Summary
CakePHP contains a SQL injection vulnerability in collation handling when unvalidated collation values are incorporated into SQL expressions. An attacker who can control a collation name passed to StringExpression or IdentifierExpression may append SQL after the COLLATE clause and influence database operations within the connection's privileges.
CakePHP contains a SQL injection vulnerability in collation handling when unvalidated collation values are incorporated into SQL expressions. An attacker who can control a collation name passed to StringExpression or IdentifierExpression may append SQL after the COLLATE clause and influence database operations within the connection's privileges.
Affected context
The issue affects CakePHP applications that construct StringExpression or IdentifierExpression objects with collation values influenced by untrusted input. It becomes risky when those values are passed to a constructor or setCollation() without allowlisting or context-aware validation before the resulting expression is compiled into a database query.
The issue affects CakePHP applications that construct StringExpression or IdentifierExpression objects with collation values influenced by untrusted input. It becomes risky when those values are passed to a constructor or setCollation() without allowlisting or context-aware validation before the resulting expression is compiled into a database query.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Application code that builds database expressions from request-controlled or otherwise untrusted collation values
- Required access: The ability to influence a collation name reaching the relevant expression API
- Trigger point: SQL generation and execution involving the affected expression
- Why exploitation is possible: The collation value may be inserted into the query after an unquoted
COLLATEclause, allowing SQL syntax to be interpreted as part of the statement - Required authority: Database impact is limited by the privileges of the application's database connection
- Attack surface: Application code that builds database expressions from request-controlled or otherwise untrusted collation values
- Required access: The ability to influence a collation name reaching the relevant expression API
- Trigger point: SQL generation and execution involving the affected expression
- Why exploitation is possible: The collation value may be inserted into the query after an unquoted
COLLATEclause, allowing SQL syntax to be interpreted as part of the statement - Required authority: Database impact is limited by the privileges of the application's database connection
Why this happens
The underlying bug is failure to treat collation names as constrained SQL identifiers or predefined values. When an expression API accepts a collation string and incorporates it into generated SQL without strict validation, attacker-controlled content can escape the intended semantic role and alter query structure. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, commonly known as SQL injection.
The underlying bug is failure to treat collation names as constrained SQL identifiers or predefined values. When an expression API accepts a collation string and incorporates it into generated SQL without strict validation, attacker-controlled content can escape the intended semantic role and alter query structure. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, commonly known as SQL injection.
Potential impact
- An attacker may alter the logic of affected database queries
- Sensitive records may be disclosed through manipulated query behavior
- Data may be modified or deleted if the database account permits those operations
- Application authentication or authorization checks could be weakened in affected query paths
- Database availability could be degraded
- An attacker may alter the logic of affected database queries
- Sensitive records may be disclosed through manipulated query behavior
- Data may be modified or deleted if the database account permits those operations
- Application authentication or authorization checks could be weakened in affected query paths
- Database availability could be degraded
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in collation inputs and ensuring that generated SQL cannot be extended through identifier-like values.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting collations to a small, explicit allowlist appropriate for each supported database
- Rejecting unexpected characters, formats, or values before expression construction
- Separating user-selectable presentation options from SQL expression construction
- Using framework APIs that represent validated identifiers or structured query components
- Applying parameterization for data values while recognizing that parameters generally do not substitute for SQL identifiers
- Limiting database accounts to the minimum permissions required by the application
- Preserving centralized validation and authorization controls for every query path
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in collation inputs and ensuring that generated SQL cannot be extended through identifier-like values.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting collations to a small, explicit allowlist appropriate for each supported database
- Rejecting unexpected characters, formats, or values before expression construction
- Separating user-selectable presentation options from SQL expression construction
- Using framework APIs that represent validated identifiers or structured query components
- Applying parameterization for data values while recognizing that parameters generally do not substitute for SQL identifiers
- Limiting database accounts to the minimum permissions required by the application
- Preserving centralized validation and authorization controls for every query path
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules that flag user-controlled data passed to collation setters or expression constructors
- Code review checks for dynamic SQL identifier, ordering, grouping, and collation values
- Searches for
setCollation()and related expression APIs where arguments originate from requests, headers, stored records, or job inputs - Runtime monitoring for unexpected
COLLATEfragments, query-shape changes, database errors, or unusual query volume - Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted SQL identifiers and security tests for query-generation boundaries
- Automated application-security scanning and code-review tools configured to identify SQL injection data flows
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules that flag user-controlled data passed to collation setters or expression constructors
- Code review checks for dynamic SQL identifier, ordering, grouping, and collation values
- Searches for
setCollation()and related expression APIs where arguments originate from requests, headers, stored records, or job inputs - Runtime monitoring for unexpected
COLLATEfragments, query-shape changes, database errors, or unusual query volume - Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted SQL identifiers and security tests for query-generation boundaries
- Automated application-security scanning and code-review tools configured to identify SQL injection data flows
