Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in the php-travel-agency-system Admin Search Pages component allows remote attackers to manipulate database queries through customer_name, voucher_no, or emp_name parameters. The issue becomes risky when these values are incorporated into SQL statements without reliable parameterization or equivalent query isolation.
A SQL injection vulnerability in the php-travel-agency-system Admin Search Pages component allows remote attackers to manipulate database queries through customer_name, voucher_no, or emp_name parameters. The issue becomes risky when these values are incorporated into SQL statements without reliable parameterization or equivalent query isolation.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the admin/customer_search.php endpoint of the Admin Search Pages component. Deployments may be exposed when the affected search parameters are reachable remotely and are processed as part of database queries without adequate separation between user input and SQL syntax. The precise database operations and authentication requirements are not established by the available description.
The vulnerability occurs in the admin/customer_search.php endpoint of the Admin Search Pages component. Deployments may be exposed when the affected search parameters are reachable remotely and are processed as part of database queries without adequate separation between user input and SQL syntax. The precise database operations and authentication requirements are not established by the available description.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remote web request to the Admin Search Pages functionality - Required access: The endpoint must be reachable, with any required
authentication or authorization determined by the deployment
- Trigger point: Processing of the customer_name, voucher_no, or emp_name
request parameters in admin/customer_search.php
- Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input may influence SQL
statement structure when query construction does not consistently use
parameterized handling
- Attack surface: Remote web request to the Admin Search Pages functionality - Required access: The endpoint must be reachable, with any required
authentication or authorization determined by the deployment
- Trigger point: Processing of the customer_name, voucher_no, or emp_name
request parameters in admin/customer_search.php
- Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input may influence SQL
statement structure when query construction does not consistently use
parameterized handling
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an injection flaw in which externally supplied search values can be interpreted as part of a database query rather than solely as data. This maps primarily to CWE-89, SQL Injection, and is also related to CWE-74, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component. The insecure pattern generally involves concatenating request values into SQL or applying incomplete escaping instead of using prepared statements and well-defined parameter binding.
The underlying bug is an injection flaw in which externally supplied search values can be interpreted as part of a database query rather than solely as data. This maps primarily to CWE-89, SQL Injection, and is also related to CWE-74, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component. The insecure pattern generally involves concatenating request values into SQL or applying incomplete escaping instead of using prepared statements and well-defined parameter binding.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read unauthorized database records
- An attacker could modify or delete application data
- Sensitive customer, voucher, employee, or administrative information may be exposed
- Database availability may be affected
- Broader compromise could occur if the database account or environment has excessive privileges
- An attacker may read unauthorized database records
- An attacker could modify or delete application data
- Sensitive customer, voucher, employee, or administrative information may be exposed
- Database availability may be affected
- Broader compromise could occur if the database account or environment has excessive privileges
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on using parameterized queries or prepared statements for every affected database operation and treating all request parameters as untrusted data. Input validation should enforce expected types, lengths, and formats as a defense-in-depth measure rather than as a substitute for query parameterization. Secure-by-default data-access abstractions can reduce direct SQL construction, while least-privilege database accounts, restricted database connectivity, and limited application permissions reduce potential impact. Centralized query handling and consistent error responses can further reduce exposure of database details.
Mitigation generally centers on using parameterized queries or prepared statements for every affected database operation and treating all request parameters as untrusted data. Input validation should enforce expected types, lengths, and formats as a defense-in-depth measure rather than as a substitute for query parameterization. Secure-by-default data-access abstractions can reduce direct SQL construction, while least-privilege database accounts, restricted database connectivity, and limited application permissions reduce potential impact. Centralized query handling and consistent error responses can further reduce exposure of database details.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection may include static analysis for string concatenation or interpolation of request parameters into SQL calls, code review of search handlers and data access layers, and policy checks requiring prepared statements. Dynamic testing can monitor representative search inputs for unexpected query behavior and database errors, while application and database logs can be reviewed for anomalous query patterns. Automated code review or software composition and security analysis tools may help identify related injection paths.
Detection may include static analysis for string concatenation or interpolation of request parameters into SQL calls, code review of search handlers and data access layers, and policy checks requiring prepared statements. Dynamic testing can monitor representative search inputs for unexpected query behavior and database errors, while application and database logs can be reviewed for anomalous query patterns. Automated code review or software composition and security analysis tools may help identify related injection paths.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
