Summary
Jinher OA 1.0 contains a SQL injection flaw in the PlanGiveOut.aspx endpoint where user-supplied data is incorporated into database queries without proper sanitization.
An attacker sending crafted httpOID parameters over the network can manipulate backend SQL statements, potentially accessing or modifying sensitive data in the application database.
Affected context
The vulnerability appears within the Jinher OA 1.0 web application, specifically in functionality exposed by /C6/JHSoft.Web.PlanSummarize/PlanGiveOut.aspx.
It arises when the application builds SQL queries using the httpOID parameter, or related request data, without robust validation or parameterization.
This typically affects deployments where the application server has direct access to a relational database and trusts incoming HTTP parameters for query construction.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public or internal web endpoint
/C6/JHSoft.Web.PlanSummarize/PlanGiveOut.aspxreachable over HTTP/HTTPS. - Required access: Ability to send requests to the application (usually remote, potentially unauthenticated depending on deployment).
- Trigger point: Submission of crafted
httpOIDvalues or related parameters that are used directly in SQL query construction. - Why exploitation is possible: The server-side code appears to concatenate or interpolate user input into SQL statements without using parameterized queries or consistent input validation, allowing attackers to alter the intended query structure.
Why this happens
The underlying bug class aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') and CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output.
Application logic likely constructs SQL commands by embedding the httpOID argument directly into query strings, treating it as trusted data.
Without parameterized statements or robust neutralization, control characters and SQL syntax in user input are interpreted by the database engine, transforming data input into query logic and enabling injection.
Potential impact
- Attackers may read sensitive records they are not authorized to access.
- Malicious users could modify, insert, or delete data in the underlying database.
- The application's integrity can be compromised, leading to altered business workflows or falsified records.
- Depending on database configuration, attackers might escalate to executing database-native procedures or accessing adjacent systems.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating direct concatenation of user input into SQL statements and tightening trust boundaries around request parameters.
Secure design patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, ensuring user data is treated strictly as values.
- Applying strict input validation for identifiers like
httpOID, limiting them to expected formats (e.g., numeric IDs or constrained UUIDs). - Centralizing database access logic to enforce consistent query-building practices and prevent ad hoc string-based SQL.
- Applying least-privilege to database accounts so that even if injection is attempted, accessible operations and data are minimized.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically relies on combining code-level analysis with operational monitoring:
- Static analysis rules that flag dynamic SQL construction using request parameters, string concatenation, or format operations.
- Targeted code reviews of data access layers to look for inline SQL strings that incorporate user input without binding parameters.
- Security testing (including automated scanners and manual penetration tests) focused on inputs like
httpOIDthat influence query behavior. - Runtime monitoring and database logging for anomalous queries, unexpected UNIONs, tautological WHERE clauses, or sudden changes to critical tables.

