Summary
SQLite's command-line shell can emit attacker-controlled dot-commands from database schema content when processing the .recover command. If a victim pipes that output into sqlite3, the embedded commands may execute operating system commands with the victim process's privileges.
SQLite's command-line shell can emit attacker-controlled dot-commands from database schema content when processing the .recover command. If a victim pipes that output into sqlite3, the embedded commands may execute operating system commands with the victim process's privileges.
Affected context
The issue occurs in SQLite command-line shell versions through 3.54.1 when the .recover command processes a database containing attacker-controlled sqlite_schema.sql values. Risk depends on a workflow that treats .recover output as executable sqlite3 input, rather than reviewing or sanitizing the generated text first.
The issue occurs in SQLite command-line shell versions through 3.54.1 when the .recover command processes a database containing attacker-controlled sqlite_schema.sql values. Risk depends on a workflow that treats .recover output as executable sqlite3 input, rather than reviewing or sanitizing the generated text first.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: SQLite command-line shell recovery workflow
- Required access: Ability to provide or cause the victim to open a crafted SQLite database
- Trigger point: The victim runs
.recoverand pipes its output intosqlite3 - Why exploitation is possible: Schema text is emitted verbatim, allowing
attacker-planted dot-commands to be interpreted by the receiving shell
- Execution context: Commands run with the privileges of the process
consuming the recovery output
- Attack surface: SQLite command-line shell recovery workflow
- Required access: Ability to provide or cause the victim to open a crafted SQLite database
- Trigger point: The victim runs
.recoverand pipes its output intosqlite3 - Why exploitation is possible: Schema text is emitted verbatim, allowing
attacker-planted dot-commands to be interpreted by the receiving shell
- Execution context: Commands run with the privileges of the process
consuming the recovery output
Why this happens
The .recover implementation treats content derived from sqlite_schema.sql as trusted output even though database files may be attacker-controlled. Because SQLite shell dot-commands are directives rather than ordinary SQL, emitting them without neutralization can cause a downstream sqlite3 process to interpret attacker-supplied text as shell instructions. This is command injection under CWE-77, caused by mixing untrusted data with an executable command language.
The .recover implementation treats content derived from sqlite_schema.sql as trusted output even though database files may be attacker-controlled. Because SQLite shell dot-commands are directives rather than ordinary SQL, emitting them without neutralization can cause a downstream sqlite3 process to interpret attacker-supplied text as shell instructions. This is command injection under CWE-77, caused by mixing untrusted data with an executable command language.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute operating system commands as the victim user
- The attacker could read, modify, or delete accessible files
- The vulnerable workflow may lead to credential or data exposure
- A compromised account or host could be used for further attacks
- An attacker may execute operating system commands as the victim user
- The attacker could read, modify, or delete accessible files
- The vulnerable workflow may lead to credential or data exposure
- A compromised account or host could be used for further attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating recovery output as untrusted data
rather than executable input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding direct piping of .recover output into an SQLite shell
- Reviewing and sanitizing generated recovery text before execution
- Using recovery workflows that separate data from shell directives
- Running database inspection and recovery in an isolated, least-privileged environment
- Restricting access to untrusted database files and applying appropriate file permissions
- Disabling unnecessary shell-command capabilities in controlled execution environments
Mitigation generally focuses on treating recovery output as untrusted data
rather than executable input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding direct piping of .recover output into an SQLite shell
- Reviewing and sanitizing generated recovery text before execution
- Using recovery workflows that separate data from shell directives
- Running database inspection and recovery in an isolated, least-privileged environment
- Restricting access to untrusted database files and applying appropriate file permissions
- Disabling unnecessary shell-command capabilities in controlled execution environments
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis and code review for direct piping of database recovery output into command interpreters
- Searching scripts and operational documentation for automated
.recover | sqlite3workflows - Monitoring recovery output for unexpected dot-commands such as
.shellor.system - Applying policy controls that prohibit execution of generated database or migration text without review
- Using automated security review tools to flag data flowing from untrusted database files into command-capable parsers
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis and code review for direct piping of database recovery output into command interpreters
- Searching scripts and operational documentation for automated
.recover | sqlite3workflows - Monitoring recovery output for unexpected dot-commands such as
.shellor.system - Applying policy controls that prohibit execution of generated database or migration text without review
- Using automated security review tools to flag data flowing from untrusted database files into command-capable parsers
