Summary
A critical authentication bypass in REDAXO's structure/history plugin allows unauthenticated attackers to forge temporary login tokens.
By forcing the session-bound secret into a predictable state, an attacker may obtain backend access as privileged accounts such as an administrator and potentially execute code outside live mode.
A critical authentication bypass in REDAXO's structure/history plugin allows unauthenticated attackers to forge temporary login tokens.
By forcing the session-bound secret into a predictable state, an attacker may obtain backend access as privileged accounts such as an administrator and potentially execute code outside live mode.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects REDAXO core deployments that enable or expose the structure/history plugin and use vulnerable temporary login token handling. Risk increases when the plugin's token-generation flow can be reached without authentication and session-tied secret material can be forced into a predictable state.
The vulnerability affects REDAXO core deployments that enable or expose the structure/history plugin and use vulnerable temporary login token handling. Risk increases when the plugin's token-generation flow can be reached without authentication and session-tied secret material can be forced into a predictable state.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The REDAXO backend authentication and structure/history plugin token-handling flow
- Required access: No valid account credentials are required
- Trigger point: Processing of temporary login tokens associated with backend sessions
- Why exploitation is possible: The session-bound secret can be driven into a predictable state, allowing forged tokens to be accepted as valid authentication material
- Attack surface: The REDAXO backend authentication and structure/history plugin token-handling flow
- Required access: No valid account credentials are required
- Trigger point: Processing of temporary login tokens associated with backend sessions
- Why exploitation is possible: The session-bound secret can be driven into a predictable state, allowing forged tokens to be accepted as valid authentication material
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authentication design error in which temporary login tokens rely on session-related secret material that can become predictable or attacker-influenced.
When the application accepts a token without sufficiently proving its authenticity and unpredictability, an unauthenticated party may forge credentials that the backend treats as valid. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the system fails to reliably verify the identity represented by an authentication token.
The underlying flaw is an authentication design error in which temporary login tokens rely on session-related secret material that can become predictable or attacker-influenced.
When the application accepts a token without sufficiently proving its authenticity and unpredictability, an unauthenticated party may forge credentials that the backend treats as valid. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the system fails to reliably verify the identity represented by an authentication token.
Potential impact
- An attacker may obtain unauthorized REDAXO backend access
- An attacker could impersonate privileged accounts, including administrators
- Malicious users may alter site content, configuration, or extensions
- Successful exploitation can lead to code execution outside live mode
- Compromised administrative access may enable persistence, data exposure, or further compromise
- An attacker may obtain unauthorized REDAXO backend access
- An attacker could impersonate privileged accounts, including administrators
- Malicious users may alter site content, configuration, or extensions
- Successful exploitation can lead to code execution outside live mode
- Compromised administrative access may enable persistence, data exposure, or further compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing predictable authentication state and strengthening the trust model for temporary tokens.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Generate temporary tokens with cryptographically secure, unpredictable randomness
- Bind tokens to server-side session state without allowing client-controlled values to influence secrets
- Apply strict expiration, single-use, audience, and privilege constraints to temporary tokens
- Reauthenticate or require additional verification for sensitive administrative actions
- Limit backend permissions and separate content administration from code or extension management
- Protect authentication endpoints with secure session, transport, and request-integrity controls
- Review and invalidate existing sessions or temporary credentials after suspected compromise
Mitigation generally focuses on removing predictable authentication state and strengthening the trust model for temporary tokens.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Generate temporary tokens with cryptographically secure, unpredictable randomness
- Bind tokens to server-side session state without allowing client-controlled values to influence secrets
- Apply strict expiration, single-use, audience, and privilege constraints to temporary tokens
- Reauthenticate or require additional verification for sensitive administrative actions
- Limit backend permissions and separate content administration from code or extension management
- Protect authentication endpoints with secure session, transport, and request-integrity controls
- Review and invalidate existing sessions or temporary credentials after suspected compromise
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess this class of issue through:
- Static analysis for token generation based on timestamps, predictable session values, or user-controlled input
- Code review of temporary-login flows, token verification, privilege transitions, and session-binding logic
- Dynamic testing that checks whether unauthenticated requests can influence token secrets or obtain privileged sessions
- Monitoring for unusual temporary-login requests, repeated token failures, administrator session creation, and backend access from unexpected sources
- Policy enforcement requiring cryptographically secure randomness, short token lifetimes, single-use semantics, and explicit privilege checks
- Automated security review tools that flag weak token construction and authentication-state manipulation patterns
Organizations can assess this class of issue through:
- Static analysis for token generation based on timestamps, predictable session values, or user-controlled input
- Code review of temporary-login flows, token verification, privilege transitions, and session-binding logic
- Dynamic testing that checks whether unauthenticated requests can influence token secrets or obtain privileged sessions
- Monitoring for unusual temporary-login requests, repeated token failures, administrator session creation, and backend access from unexpected sources
- Policy enforcement requiring cryptographically secure randomness, short token lifetimes, single-use semantics, and explicit privilege checks
- Automated security review tools that flag weak token construction and authentication-state manipulation patterns
