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CVE-2026-14453

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.6)

SSTI (CWE-94) in Centreon Open Tickets Module

CVE-2026-14453

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Template Injection

CWE:

CWE-94

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical Server-Side Template Injection vulnerability in Centreon's centreon-open-tickets module allows arbitrary code execution when the message_confirm field is rendered via Smarty without a security policy.

Any authenticated user who can control this field may execute server-side code, expose environment secrets, and disrupt the Centreon Infra Monitoring platform.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in Centreon's centreon-open-tickets module where user-controlled content is persisted and later processed by the Smarty templating engine.

It is relevant in deployments where authenticated users can supply or modify the message_confirm field and where Smarty is configured without a restrictive security policy.

Risk increases when the application runs with access to sensitive environment variables, secrets, or critical monitoring infrastructure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web interface of the Centreon Infra Monitoring product (centreon-open-tickets module)
  • Required access: Authenticated access with permissions to create or modify ticket data, including message_confirm
  • Trigger point: Rendering of stored message_confirm data through Smarty templates during ticket workflows
  • Why exploitation is possible: The field is stored unsanitized and interpreted by Smarty with no security policy, allowing template expressions to be treated as executable code on the server

Why this happens

This issue stems from treating untrusted, user-supplied data as part of server-side templates without appropriate isolation or sanitization.

In the affected module, the message_confirm field is persisted and then passed directly into Smarty, a powerful templating engine capable of executing logic on the server.

With no security policy or sandboxing enabled, injected template code can invoke arbitrary functions and interact with the runtime environment.

Conceptually, this maps to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code, where unvalidated input is allowed to influence server-side code execution paths.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary code on the Centreon server
  • Disclosure of environment variables, configuration data, and embedded secrets
  • Compromise of credentials used to access monitored infrastructure or integrations
  • Denial of service through deliberate process crashes or resource exhaustion
  • Full takeover of the monitoring platform and potential pivot into connected systems

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on removing direct execution of user-controlled data in template engines and enforcing strict separation between data and logic.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Escaping or encoding user-input fields before rendering in server-side templates so they are treated as plain text
  • Enabling and configuring a restrictive Smarty security policy or sandbox that disallows dangerous functions and code constructs
  • Using a templating approach where application code constructs the logic and templates only handle display, avoiding dynamic evaluation of user content
  • Reducing runtime privileges of the Centreon application so that, even if template injection occurs, the process has minimal access to sensitive resources
  • Centralizing validation rules for rich-text or message fields to restrict allowable syntax and block template directives altogether

How teams detect issues like this

Detection commonly involves a combination of code-focused and runtime techniques:

  • Static analysis rules that flag passing user-controlled or database-derived fields directly into template engines capable of execution
  • Code review checklists that require verification of template engine security policies and explicit escaping of dynamic content
  • Security tests that attempt to inject benign template expressions into message or description fields and observe whether server-side evaluation occurs
  • Policy enforcement in CI/CD pipelines to prevent disabling of template sandboxes or addition of high-risk engine plugins
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual template evaluation errors, unexpected function calls from templating contexts, or anomalous access to environment variables

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/centreon/centreon/releases

Frequently asked

questions

No, exploitation generally requires an authenticated user who can supply or modify data rendered by the centreon-open-tickets module, particularly the message_confirm field.

The attacker needs valid credentials and sufficient permissions to create or edit tickets or related records that influence the vulnerable template field. Elevated monitoring roles increase the potential impact but are not strictly required for exploitation.

The most robust fix pattern is to ensure that user-controlled data is always treated as plain content in templates: escape all dynamic fields, enforce a strict Smarty security policy or sandbox, and prevent any direct evaluation of user-supplied template directives.

Future prevention relies on architectural and process controls: standardize secure templating practices, mandate security policies for all template engines, incorporate automated checks for user-data flowing into executable contexts, and include SSTI-specific tests in regular application security assessments.

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