Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Improper Authentication in CRMEB appleLogin API Endpoint

CVE-2026-1202

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Authentication Bypass / Account Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

CRMEB up to version 5.6.3 contains an improper authentication flaw in the appleLogin function of LoginController.php that mishandles the openId parameter during Apple-based login.

A remote attacker can abuse this weakness to bypass normal authentication checks and potentially obtain unauthorized access to user accounts by manipulating the openId value.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in CRMEB deployments that expose the v1 API login controller and support Apple-based authentication through the appleLogin endpoint.

The flaw is present when the backend implicitly trusts the openId argument or performs incomplete verification of its authenticity and association with the requesting user.

Any internet-accessible CRMEB instance using this login flow and running a vulnerable version may be exposed if requests to the Apple login API are not otherwise constrained.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public HTTP(S) API endpoint (appleLogin) within the CRMEB v1 login controller.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the CRMEB API; no prior authentication is required if the endpoint is reachable anonymously.
  • Trigger point: Sending crafted requests to the appleLogin function with a manipulated openId parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application performs incomplete or incorrect verification of the openId, relying on client-supplied data or insufficient server-side validation instead of strictly validating tokens and identity assertions with the identity provider.

Why this happens

This issue stems from improper authentication logic (CWE-287) in the Apple login flow.

Instead of treating the openId as untrusted input that must be validated against an authoritative identity provider and cryptographically verified tokens, the backend appears to accept or insufficiently validate the supplied identifier and directly associates it with an application user.

The insecure pattern is trusting identifiers or claims from the client without robust server-side verification of their authenticity, integrity, and binding to the current session and user.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized login as existing users by supplying a forged or guessed openId.
  • Account takeover for users whose identifiers can be predicted, intercepted, or manipulated.
  • Exposure of personal or business data stored in compromised CRMEB accounts.
  • Use of compromised accounts as a pivot for further fraud, social engineering, or configuration tampering.
  • Degradation of trust in Apple-based single sign-on mechanisms within the application.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on strengthening server-side authentication and identity verification and eliminating trust in client-supplied identifiers.

Useful defensive patterns include:

  • Performing full server-side validation of identity provider tokens (e.g., verifying signatures, issuer, audience, expiry) rather than trusting openId or similar IDs from the client.
  • Binding authenticated identities to securely obtained tokens or assertions, not to raw identifiers supplied in application parameters.
  • Implementing strict checks that ensure the openId is both valid and actually belongs to the authenticated Apple user by consulting the identity provider directly.
  • Centralizing authentication logic in well-reviewed modules and avoiding bespoke ad-hoc checks in individual controllers.
  • Applying the principle of least privilege to downstream actions, so that even if authentication is mis-evaluated, the blast radius is reduced.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level weaknesses and runtime anomalies:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag authentication flows that rely on client-supplied identifiers (openId, userId, uid) without token or signature verification.
  • Look for login endpoints where identity decisions are made based on a single request parameter or missing checks against an external identity provider.
  • Review controller methods handling social or SSO logins to ensure they delegate to a centralized, verified authentication module.
  • Policy and automated checks:
  • Enforce coding standards requiring all third-party identity integrations to use provider SDKs or well-tested libraries, not custom parsing of identifiers.
  • Add CI checks or SAST rules for functions that create sessions or tokens without verifying cryptographic claims.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor authentication logs for unusual patterns such as multiple accounts accessed from the same IP using Apple login without normal credential challenges.
  • Alert on high rates of failed and then suddenly successful Apple login attempts using varying identifiers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/foeCat/CVE/blob/main/CRMEB/apple_login_auth_bypass.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.341788
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.341788
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.734711

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is remotely exploitable against any internet-exposed CRMEB instance that exposes the vulnerable appleLogin endpoint. Because an exploit is publicly available, the practical risk is elevated, especially for systems without additional compensating controls such as WAF rules or strict rate limiting.

In many scenarios, no prior account or valid Apple credentials are required if the implementation accepts manipulated openId values without fully verifying them. However, the exact requirements depend on how the login flow is implemented and whether any additional server-side checks exist.

The safest approach is to refactor the Apple login implementation to rely solely on securely validated tokens or assertions obtained from Apple, verifying signatures, issuer, audience, and expiry on the server. The application should derive the authenticated user identity from these validated claims, not from raw identifiers passed in request parameters.

Use battle-tested authentication libraries or provider SDKs for all third-party login flows, centralize authentication logic, and adopt a security design rule that no identity or authorization decision is made using unverified client input. Combine this with regular security reviews of authentication endpoints and automated checks that flag direct trust in client-supplied identifiers.

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