Summary
DroidMind through version 0.4.0 contains a command injection vulnerability in device-management operations. An MCP client, including a prompt-injected agent, may bypass the shell command allowlist and cause blocked commands to execute on a connected Android device when attacker-controlled parameters reach vulnerable command-handling paths.
DroidMind through version 0.4.0 contains a command injection vulnerability in device-management operations. An MCP client, including a prompt-injected agent, may bypass the shell command allowlist and cause blocked commands to execute on a connected Android device when attacker-controlled parameters reach vulnerable command-handling paths.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in DroidMind deployments through 0.4.0 that expose MCP operations for Android device management. It becomes risky when client-controlled values are interpolated into Device.run_shell() or accepted by Device.list_directory() without effective validation and are subsequently interpreted by a shell. The practical impact depends on the connected device's permissions, enabled operations, and deployment trust boundaries.
The vulnerability occurs in DroidMind deployments through 0.4.0 that expose MCP operations for Android device management. It becomes risky when client-controlled values are interpolated into Device.run_shell() or accepted by Device.list_directory() without effective validation and are subsequently interpreted by a shell. The practical impact depends on the connected device's permissions, enabled operations, and deployment trust boundaries.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: MCP-exposed Android device-management functions
- Required access: The ability to submit requests or parameters to an MCP client connected to DroidMind
- Trigger point: Processing parameters through
Device.run_shell()or unvalidatedDevice.list_directory() - Why exploitation is possible: Shell metacharacter substitution can be interpreted after the command allowlist check, allowing injected operations to evade intended command restrictions
- Attack surface: MCP-exposed Android device-management functions
- Required access: The ability to submit requests or parameters to an MCP client connected to DroidMind
- Trigger point: Processing parameters through
Device.run_shell()or unvalidatedDevice.list_directory() - Why exploitation is possible: Shell metacharacter substitution can be interpreted after the command allowlist check, allowing injected operations to evade intended command restrictions
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is insufficient separation between data and shell syntax. Parameters are incorporated into command strings or passed through insufficiently validated directory-handling logic, while allowlist enforcement does not account for shell substitution semantics. This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, because attacker-controlled input can alter the command interpreted by the operating system.
The underlying flaw is insufficient separation between data and shell syntax. Parameters are incorporated into command strings or passed through insufficiently validated directory-handling logic, while allowlist enforcement does not account for shell substitution semantics. This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, because attacker-controlled input can alter the command interpreted by the operating system.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute commands that the allowlist intended to block
- Connected Android devices could be rebooted, disrupted, or otherwise modified
- Device data could be exposed, altered, or deleted
- Compromised devices could be used to affect connected development or testing workflows
- Prompt-injected agents could unintentionally trigger unauthorized device operations
- An attacker may execute commands that the allowlist intended to block
- Connected Android devices could be rebooted, disrupted, or otherwise modified
- Device data could be exposed, altered, or deleted
- Compromised devices could be used to affect connected development or testing workflows
- Prompt-injected agents could unintentionally trigger unauthorized device operations
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from device-management operations and treating all MCP parameters as untrusted input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process or Android API calls with structured argument arrays instead of concatenated shell commands
- Apply strict allowlists to operation names and individual arguments before execution
- Reject shell metacharacters and unexpected argument forms where shell invocation cannot be avoided
- Validate directory and device identifiers against constrained schemas and permitted locations
- Enforce least privilege on connected devices and isolate automation accounts from sensitive devices
- Require explicit authorization for disruptive operations and use secure-by-default client policies
- Add confirmation or human approval controls for high-impact device actions
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from device-management operations and treating all MCP parameters as untrusted input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process or Android API calls with structured argument arrays instead of concatenated shell commands
- Apply strict allowlists to operation names and individual arguments before execution
- Reject shell metacharacters and unexpected argument forms where shell invocation cannot be avoided
- Validate directory and device identifiers against constrained schemas and permitted locations
- Enforce least privilege on connected devices and isolate automation accounts from sensitive devices
- Require explicit authorization for disruptive operations and use secure-by-default client policies
- Add confirmation or human approval controls for high-impact device actions
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying string interpolation or concatenation in shell execution paths
- Code review checks for allowlists applied before, rather than after, shell parsing
- Tests using metacharacter-containing inputs to verify that command boundaries cannot be changed
- Review of MCP tool schemas for unconstrained strings passed to device operations
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected shell processes, blocked-command attempts, reboot activity, and unusual device changes
- Policy enforcement requiring structured process APIs and approval gates for destructive actions
Automated code-review and security-scanning tools may help identify risky command-construction patterns, but should be supplemented with behavioral testing.
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying string interpolation or concatenation in shell execution paths
- Code review checks for allowlists applied before, rather than after, shell parsing
- Tests using metacharacter-containing inputs to verify that command boundaries cannot be changed
- Review of MCP tool schemas for unconstrained strings passed to device operations
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected shell processes, blocked-command attempts, reboot activity, and unusual device changes
- Policy enforcement requiring structured process APIs and approval gates for destructive actions
Automated code-review and security-scanning tools may help identify risky command-construction patterns, but should be supplemented with behavioral testing.
