Summary
PipesHub contains an event type injection vulnerability that can let an authenticated user with only the crawl:write scope trigger connector-deletion behavior through a schedule route. Successful exploitation may remove connector instances and purge associated record embeddings without the intended connector-deletion authorization.
PipesHub contains an event type injection vulnerability that can let an authenticated user with only the crawl:write scope trigger connector-deletion behavior through a schedule route. Successful exploitation may remove connector instances and purge associated record embeddings without the intended connector-deletion authorization.
Affected context
The issue affects PipesHub deployments that expose schedule routes accepting a connector path segment and use that segment to select event behavior. Risk is present when authorization checks for the requested operation are not independently enforced after the event type is derived from user-controlled route data.
The issue affects PipesHub deployments that expose schedule routes accepting a connector path segment and use that segment to select event behavior. Risk is present when authorization checks for the requested operation are not independently enforced after the event type is derived from user-controlled route data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Schedule-related HTTP route containing a connector path segment
- Required access: An authenticated account with the
crawl:writescope - Trigger point: Processing a crafted connector value that resolves to a deletion event
- Why exploitation is possible: The application may use the injected event type to invoke connector deletion without separately requiring the
connector:deletescope or lock checks
- Attack surface: Schedule-related HTTP route containing a connector path segment
- Required access: An authenticated account with the
crawl:writescope - Trigger point: Processing a crafted connector value that resolves to a deletion event
- Why exploitation is possible: The application may use the injected event type to invoke connector deletion without separately requiring the
connector:deletescope or lock checks
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authorization design error involving user-controlled event or action selection. A route parameter is interpreted as an event type, allowing a caller with limited permissions to reach a destructive operation whose authorization requirements are not re-evaluated independently.
This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, because the application fails to enforce the required permission check before performing connector deletion and related data cleanup.
The underlying flaw is an authorization design error involving user-controlled event or action selection. A route parameter is interpreted as an event type, allowing a caller with limited permissions to reach a destructive operation whose authorization requirements are not re-evaluated independently.
This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, because the application fails to enforce the required permission check before performing connector deletion and related data cleanup.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized deletion of connector instances
- Purging of record embeddings associated with affected connectors
- Loss of connector-backed data availability
- Disruption of scheduled crawling or synchronization workflows
- Increased operational and recovery costs
- Unauthorized deletion of connector instances
- Purging of record embeddings associated with affected connectors
- Loss of connector-backed data availability
- Disruption of scheduled crawling or synchronization workflows
- Increased operational and recovery costs
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation typically focuses on separating routing, event selection, and authorization decisions.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving allowed actions from server-side route definitions rather than trusting event-like path values
- Enforcing operation-specific authorization immediately before every destructive action
- Requiring the dedicated connector-deletion privilege for connector removal and associated cleanup
- Applying allowlists for connector identifiers and event types
- Treating scope checks and connector lock checks as mandatory independent controls
- Limiting service-account permissions and using least-privilege defaults
- Adding confirmation, auditing, and recovery controls for destructive operations
Mitigation typically focuses on separating routing, event selection, and authorization decisions.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving allowed actions from server-side route definitions rather than trusting event-like path values
- Enforcing operation-specific authorization immediately before every destructive action
- Requiring the dedicated connector-deletion privilege for connector removal and associated cleanup
- Applying allowlists for connector identifiers and event types
- Treating scope checks and connector lock checks as mandatory independent controls
- Limiting service-account permissions and using least-privilege defaults
- Adding confirmation, auditing, and recovery controls for destructive operations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis patterns where request parameters select handlers, commands, or event types
- Code review signals showing authorization performed only at a parent route or for a broader operation
- Tests that exercise each destructive handler with lower-privileged scopes
- Policy checks requiring operation-specific authorization before deletion or data purge
- Audit events where accounts with crawling permissions invoke connector deletion or unusual cleanup actions
- Automated security testing that mutates route parameters and verifies privilege boundaries
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis patterns where request parameters select handlers, commands, or event types
- Code review signals showing authorization performed only at a parent route or for a broader operation
- Tests that exercise each destructive handler with lower-privileged scopes
- Policy checks requiring operation-specific authorization before deletion or data purge
- Audit events where accounts with crawling permissions invoke connector deletion or unusual cleanup actions
- Automated security testing that mutates route parameters and verifies privilege boundaries
