Summary
A SQL injection flaw in funadmin's Frontend List Endpoint can occur when the selectFields argument is used by Curd::selectList to construct database queries. Because the endpoint is remotely reachable, an attacker may be able to manipulate queries; the resulting impact depends on access controls and the database permissions available to the application.
A SQL injection flaw in funadmin's Frontend List Endpoint can occur when the selectFields argument is used by Curd::selectList to construct database queries. Because the endpoint is remotely reachable, an attacker may be able to manipulate queries; the resulting impact depends on access controls and the database permissions available to the application.
Affected context
The reported issue affects the Frontend List Endpoint in funadmin 7.1.0, specifically Curd::selectList in /frontend/ajax/index. It may be present where remotely supplied selectFields values influence SQL query construction without adequate parameterization or validation. The description does not establish whether authentication is required or what database operations are exposed.
The reported issue affects the Frontend List Endpoint in funadmin 7.1.0, specifically Curd::selectList in /frontend/ajax/index. It may be present where remotely supplied selectFields values influence SQL query construction without adequate parameterization or validation. The description does not establish whether authentication is required or what database operations are exposed.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible Frontend List Endpoint
- Required access: The ability to reach the endpoint; whether authentication is required is not specified
- Trigger point: Processing of the
selectFieldsargument byCurd::selectList - Why exploitation may be possible: User-controlled field selections may affect SQL query structure if they are incorporated without safe query construction and appropriate validation
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible Frontend List Endpoint
- Required access: The ability to reach the endpoint; whether authentication is required is not specified
- Trigger point: Processing of the
selectFieldsargument byCurd::selectList - Why exploitation may be possible: User-controlled field selections may affect SQL query structure if they are incorporated without safe query construction and appropriate validation
Why this happens
The reported behavior is consistent with SQL injection, classified as CWE-89, and the broader improper neutralization of special elements, classified as CWE-74. The underlying insecure pattern is allowing externally influenced input to alter SQL syntax rather than treating it strictly as data. Validation alone may not reliably protect query structure when values are concatenated into SQL.
The reported behavior is consistent with SQL injection, classified as CWE-89, and the broader improper neutralization of special elements, classified as CWE-74. The underlying insecure pattern is allowing externally influenced input to alter SQL syntax rather than treating it strictly as data. Validation alone may not reliably protect query structure when values are concatenated into SQL.
Potential impact
- An attacker may be able to alter database queries made by the endpoint.
- Depending on query behavior and database permissions, unauthorized data access or modification could occur.
- Database availability or integrity could be affected.
- Data exposed through the application may be at risk if the endpoint can access sensitive records.
- An attacker may be able to alter database queries made by the endpoint.
- Depending on query behavior and database permissions, unauthorized data access or modification could occur.
- Database availability or integrity could be affected.
- Data exposed through the application may be at risk if the endpoint can access sensitive records.
General mitigation guidance
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or query-builder APIs that keep data separate from SQL syntax.
- Where dynamic column selection is required, map user-facing choices to a fixed allowlist of known fields rather than accepting arbitrary SQL fragments.
- Apply input validation as a supplementary control, not as a replacement for safe query construction.
- Limit the database account to the minimum permissions needed by the application.
- Avoid exposing sensitive records through endpoints unless access checks explicitly authorize them.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or query-builder APIs that keep data separate from SQL syntax.
- Where dynamic column selection is required, map user-facing choices to a fixed allowlist of known fields rather than accepting arbitrary SQL fragments.
- Apply input validation as a supplementary control, not as a replacement for safe query construction.
- Limit the database account to the minimum permissions needed by the application.
- Avoid exposing sensitive records through endpoints unless access checks explicitly authorize them.
How teams detect issues like this
- Use static analysis to identify SQL built through string concatenation or interpolation involving request parameters.
- Review code paths that pass
selectFieldsor similar dynamic field arguments into query construction. - Test endpoint behavior with security-focused input validation in an authorized environment, and monitor for unusual database errors or query patterns.
- Enforce code-review and CI policies requiring parameterized queries and allowlisted dynamic identifiers. Automated review tools may help flag risky patterns.
- Use static analysis to identify SQL built through string concatenation or interpolation involving request parameters.
- Review code paths that pass
selectFieldsor similar dynamic field arguments into query construction. - Test endpoint behavior with security-focused input validation in an authorized environment, and monitor for unusual database errors or query patterns.
- Enforce code-review and CI policies requiring parameterized queries and allowlisted dynamic identifiers. Automated review tools may help flag risky patterns.

