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CVE-2026-120279

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in WAVLINK WN536AX6-A

CVE-2026-120279

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Command Execution and Device Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical OS command injection flaw is reported in the openvpn_cli handler of WAVLINK WN536AX6-A firmware V260507. A remotely supplied file_id value may reach command execution in /protocol.csp, potentially allowing an attacker to run operating-system commands on the device.

A critical OS command injection flaw is reported in the openvpn_cli handler of WAVLINK WN536AX6-A firmware V260507. A remotely supplied file_id value may reach command execution in /protocol.csp, potentially allowing an attacker to run operating-system commands on the device.

Affected context

The reported issue is in the openvpn_cli handler associated with /protocol.csp on WAVLINK WN536AX6-A V260507. It may arise when the handler processes the file_id argument in a way that allows its contents to affect operating-system command execution. The available description does not specify authentication requirements or deployment conditions, so exposure depends on the device's configuration and network reachability.

The reported issue is in the openvpn_cli handler associated with /protocol.csp on WAVLINK WN536AX6-A V260507. It may arise when the handler processes the file_id argument in a way that allows its contents to affect operating-system command execution. The available description does not specify authentication requirements or deployment conditions, so exposure depends on the device's configuration and network reachability.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The /protocol.csp endpoint and its openvpn_cli handler must be reachable.
  • Required access: The description reports remote exploitation but does not establish whether authentication is required.
  • Trigger point: Processing of the file_id argument by the handler.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The argument may be interpreted as part of an operating-system command rather than handled strictly as data.
  • Exploit availability: A public exploit has reportedly been published; its applicability may depend on the target's configuration.
  • Attack surface: The /protocol.csp endpoint and its openvpn_cli handler must be reachable.
  • Required access: The description reports remote exploitation but does not establish whether authentication is required.
  • Trigger point: Processing of the file_id argument by the handler.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The argument may be interpreted as part of an operating-system command rather than handled strictly as data.
  • Exploit availability: A public exploit has reportedly been published; its applicability may depend on the target's configuration.

Why this happens

The reported behavior is consistent with OS command injection, classified as CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The underlying insecure pattern is allowing externally influenced input to alter the structure or meaning of a system command. CWE-77 describes the broader class of command injection; CWE-78 applies when the affected command is an operating-system command.

The reported behavior is consistent with OS command injection, classified as CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The underlying insecure pattern is allowing externally influenced input to alter the structure or meaning of a system command. CWE-77 describes the broader class of command injection; CWE-78 applies when the affected command is an operating-system command.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute commands in the context of the affected service.
  • The device could be compromised, potentially affecting its availability or configuration.
  • Sensitive information accessible to the service may be exposed.
  • A compromised device could potentially be used as a foothold for further activity on connected networks.
  • An attacker may execute commands in the context of the affected service.
  • The device could be compromised, potentially affecting its availability or configuration.
  • Sensitive information accessible to the service may be exposed.
  • A compromised device could potentially be used as a foothold for further activity on connected networks.

General mitigation guidance

Defensive patterns focus on ensuring external input cannot become command syntax:

  • Prefer APIs that invoke specific functions directly instead of constructing shell commands.
  • Where a system command is unavoidable, pass arguments using structured process APIs and avoid shell interpretation.
  • Validate inputs against a narrow, explicit allowlist and treat identifiers as data, not command fragments.
  • Run services with the minimum privileges and access necessary.
  • Limit network exposure to management interfaces and apply access controls appropriate to the environment.

Defensive patterns focus on ensuring external input cannot become command syntax:

  • Prefer APIs that invoke specific functions directly instead of constructing shell commands.
  • Where a system command is unavoidable, pass arguments using structured process APIs and avoid shell interpretation.
  • Validate inputs against a narrow, explicit allowlist and treat identifiers as data, not command fragments.
  • Run services with the minimum privileges and access necessary.
  • Limit network exposure to management interfaces and apply access controls appropriate to the environment.

How teams detect issues like this

  • Review handler code and related libraries for shell invocation or command construction that uses request-controlled values.
  • Use static analysis rules to flag shell APIs, unsafe string concatenation, and externally influenced command arguments.
  • Add code-review checks for input validation and structured process invocation at command-execution boundaries.
  • Apply network and device monitoring policies to identify unexpected access to management endpoints or unusual process activity.
  • Automated code review tools may help surface risky command construction patterns.
  • Review handler code and related libraries for shell invocation or command construction that uses request-controlled values.
  • Use static analysis rules to flag shell APIs, unsafe string concatenation, and externally influenced command arguments.
  • Add code-review checks for input validation and structured process invocation at command-execution boundaries.
  • Apply network and device monitoring policies to identify unexpected access to management endpoints or unusual process activity.
  • Automated code review tools may help surface risky command construction patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pipiyyb/cve/blob/main/WAVLINK%20WN536AX6-A/WN536AX6-A_file_id.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-120279
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/919788
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/429623
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/429623/cti

Frequently asked

questions

The report states that the attack can be launched remotely. Actual exposure depends on whether the affected handler is reachable in a particular deployment.

The available description does not specify authentication requirements. Access controls and the device's configuration may affect exploitability.

Avoid building shell commands from request data. Prefer direct APIs with structured arguments, strict input allowlists, and least-privilege execution.

Treat external input as data, review command-execution boundaries, use static analysis for unsafe command construction, and restrict access to management interfaces.

The report states that the attack can be launched remotely. Actual exposure depends on whether the affected handler is reachable in a particular deployment.

The available description does not specify authentication requirements. Access controls and the device's configuration may affect exploitability.

Avoid building shell commands from request data. Prefer direct APIs with structured arguments, strict input allowlists, and least-privilege execution.

Treat external input as data, review command-execution boundaries, use static analysis for unsafe command construction, and restrict access to management interfaces.

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