attacker cannot access directly.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in WGDashboard deployments where authenticated users can configure or trigger webhook requests and the server does not sufficiently restrict destination URLs or response handling. Risk depends on the server's network connectivity, available credentials, reachable internal services, and the permissions granted to authenticated users.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Webhook functionality exposed by the WGDashboard application
  • Required access: Valid authenticated access with sufficient permission to use or influence webhooks
  • Trigger point: Server-side processing of a webhook request
  • Why exploitation is possible: Destination and request behavior may be attacker-controlled without adequate URL validation, network egress restrictions, or response isolation

Why this happens

The underlying bug is insufficient validation and restriction of server-initiated outbound requests. When user-controlled webhook destinations are accepted as trusted URLs, the application can be induced to access resources on internal networks or the local host and disclose returned content to the requester. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal administrative services or network-only endpoints
  • Retrieval of sensitive response data
  • Exposure of cloud or service metadata where reachable
  • Circumvention of network access controls
  • Further compromise if accessible services contain additional weaknesses

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-supplied destinations and limiting the server's outbound network capabilities.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Allowing webhook requests only to explicitly approved destinations
  • Validating URL schemes, hosts, ports, and resolved addresses
  • Blocking loopback, link-local, private, and otherwise restricted address ranges
  • Rechecking destinations after DNS resolution to reduce rebinding risks
  • Applying network egress controls and isolating webhook processing
  • Returning only the minimum response data required by the feature
  • Enforcing least privilege for authenticated users and webhook permissions

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify SSRF risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for user-controlled URLs passed to HTTP client libraries
  • Code review checks for missing allowlists, private-address filtering, and redirect validation
  • Monitoring outbound requests from the application to unexpected hosts, ports, or address ranges
  • Network policies that alert on access to internal control planes, metadata services, or loopback targets
  • Security tests that verify URL parsing, DNS resolution, redirect handling, and response exposure

Automated application security review tools may help identify server-side request flows, but findings should be validated against deployment network controls.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Stuub/WGDashboard-v4.3.2-Full-Read-SSRF-via-Webhooks-PoC
github.comgithub.com/WGDashboard/WGDashboard

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker may be able to exploit it through the web application if they have valid authentication and the required webhook permissions.

The impact depends on destinations reachable from the WGDashboard server, its network position, outbound firewall rules, and the privileges of accessible services.

Restrict webhook destinations to an explicit allowlist, validate resolved addresses and redirects, and limit the application's outbound network access.

Treat webhook URLs as untrusted input, enforce centralized SSRF protections, apply least privilege, monitor egress traffic, and review all server-side HTTP request functionality.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.